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Nietzsche's Free Spirit Works

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Abbreviations of Nietzsche's Works

BT	1872	*The Birth of Tragedy*
FEI	1872	*Future of our Educational Institutions*
TL	1873	*Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense*
UM	1873–1876	*Untimely Meditations*
DS	1873	*David Strauss, the Confessor and Writer*
HL	1874	*The Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life*
SE	1874	*Schopenhauer as Educator*
RWB	1876	*Richard Wagner in Bayreuth*
HH	1878	*Human, All Too Human I*
HH II	1879	*Human, All Too Human II*
AOM	1879	*Assorted Opinions and Maxims*
WS	1880	*The Wanderer and His Shadow*
D	1881	*Daybreak*
GS	1882	*Gay Science*
Z	1883–1885	*Thus Spoke Zarathustra*
BGE	1886	*Beyond Good and Evil*
GM	1887	*The Genealogy of Morals*
CW	1888	*The Case of Wagner*
TI	1888	*Twilight of the Idols*
AC	1888	*The Antichrist*
EH	1888	*Ecce Homo*
NCW	1888	*Nietzsche contra Wagner*
DD	1888	*Dionysus-Dithyrambs*

Introduction

Matthew Dennis and David Rowthorn

Ruth Abbey was on safe ground in 2000 when she bemoaned the near total neglect of Nietzsche's middle period – his so-called 'Free Spirit works' – in her monograph on the subject.[1] Today the situation has changed so radically, however, that she would surely temper her claim. Over the last decade Nietzsche scholars have devoted ever more attention either to the period itself (1878–1882) or to its most salient themes (development in scientific methods, self-cultivation, the virtues, Hellenism, and – of course – the Free Spirit). While Nietzsche scholarship in the Anglophone world continues to be dominated by the later-period texts, since Abbey's pioneering study went to press, scholarly interest in Nietzsche's middle period has increased exponentially.

Despite this recent surge of interest, the contributions to this volume of *Pli* make it clear that more scholarly work on the middle period is needed, especially since such work can give rise to illuminating (if not disquieting) results. In the contributions that follow, we discover not so much a transitionary Nietzsche, but rather an autonomous thinker possessing an alternative philosophical agenda and conceptual vocabulary to the one that comes to define his later work. Not only does examining the middle period tell us much about the provenance of Nietzsche's later concepts and the gestation of his ideas through the late 1870s and early 1880s, it also shows that his middle-period persona deserves (and demands) to be taken seriously in its own right.

[1] Ruth Abbey, *Nietzsche's Middle Period* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

The Free Spirit – perhaps Nietzsche's most compelling sketch of an ethical ideal – is the product of a radical project of breaking with tradition and pursuing new horizons of knowledge. For this task, *Redlichkeit* ('integrity' or 'honesty'), both in relation to oneself and to others, is crucial. Carol Diethe opens the issue with her translation of key *Nachlass* fragments on this theme. The translation is introduced by Keith Ansell-Pearson, who gives it valuable historical and philosophical context. The fragments reveal a Nietzsche keen to stoke the passion for knowledge in his readers and equip them with the intellectual virtues required for a great new cultural project.

Christa Davis Acampora takes this up with her discussion of negative freedom, i.e. freedom *from* age-old traditions and metaphysical illusions, which can only come about through the pursuit of knowledge. Acampora makes clear, however, that negative freedom in the Nietzschean sense is exhibited neither by those contemporaries of Nietzsche that claimed to be 'free thinkers', nor by those who cannot endure long bouts of solitude. Acampora distinguishes these ideas from the specific kind of negative freedom which interests Nietzsche. But she goes further than this by exploring the positive conception of freedom contained in the ideal of the Free Spirit. This is a freedom *for* whatever opportunities and challenges the future of humankind might present.

The two moments of breaking with the old and preparing for the new form the foundation of Jonathan Cohen's paper, which argues that *Gay Science* represents an advance on and rethinking of the core of *Human, All Too Human*. This builds on his in-depth 2010 study of that earlier text.[2] In the last text of his middle period, Nietzsche loosens the reigns on his destructive project of undermining ingrained metaphysics and sets out to formulate his alternative. In *Gay Science*, we see the Free Spirit being gradually replaced with the forward-looking, forward-thinking philosophers of the future, who play such an important role in Nietzsche's later work.

The name *Gay Science* gives us a clue to part of what defines Nietzsche's new project, namely that it will strive for more than a disinterested appraisal of nature. Instead, it will be a deeply affective and personal way to model one's entire life; its central mood will be joy. Rebecca Bamford's

[2]Jonathan Cohen, *Science, Culture, and Free Spirits: A Study of Nietzsche's Human, All-Too-Human* (New York: Prometheus, 2010).

paper shows, however, that mood forms a key part of Nietzsche's 'science' even in *Daybreak*. Mood helps to, among other things, displace the morality of custom, and, in service of this end, Nietzsche's writing is designed to invoke an affective response.

The next paper sees Katia Hay and Herman Siemens engaged in a dialogue that delves deeper into the notion of a gay science by exploring its moments of seriousness and laughter. Here, mood is tied to the idea of a *zu Hause*, an 'at-home', and of wandering from one's home. This presents the Free Spirit not as radically sceptical or alienated, but as partaking in a freedom that includes an awareness of the conditions of one's freedom, namely one's origins. In its latter stages, the dialogue builds on its early poetic descriptions of Nietzsche's own nomadic existence by presenting a way to understand gay science as a philosophically substantive endeavour.

Gay science, then, is not a disinterested pursuit of knowledge, but a deeply emotionally invested one. Thomas Ryan and Micheal Ure see this decision to embrace the extremes of suffering and joy as defining Nietzsche's advance over Stoicism. The latter sought to cure existential problems by retreating from existence, but this only served to limit the potential for humans to learn new ways of dealing with that existence affirmatively and even joyously. Nietzsche, unlike the Stoics, encourages experimentation with ways of living, even if such experimentation involves an essentially bipolar existence.

Simon Scott opens by agreeing with Ryan and Ure about Nietzsche's position relative to the Stoics. Given that we are choosing to live with, rather than suppress, the passions, he goes on to explain, we are committed, as philosophers and scientists, to understanding the passions. Scott breaks down some of Nietzsche's comments in *Daybreak* to begin to shed light on the role and nature of the passions in his philosophy. Scott, like Ryan and Ure, repeatedly situates Nietzsche relative to the Ancient philosophers, who had such a strong influence on him.

Ruth Abbey's paper is an extended engagement with the only other major book on the middle period, Paul Franco's *Nietzsche's Enlightenment*, published in 2011.[3] The paper turns on the question of whether we should treat the middle-period works as continuous (the 'lumping' approach)

[3]Paul Franco, *Nietzsche's Enlightenment: The Free-Spirit Trilogy of the Middle Period* (London: University of Chicago Press, 2011).

or as discrete, self-contained wholes (the 'separation' approach). Abbey puts pressure on Franco's endorsement of the latter, claiming that either approach yields roughly similar interpretative conclusions. The onus, she claims, is on the separation approach to defend its claim to interpretive superiority. This is a paper that will fuel an important debate among those seeking to get a grip on these often cryptic works as a whole. Abbey concludes her paper by calling for more cumulative debate on the middle period, debate of the kind found in discussions of Nietzsche's later works. Agreeing on an approach to the works as a whole is an important step in this direction.

One of the key cumulative debates to be found in the aforementioned literature on the later works revolves around the question of Nietzsche's commitment to naturalism. Frank Chouraqui enters this debate, bringing analytic rigour to bear on Brian Leiter's recent paper, *Nietzsche's Naturalism Reconsidered*.[4] Chouraqui sees Leiter as facing a range of problems that can be solved with a conception of naturalism that Chouraqui sees in book 5 of *Daybreak*. Central to this naturalism is the idea that nature is determined by our interpretive activity and cannot, therefore, be treated as a fixed standard by which to measure our theories. This paper shows that the middle period can contribute to debates that already have momentum in Nietzsche studies more generally.

The issue concludes with a discussion between the editors and one of the most highly respected non-Anglophone Nietzsche scholars: Werner Stegmaier. Stegmaier provides a valuable additional perspective on Nietzsche and Nietzsche scholarship. He puts pressure on the idea of delineating a 'middle period', something that Abbey also addresses. He also comments on an issue that is seldom discussed, especially in print, namely the gulf between Anglophone and non-Anglophone Nietzsche scholarship.

We believe that these contributions will deepen understanding and interest in the middle period. We are delighted to include so many middle-period specialists, and would like to thank them for their generosity in contributing to this project. Many of the contributors to the volume participated in Keith Ansell-Pearson's workshop-conference series on the Free Spirit, which ran from 2012 to 2013, and which initiated conversations

[4]Brian Leiter, 'Nietzsche's Naturalism Reconsidered,' chap. 25 in *The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche*, ed. Ken Gemes and John Richardson (Oxford University Press, 2009).

for the first time between many scholars working in this area. On behalf of the postgraduate community here at Warwick, we would like to express our thanks to Keith for organising these truly wonderful events, as well as to Simon Scott for ensuring that they ran so smoothly. Most importantly, however, we would like to thank Keith for his unceasing enthusiasm and support, and for his guidance while we executed the project.

Pli 25 (2014)

Nietzsche on Integrity

Select Nachlass *Fragments from 1880–1881*

Translated by Carol Diethe
with an introduction by Keith Ansell-Pearson

Introduction

These notes from 1880–1881 provide valuable, if enigmatic, insight into two conceptions that are at the heart of Nietzsche's intellectual project in his middle period: (a) the notion of *Redlichkeit* or integrity; and (b) the idea of the passion of knowledge. The final sketches of a notebook for the autumn of 1880 indicate that Nietzsche planned a work on *Redlichkeit*: he writes of its history and its passion, '*Passio nova* oder Von der Leidenschaft der Redlichkeit' (*KSA* 9:6[461]; see also *KSA* 9:6[457–459]). This is the virtue that in *Daybreak* is said to be our youngest virtue (*D* 456). For one commentator the 'art of intellectual integrity' is, in fact, the basic method of Nietzsche's thinking,[1] and his 'entire philosophy may be regarded as a *Bildung der Redlichkeit*'.[2] Furthermore, *Redlichkeit* can be conceived as Nietzsche's most open and dynamic concept (*D* 261). Another commentator argues that Nietzsche's understanding of *Redlichkeit*, with its semantic overtones of frank speech, was 'flavored both by his understanding of the flourishing of *parrhêsia* in the ancient world … and of its incarnation in

[1] Wilhelm S. Wurzer, 'Nietzsche's Dialectic of Intellectual Integrity: A Propaedeutic Study,' *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 13, no. 2 (1975): p. 236.
[2] Wilhelm S. Wurzer, 'Nietzsche's Hermeneutic of *Redlichkeit*,' *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 14, no. 3 (1983): p. 259.

the French classical moralists, above all in Montaigne'.[3] What is essential to the Nietzschean conception and appreciation of *Redlichkeit* is an honest acknowledgement of the unpleasant and inconvenient aspects of reality or nature.[4] The way Foucault describes *parrhêsia* captures well, I think, a key aspect of Nietzsche's philosophical practice: 'The word ... refers to a type of relationship between the speaker and what he says. For in *parrhêsia*, the speaker makes it manifestly clear and obvious that what he says is his *own* opinion ... The fact that a speaker says something dangerous – different to what the majority believes – is a strong indication that he is a *parrhesiastes*'.[5]

Nietzsche first writes of the passion of knowledge (*Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis*) in his published writings in *D*. In aphorism 429 of the text he notes that the drive to knowledge has become so strongly rooted in us that we cannot now want happiness without knowledge. Knowledge has become a deep-rooted passion that shrinks at no sacrifice. Indeed, such is now our passion for knowledge that even the prospect of humanity perishing of this passion does not exert any real influence on us. What is the character of Nietzsche's investment in the passion of knowledge? What hopes and expectations did he have with respect to practices of knowledge? One thing is for sure: with his attachment to the passion of knowledge Nietzsche wanted to become a different kind of philosopher to his mentor Schopenhauer, one less hemmed in by the fears and frailties of personality and genuinely open to the world. Unlike Schopenhauer, Nietzsche will not cling to the need of metaphysics and the need for a metaphysical system. His primary commitment is to 'experimentation' in which the love of knowledge gives humanity the right to self-experimentation. He invites us to replace the dream of immortality with a new sobriety toward existence, as this aphorism makes clear: 'With regard to knowledge [*Erkenntniss*] the most useful accomplishment is perhaps: that the belief in the immortality of the soul has been abandoned. Now humanity is allowed to wait; now it no longer needs to rush headlong into things and choke

[3]Melissa Lane, 'Honesty as the Best Policy: Nietzsche on *Redlichkeit* and the Contrast between Stoic and Epicurean Strategies of the Self,' in *Histories of Postmodernism*, ed. Jill Hargis and Sara Rushing (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 27.
[4]Ibid., p. 41.
[5]Michel Foucault, *Fearless Speech*, ed. Joseph Pearson (Los Angeles: Semiotext, 2001), pp. 12, 15.

down half-examined ideas as formerly it was forced to do. For in those days the salvation of poor 'eternal souls' depended on the extent of their knowledge acquired during a short lifetime; they had to *make a decision* overnight – 'knowledge' took on a dreadful importance' (*D* 501). Nietzsche argues that we are now in a new situation with regard to knowledge and as a result we can conquer anew our courage for making mistakes, for experimentation, and for accepting things provisionally. Without the sanction of the old moralities and religions individuals and entire generations, 'can now fix their eyes on tasks of a vastness that would to earlier ages have seemed madness' (*D* 501).

Nietzsche places the passion of knowledge in the service of a philosophical project that aims at disabusing humanity of its consoling fictions and encouraging it to pursue new truths and a new kind of philosophical wisdom. The task is to break with accustomed habits of knowing and perceiving, so that one has the chance to become something different than what one's history has conditioned one to be, to think and perceive differently. For Foucault this gives us, in fact, a definition of philosophical activity today, which consists in the critical work that thought brings to bear on itself. Instead of legitimating what is already known, the task is to think differently, and this is an essential part of philosophical activity conceived as an *askēsis*.[6]

– Keith Ansell-Pearson

Select *Nachlass* Fragments: 1880–1881

Notebook 6

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My **task**: to sublimate all drives so that the perception of the strange goes a long way but is still linked to pleasure: the drive for integrity towards

[6]Michel Foucault, *The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality*, trans. Robert Hurley, vol. 2 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985), p. 9.

myself, justice towards things, being so strong that its *joy* outweighs the value of other forms of pleasure, and those are necessarily sacrificed to it either wholly or in part. True, there is no experience without involvement, it would be complete boredom. But the *gentlest* emotion would suffice.

130

The intellect is the tool of our drives and nothing more, it is *never free*. It sharpens itself in the struggle with various drives, and refines the activity of each individual drive thereby. The will to power, to the infallibility of our person, resides in our greatest justice and integrity: scepticism just applies to all authority, we do not want to be duped, not even by *our drives*! But what does not *want*? A drive, certainly!

166

Integrity with regard to property prompts us to say that we are a complete assemblage of loot, and that we thereby feel things in an all too blunt and coarse manner. The individual has false pride in regard to material and colours: but he can *paint a new picture* to the delight of the connoisseur – with that, *he makes reparation for his assault on worldly possessions*. Viewing our existence as though we had done something to achieve it – *not as 'debt'* but as an advance and debts! We live off everything, it is right, therefore, to give back something to provide food for all. (Christ was not faddish regarding this feeling, he shared what others had thought before him as though he owned it.)

203

Not that we want to help and be useful to the human: no, *the fact that we enjoy humans* is the essence of the so-called good human and of morality. It is a novelty, a latecomer. Our 'good deeds' are to be taken for granted with regard to this enjoyment: if we do not fear or alienate them and relate to them in innumerable ways, they can be nothing other than those calculated to increase our enjoyment of them, i.e. we take the trouble to promote their striving for stylised individuality, in order to at least remove the prospect of the ugly (suffering). Love towards humans?? but I say: joy

in the human! And to prevent this being ridiculous, we have to help to provide what gives us joy. – As you see: integrity on our part and the recognition of an unfamiliar phenomenon, the development of taste, which needs to see *beautiful, joyful* humans, must lead the way. This is where a *selection* takes place: we seek out those who provide us with enjoyment and assist us and flee from the others – that is the right morality! *Extinguishing* the miserable deformed degenerates must be the trend! Do not support them at any price! Nice though the belief in mercy towards those who are unworthy and help for the wicked and weak might be – it is an exception, on the whole, and on the whole it would turn people nasty (as in Christianity, for example). It is a case of always building on natural drives: 'to create pleasure for those who please us and suffering for those who annoy us'. We stamp out the wild animals and we breed and tame: that is a great instinct. We *ourselves deteriorate* at the sight of the ugly and contact with it; build a dam! Level it into a commodity! And so on.

If we just consort with those who please and uplift us, groups and classes will form which in their turn occupy an alienated position, close or remote, in just such a case. This is *very good*, a necessary construction by society, out of integrity!

234

We all share drives with animals: our increase in integrity makes us less dependent on the stimulus of these drives. This very integrity is the result of intellectual work, namely when two opposing drives set the intellect into motion. With regard to a thing or person, memory introduces us by means of a new affect of the imagination, which this thing or this <person> aroused in us by means of another affect: and there, *different* qualities appear which, taken as a whole, is *one* step towards integrity, in other words, to hold it against him whom we now hate that we once loved him and compare his former image that we used to have to the present one, soothingly balancing out the present one. Wisdom *demands* this: for without that, we would take our hatred too far and place ourselves in danger. Basis of integrity: we grant the images of the *same* things a right in ourselves!

381

I find Schopenhauer somewhat superficial in psychological matters, he neither enjoyed himself much nor suffered much; a thinker should beware of *becoming harsh*: where would he get his material from then. His passion for knowledge was *not big* enough for him to suffer on its behalf: he barricaded himself in. His pride, too, was greater than his thirst for knowledge, in revoking, he feared for his reputation.

Notebook 7

19

Plan

Ch 1. We believe it is the opposite of passion: but it feels good and therefore we begin a struggle with the passions in favour of reason and justice. We innocents!

Ch 2. We suddenly discover that it carries all the signs of passion itself. The perception causes us to suffer, we strive after the untroubled early morning light of the wise. But we guess: even this light is *passionate movement*, yet sublimated, unrecognisable for clodhoppers.

Ch 3. We seek to withdraw from the yoke, we succumb to other passions (art). We seek to kill them by dissection, by deducing their origin. In doing so, we discover *how* it is that passions develop, *how* they work, *how they are ennobled and take effect*.

Ch 4. The reaction from outside begins: everything we hold against this ourselves in order to free ourselves, all our errors, turn against upon us from outside, like a breakup with friends, and so on. It is a new and unknown passion. Its gloomy bliss! It lets us bear it! It produces solitude, it reveals the thinkers to us!

40

I do not think that integrity towards oneself is something so absolutely lofty and clean: but in this, I feel we need cleanliness. A person can be whosoever he wishes, genius or actor – but he must be clean! (H. Heine had something clean about him.)

53

I am not in a position to acknowledge anything great which is not connected to *integrity towards oneself*; playacting towards oneself fills me with horror: if I discover something of the sort, I do not hold any great achievements as valid; I know they have this playacting everywhere and at the deepest base. – On the other hand, I understand external playacting (e.g. Napoleon's): probably many people find it necessary – which is a form of ignorance.

165

People have warbled on to me about the serene happiness of knowledge – but I have not found it, indeed, I despise it, now I know the bliss of unhappiness of knowledge. Am I therefore bored? Always anxious, heart throbbing with expectation or disappointment! I bless this misery, it enriches the world thereby! In doing so, I take the slowest of strides and slurp down these bittersweet delicacies.

I no longer want any knowledge without danger: let there always be the treacherous sea or the merciless high mountains around the seeker of knowledge.

171

Yes, we shall be destroyed by this passion! But that is not an argument against it. Otherwise, death would be an argument against the life of an individual. We *must* be destroyed, as humans and as humankind! Christianity showed the only way, through extinction and the denial of all coarse drives. Through the renunciation of action, of hatred of loving, we get to that point on the path of passion for knowledge. Contented *spectators* – until nothing more is to be seen! Despise us for that reason, you who act! We

mass for the *use* and *direction* of which individuals ***compete***. It is a *piece of mastery over nature*: above all, nature must be acknowledged, then *directed* and *used*. – Would my *goal* be knowledge once again? to place a quantity of power in the service of knowledge?

69

The passion for knowledge sees *itself* as *purpose* of existence – if it denies the purposes, it sees itself as the most *valuable result* of all accidents. Will it deny the value? It cannot claim to **be** the highest pleasure? But to *search* for **that**? To design the being *most capable of pleasure*, as means and task of this passion? To heighten the senses and the pride, and the thirst etc.

To descend a mountain, to embrace the area with one's eyes, all with unquenched desire. Passionate lovers who do not know how to reach *union* (– as with Lucretius) The one who knows *demands* union with things and sees himself as *separate* – that is his passion. Everything should either be dispersed in knowledge or he disperses himself in things – that is his tragedy (the latter, his death and its *pathos*). The former is his striving to *make* everything into intellect –: a *pleasure* to conquer matter, to make it evaporate, to violate it etc. Enjoyment of the atomistic of mathematical points. *Greed*!

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Pli 25 (2014)

In What Senses are Free Spirits Free?[1]

Christa Davis Acampora

My broadest claim in this article is, unsurprisingly, that there are multiple senses of freedom associated with the *freedom* of the free spirit. These include both positive and negative senses – that is, when describing how free spirits are *free*, Nietzsche sometimes characterises this as *freedom to* do something, and sometimes as *freedom from* certain kinds of constraints. In this article, I do not aim to provide an exhaustive catalogue of the different senses invoked in Nietzsche's 'free spirit' texts. Instead, I wish to highlight some particular senses, including some that are less frequently discussed in the scholarly literature and account for how these differing senses are related, including some puzzling ideas that Nietzsche appears to hold regarding how these different senses might be realisable simultaneously. In thinking through this, I believe, we are presented with ideas that bear on Nietzsche's views about freedom more generally.

[1]This text originated as a presentation at the Warwick Nietzsche Workshop: The Philosophy of the Free Spirit, March 2012. I gratefully acknowledge the support of the British Academy, the University of Warwick Philosophy Department, and Keith Ansell Pearson, the workshop organiser. I also developed some of the ideas here in discussion with audiences at Stony Brook University and those in attendance at the *Nietzsche in Assos* conference in Assos, Turkey, July 2013.

1. What are Free Spirits Free From? A Sense of Negative Freedom in Nietzsche

We can begin with one of the most obvious senses of freedom of the free spirit, and perhaps one that at least some people think of as the primary (or, even exclusive) sense in which free spirits are free: namely, in terms of being *free from* certain claims of society, particularly those regarded as customary and binding. As Nietzsche begins to develop the notion of the free spirit in those works designated as part of a series on the free spirit, Nietzsche carefully works through how customs claim – as well as make possible – individuals. This binding force is exploited by morality, which has a variety of tactics for shaping and moulding both the psychic and physical forms of human existence. In this respect, morality makes a particular kind of common life possible while it establishes terms for distinction that make one recognisable as an individual, either through exceptional realisation of the positively esteemed way of life or by virtue of one standing out from it.

At times, the freedom of the free spirit is at least partially constituted by his or her (or perhaps *its* – if we don't think free spirits are actual people or even a type of person but rather spiritual forms that can be realised at various times and to various degrees) ability to loosen, if not escape, these bonds. Nietzsche sometimes talks about this feature as a step, sometimes as an initial or at least early stage in a developmental process of becoming a free spirit,[2] and later he designates some as 'free, very free spirits' (*BGE* 44). Free spirits are contrasted in Nietzsche's texts and in the scholarly literature with various kinds of so-called 'fettered spirits'. The free spirits are envisioned by Nietzsche as not *bound* to the morality of custom, convention, superstition, or even morality itself and the habits of thinking (or not thinking) and valuing that characterise such views. Free spirits are, minimally, free of *this*. In short, they have a certain kind of independence that fettered spirits lack.

One form of such independence that Nietzsche repeatedly emphasises is independence or freedom from association: solitude, being able to withstand a lack of human companionship. There are quite a few passages in

[2]For a developmental account of the free spirit, particularly in relation to Nietzsche's views about science and culture, see Jonathan Cohen, *Science, Culture, and Free Spirits: A Study of Nietzsche's Human, All-Too-Human* (New York: Prometheus, 2010).

which solitude is described in a sense that suggests at least one of the ways Nietzsche conceives it is in terms of being free *from* (so we have another negative sense of freedom), the demands of others, being free from obligations, associations, and their influences.

This is particularly evident in *Beyond Good and Evil* in the final section of the part titled 'Der Freie Geist':

> At home, or at least having been guests, in many countries of the spirit; having escaped again and again from the musty agreeable nooks into which preference and prejudice, youth, origin, the accidents of people and books or even exhaustion from wandering seemed to have banished us; full of malice against the lures of dependence that lie hidden in honours, or money, or offices, or enthusiasms of the senses; ... we are born, sworn, jealous friends of *solitude*, of our own most profound, most midnightly, most middaily solitude: that is the type of man we are, we free spirits![3]

And further, in *The Genealogy of Morals*, where Nietzsche writes:

> Every philosopher would speak as Buddha did when he was told of the birth of a son: 'Rahula has been born to me, a fetter has been forged for me' (Rahula here means 'a little demon'); every 'free spirit' would experience a thoughtful moment, supposing he had previously experienced a thoughtless one, of the kind that once came to the same Buddha – 'narrow and oppressive', he thought to himself, 'is life in a house, a place of impurity; freedom lies in leaving the house': 'thinking thus, he left the house'. (*GM* I.7)

This is obviously not the only purpose or benefit of solitude as Nietzsche sees it, and it is a topic that warrants its own discussion, but it is certainly an evident strand in Nietzsche's thinking about the respect in which the

[3]Citations of Nietzsche's *Beyond Good and Evil* and *On the Genealogy of Morals* are drawn from Walter Kaufmann's translation of *BGE* (New York: Vintage Books, 1966) and Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale's translation of *GM* in *On the Genealogy of Morals* and *Ecce Homo* (New York: Vintage Books, 1967).

free spirit is free. Free spirits to some extent appear to be negatively free of others, communally and individually.

If we look at how Nietzsche compares and contrasts free spirits with fettered ones, as Bernard Reginster does in his article on Nietzsche and fanaticism,[4] then we see that the free spirits are also free from a certain kind of relationship to truth. To be sure, they care very much about the truth, and this motivates what they question and how. But they have a somewhat different relation to truth. This suggests, if the analysis holds, that free spirits are free in ways that might differ from their free-thinking Enlightenment counterparts. For they, too, certainly prized truth and also might be thought to value 'thinking for oneself' in ways which, on the face of it, would appear congenial to Nietzsche's views, but Nietzsche is quite clear that his free spirits are distinctive. We see this quite clearly in *BGE* 25, where Nietzsche points to Bruno, and by implication to Nietzsche's own contemporary free thinkers who idealise him as their forefather. Bruno (1548–1600) is the sort of figure who we might imagine would have appealed to Nietzsche. Bruno was martyred for his support of the ideas of Copernicus. He was shunned from nearly every academic community on account of his opposition to Aristotle; he advanced the view that the world was eternal and ever-changing, and he anticipated a theory of relativity in his arguments against Aristotle's notions of opposites: 'There is no absolute up or down, as Aristotle taught; no absolute position in space; but the position of a body is relative to that of other bodies. Everywhere there is incessant relative change in position throughout the universe, and the observer is always at the center of things'.[5] In a play he wrote, which evokes themes of satyr plays, Bruno features the 'ass of Cyllene', which skewers superstition. The 'ass' is everywhere, not only in the church at the time of the ass festival (and at other times) but also in all other public institutions, including the courts and the schools.[6] Bruno was a sceptic, particularly about theological matters where scientific reasoning offered evidence that

[4]Bernhard Reginster, 'What is a Free Spirit?: Nietzsche on fanaticism,' *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 85, no. 1 (2003): 51–85.

[5]Jennifer Michael Hecht, *Doubt: A history* (New York: Harper Collins, 2003), p. 294.

[6]Kathleen Marie Higgins, 'Nietzsche and the Mystery of the Ass,' in *A Nietzschean Bestiary: Becoming Animal Beyond Docile and Brutal*, ed. Christa Davis Acampora and Ralph R Acampora (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 100–119.

contradicts matters of faith, and he was an advocate of free thought.

It would seem that Bruno would be a good model for a free spirit. And he was – but *not* the sort that Nietzsche appears to be advocating. Bruno was an icon for the 'free thinkers' (*Freiedenken*) movement, with which Nietzsche explicitly contrasts his free spirits in *BGE* 44. Some context related to the composition of the text is helpful. Nietzsche finished *BGE* in early summer 1885. During the period when he was writing the text he spent time in Venice, a home of Bruno. While Nietzsche was in Venice, a group of notable figures formed an international committee to erect a monument to Bruno on the site of his execution in Rome. The committee included Victor Hugo (cf. *TI* 'Skirmishes' 1), Herbert Spencer, Ernest Renan (cf. *TI* 'Skirmishes' 2), Ernst Haeckel, Henrik Ibsen, and Ferdinand Gregorovius. So if we want to know who it is that Nietzsche targets when he talks about the wrong kind of free spirits, we might explore these. The statue of Bruno was eventually erected in 1889.

At least part of Nietzsche's opposition to his contemporary free thinkers, particularly those who take Bruno as an icon, focuses on the fact that the martyrs to truth evince a kind of unconditionality that ultimately imprisons, fetters perhaps, with even more grave consequences than those who otherwise shirk Enlightenment ideals. Truth at any price – even when used to oppose superstition and the Christianised worldview – might be thought to replace one god with another. It seems clear that Nietzsche thinks his own free spirits are also free from this, or they at least strive to be such – they are oriented toward a kind of *freedom from unconditionality*, including – perhaps especially – with respect to their valuation of truth.

There are two features of this idea of freedom-from-unconditionality that I wish to underscore in characterising the freedom of the free spirit. Negatively, the free spirit is detached from a particular commitment to truth – in advance of and even in the face of some reasons to believe otherwise. The free spirit is free from *compromising* commitment. But there is still more to be done in order to clarify just what it is that might be compromised in the absence of such independence, something to which I return below when examining some of the positive senses in which free spirits are free. In addition to being free from such commitment, Nietzsche's free spirit is free from a certain kind of accompanying feeling – namely, that linked with a need to produce the feeling of power in this unusual way, even

to the point of extinction as those who are martyred for it. Reginster argues for this view: namely, figures Nietzsche regards as fettered spirits (particularly the so-called free spirits Nietzsche anticipates replacing), draw a sense of their own power from their subjection to the immensely binding force of unconditional commitment. By tying themselves to the unconditional valuation of truth, they gather a sense of themselves as joining or being a part of such manifestations of power. Yet another characterisation of a negative sense of freedom for the free spirits is that they are *free from* this particular need, to produce the feeling of power (which Nietzsche thinks all beings seek) in this particular way.

At the same time that this condition might be thought of as liberating, it presents us as readers of Nietzsche with a bit more trouble. Since all beings strive for and take pleasure in the feeling of power, it remains to be seen how Nietzsche's free spirits actually do pursue and experience this feeling, if not through binding themselves to unconditional commitments, and consider whether the alternative bears any structural resemblance to that associated with the fettered or 'so-called' free spirits. Put more simply, and Reginster does not explore this, I wonder whether the relation between freedom and unfreedom that characterises the experience of power for the so-called free spirit is structurally similar in the case of Nietzsche's free spirit. The particular kind of fettered spirit we are considering in this case unconditionally binds himself to truth, and in so doing (by becoming bound) he realises and finds his freedom or at least an indicator of his freedom. Is Nietzsche's free spirit simply unbound in a way that the so-called free spirit is not? All of these ways in which the free spirit is *free from* – the ways in which the free spirit has freedom in a negative sense – might appear to suggest as much, but there are positive senses of freedom that the free spirit realises or to which it aspires, and I will suggest that these perhaps similarly require certain kinds of binding as well.

2. Positive Senses of Freedom for Free Spirits

In the discussion of negative freedom of free spirits, I underscored their independence, a feature Nietzsche repeatedly emphasises, and I explored some of the things in relation to which the free spirit is independent. I now wish to look more closely at a key passage in which Nietzsche describes this

feature of free spirits to enquire precisely about that from which the free spirits are free. Looking for this source negatively also provides some clues about the positive sense. Here too Nietzsche's conception of independence gains some complexity and subtlety that require more reflection than what is sometimes found in the secondary literature. The passage is *BGE* 41, still in the section on 'The Free Spirit', where Nietzsche writes:

> One has to test oneself to see that one is destined for independence and command – and do it at the right time. One should not dodge one's tests, though they may be the most dangerous game one could play and are tests that are taken in the end before no witness or judge but ourselves.

There are many questions that arise here, but I want to focus on the term translated here as 'independence': *Unabhängigkeit*.[7] Literally, this is a state or condition of being unattached. But simply *unattached* might suggest something a bit too casual. I think a stronger translation in the English is warranted, and this stronger sense facilitates a somewhat different understanding of the *kind* of independence Nietzsche is talking about here. *Auf Deutsch*, *Abhängigkeit* is the term used for dependence, so it is clear how *Unabhängigkeit* yields an appropriate translation as 'independence': the 'un' negates the 'dependence'. *Unabhängigkeit* is a negative condition: to be not in a state of dependence. While *Abhängigkeit* can be used to talk about dependence in a positive sense of cooperation, is it also used to describe another specific kind of dependence that was becoming an object of increasingly intense scrutiny both culturally and biologically in Nietzsche's day, namely the kind of dependence found in contexts of *addiction*. I think a stronger sense akin (if not a direct reference) to the connotations associated with the immensely powerful pull that addiction commands is appropriate to the context of Nietzsche's concern.

Earlier in *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche links independence, when attempted by those who are unprepared for it, with the story of Theseus and

[7] This passage is discussed in its context, elaborating some of the same points below, in Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil: A Reader's Guide, which I co-authored with Keith Ansell-Pearson (New York: Continuum, 2012).

the minotaur, a theme that is echoed at the end of the book.[8] In *BGE* 29, Nietzsche writes:

> Independence is for the very few; it is a privilege of the strong. And whoever attempts it even with the best right but without inner constraint proves that it is probably not only strong, but also daring to the point of recklessness. He enters a labyrinth, he multiplies a thousandfold the dangers which life brings with it in any case, not the least of which is that no one can see how and where he loses his way, becomes lonely, and is torn piecemeal by some minotaur of conscience. Supposing one like that comes to grief, this happens so far from the comprehension of men that they neither feel it nor sympathise. And he cannot go back any longer. Nor can he go back to the pity of men. –

The German in this case is 'Unabhängig zu sein', to be unattached. And this passage is also related to the earlier concern about solitude, only here Nietzsche underscores just how difficult it can be to tolerate such detachment. Clearly, he has in mind something more extreme than simply non-reliance or lack of cooperation in using this term. This condition is dissociative but it is dissociative from a state of reliance or addiction on substances that themselves induce states of dissociation. Furthermore, insofar as the root *abhang* means hang below, *unabhang* could playfully suggest a certain sort of defiance of gravity. This is an image invoked by Nietzsche in his emphasis on dancing as well as flying like a bird as in 'The Songs of Prince Vogelfrei', the appendix to *GS*, and it is at the core of Nietzsche's therapy for combating what he calls 'the spirit of gravity' in *GS* (especially sections 380 and 382) and *Z*, as mentioned below.[9] All told, independence, for Nietzsche, appears to be much more complex and potentially more significant than it might appear at first glance.

[8] Some notable discussions of Ariadne include Gilles Deleuze, 'The Mystery of Ariadne according to Nietzsche,' in *Essays Critical and Clinical*, trans. Daniel W. Smith (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); and Gary Shapiro, *Nietzschean Narratives* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989).

[9] I am grateful to Duncan Large for pointing out this connection.

Nietzsche provides greater focus and specificity about his intended meaning when he returns to some related ideas later in the final section of 'The Free Spirit' in *BGE*. In this case, Nietzsche associates free, *very free* spirits with the philosophers of the future. That is, it would appear that the philosophers of the future are free spirits, but not all free spirits are philosophers of the future. In this section, Nietzsche directly states that he wants to be as clear as possible about the nature of the free spirits so as to avoid misunderstanding and confusion of them with other varieties of free spirit advocated by those *Freidenker* and the like, mentioned above, those whom Nietzsche describes as '*levelers*'; they are:

> all human beings without solitude [*Einsamkeit*], without their own solitude [*eigne Einsamkeit*], clumsy good fellows whom one should not deny either courage or respectable decency – only they are unfree [*unfrei*] and ridiculously superficial [*zum Lachen oberflächlich sind*], above all in their basic inclination to find in the forms of the old society as it has existed so far just about the cause of *all* human misery and failure – which is a way of standing truth happily upon her head! What they would like to strive for with all their powers is the universal green-pasture happiness of the herd, with security, lack of danger, comfort, and an easier life for everyone; the two songs and doctrines which they repeat most often are 'equality of rights' and 'sympathy for all that suffers' – and suffering itself they take for something that must be *abolished*. (*BGE* 44)

By contrast, those whom Nietzsche sees as truly *free* regard that which opposes the goals of the *Freidenker*, the opposite conditions of security, safety, comfort, and ease, as conditions for growth, even flourishing: 'prolonged pressure and constraint' facilitate growth, development, and the gathering of strength and vigour. Famously – and *infamously* – Nietzsche claims certain forms of *unfreedom* condition the opposite spirit: 'We think that hardness, forcefulness, slavery, danger in the alley and the heart, life in hiding, stoicism, the art of experiment and devilry of every kind, that everything evil, terrible, tyrannical in man, everything in him that is kin to beasts of prey and serpents serves the enhancement of the species "man" as much as

its opposite does' (*BGE* 44). I will suggest below how we can see this as potentially contributing to the positive sense of freedom Nietzsche's free spirits realise and how this is related to what the free spirits are ultimately, *possibly*, able to do, but before I get to that point, I wish to take notice of a few things. Nietzsche is **not** saying that 'hardness, forcefulness, slavery', and the like are *more* life-enhancing than their opposite – rather, he claims they are enhancing *at least as much* as their opposites. This is to some extent an acknowledgement and justification (in the sense of recognition of what Nietzsche elsewhere affirms as the *innocence of becoming*) of the fullness of life, an affirmation or love of all that is, rather than just the particular aspects we especially esteem or to which we aspire at any particular moment. This, I suggest later on in the article, is an important affective orientation for the free spirit to take. It will play an important role in making it possible for Nietzsche's free spirits' detachment to not ultimately undermine them.[10]

Returning to the matter of how unfreedom, more specifically, might be necessary for or potentially in the service of freedom, we should certainly try to gain greater clarity about the matter of *whose unfreedom* serves freedom and in what respect. One possible interpretation, one not unfamiliar in the critical literature on Nietzsche and not without justification, is that Nietzsche might mean that it is necessary for *some* to be unfree in order for *others* to be free. In such a case, the unfree are sacrificed for the benefit or advantage of the freedom of those (presumably few) others who will reap the greatest benefits of the forced labour and limited opportunities of those who are enslaved. Others are simply the means to serve the end of the production of rare type who achieves unprecedented freedom. There are a good number of other passages where Nietzsche makes reference to conditions of servitude and subjection of this sort, suggesting precisely such an interpretation (as for example just a few sections later in the book where philosophers are described as exercising a 'selective and cultivating influence' placing others 'under their spell' (*BGE* 61), so I am not categorically denying that it is part of the story of Nietzsche's complicated views on

[10]For a different, but interesting, account of the significance of the affective orientation toward truth in Nietzsche with respect to its bearing on freedom, see Peter Poellner, 'Nietzschean Freedom,' in *Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy*, ed. Ken Gemes and Simon May (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 151–181.

freedom. But it is also the case that part of what Nietzsche seems to think is that *unfreedom conditions a certain kind of freedom* in the very same individuals – it is somehow important that those who would be free, perhaps especially those who would be very free, must somehow first (or perhaps in some respects simultaneously) be unfree, that, minimally, as suggested in *BGE* 29, cited above, they have an *inner constraint*. To round off this part of my discussion, I wish to focus on precisely this relation between freedom and unfreedom, which will bring us back to further exploration of what constitutes *Abhängigkeit*, dependence, of the sort from which the free spirits are free. *BGE* 41 continues and concludes with the following:

> Not to remain stuck to a person – not even the most loved – every person is a prison, also a nook. Not to remain stuck to a fatherland — not even when it suffers most and needs help most – it is less difficult to sever one's heart from a victorious fatherland. Not to remain stuck to some pity – not even for higher men into whose rare torture and helplessness some accident allowed us to look. Not to remain stuck to a science – even if it should lure us with the most precious finds that seem to have been saved up precisely for us. Not to remain stuck to one's own detachment, to that voluptuous remoteness and strangeness of the bird who flees ever higher to see ever more below him – the danger of the flier. Not to remain stuck to our own virtues and become as a whole the victim of some detail in us, such as our hospitality, which is the danger of dangers for superior and rich souls who spend themselves lavishly, almost indifferently, and exaggerate the virtue of generosity into a vice. One must know how *to conserve oneself*: the hardest test of independence.

Here, dependence is defined not merely in terms of consorting with others and so on but rather in terms of 'remaining stuck', becoming *dependent*: Not to remain stuck to a person – not even the most loved'; 'Not to remain stuck to a fatherland'. Nietzsche does not say, 'Don't love, don't bother thinking about or becoming involved with a fatherland'. Instead, he says that one who is independent in the way that free spirits are described just a few sections further on in *BGE* 44, avoids the lures of dependence.

> Is it any wonder that we 'free spirits' are not exactly the most communicative spirits? that we do not want to betray in every particular *from what* a spirit can liberate himself and *to what* he may then be driven? And as for the meaning of the dangerous formula 'beyond good and evil', with which we at least guard against being mistaken for others: we *are* something different from '*libres-penseurs*', '*liberi pensatori*', '*Freidenker*', and whatever else all these goodly advocates of 'modern ideas' like to call themselves.
>
> At home, or at least having been guests, in many countries of the spirit; having escaped again and again from the musty agreeable nooks into which preference and prejudice, youth, origin, the accidents of people and books or even exhaustion from wandering seemed to have banished us; full of malice against the lures of dependence that lie hidden in honours, or money, or offices, or enthusiasms of the senses;

Free of those sorts of attachments one can then cultivate attachments for other things to the point of gratitude:

> grateful even to need and vacillating sickness because they always rid us from some rule and its 'prejudice', grateful to god, devil, sheep, and worm in us;

Detached from the lures and preoccupations described above, one can form interests in other things, explore them:

> curious to a vice, investigators to the point of cruelty, with uninhibited fingers for the unfathomable, with teeth and stomachs for the most indigestible, ready for every feat that requires a sense of acuteness and acute senses, ready for every venture...

Free spirits are not merely free of any sort of attachment; rather, they avoid remaining stuck to such bonds – even as we have seen, *to their notion of themselves as being detached.* And this condition makes it possible for them to form other attachments, so that they are enabled to expand their range of

possible associations rather than limit it. Moreover, because of the way in which they hold their attachments, in contrast with the fettered spirits who are addicted to their attachments, the free spirits, at least as described here appear to be able to *love* in ways that a more narrow partiality might not allow. If this is a reasonable and appropriate interpretation of Nietzsche's passage here, then this provides opportunities to appreciate a distinctively affirmative dimension of Nietzsche's sense of independence and how it potentially impacts our relations with others.

Frequently in Nietzsche's texts, free spirits are described in terms of being great travellers: they associate with many different and *many different kinds of* people. This appears to be one of the ways in which they negatively avoid remaining stuck, but I think this same characteristic also positively contributes to who and what they are and what they are able to do. In these very same associations, part of what the free spirit is able to do by loosening himself from just one or several chains, is to form many more associations, develop more and more of his own resources. In being free from the limitations of the fettered spirit, free spirits are *free to become something more.* But, obviously, it is not sheer multiplicity that Nietzsche admires. Rather, he appears to think of this capacity in terms of a kind of fullness and amplitude, a bounty. I shall have more to say about this in just a moment. But before doing so, I note that one of the ways in which the free spirit *cannot* be free – because no one can be – is in the sense of having a free will, realising the classic notion of free will.

Of course, there is no single 'classic notion of free will', rather there are classical notions of free will, virtually all of which Nietzsche appears to reject. Nietzsche repeatedly and consistently rails against this view, offering as an alternative a drive psychology that explains the *experience* and *feeling of willing* as a particular perspective of a drive or set of drives in relation to the others, that is, the perspective of the commanding drive or drives that constitute us. Part of the reason why free will in this sense is not possible, Nietzsche thinks, is because he does not think there is any such thing as a will that somehow is in a relationship with other parts of the soul such that it can command. There is no separate ego or *I* behind our actions willing or directing in the background. We are organisations of drives, and there are a varieties of ways in which such organisations take shape and are

maintained.[11]

Free spirits, by virtue of the extraordinary associations that their independence facilitates, have a greater, more expansive set of resources enlivened, activated, and ready for recruitment in the organisations they are. If this is right then we can also consider the various ways in which organisations such as those the free spirits are enabled to become can be said to be free (or not). This focuses the question of the freedom of the free spirit on the relationship of its own constitutive parts or features rather than strictly on its freedom with respect to other organisations, or its political or social situation.

3. Challenging Freedom: The Difficulty of Freedom for the Free Spirits

Nietzsche creates something of a problem in explaining how the loosening of attachment and the amplification of available drives can lead to strength rather than disintegration and chaos. This seems to be precisely the kind of risk Nietzsche conjures in association of independence with the minotaur in the passage cited above. And it raises the question of how free spirits capitalise on the variety they acquire through their increased associations so that they can be said to be *enabled* by these resources rather than ruined by them.

One of the dangers associated with enlivening more of the drives and expanding their capacities by virtue of amplifying or increasing one's associations is that it may result in a situation more likely to produce conflict. Homogenisation of drives can be seen as in the service of a kind of relative peace, or at least the appearance of such through minimising conflict. The fettered soul has a dominant drive that whips into submission all the others: The drive for unconditional truth is a drive that maintains its rule in the fettered spirit by subjugating the other drives. Thus, it must always guard against losing its dominance. It is hard to describe such a person as actually free even if they have the semblance of ruling themselves. They

[11] I elaborate these ideas in various publications, most recently my Christa Davis Acampora, 'Beholding Nietzsche: 'Ecce Homo', Fate, and Freedom,' chap. 16 in *The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche*, ed. Ken Gemes and Simon May (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

might have order but there is very much in them that would seem to be unfree.

The free spirit, on the other hand, becomes an expansive multiplicity of drives,[12] and this potentially creates and nourishes more contenders for dominance in the soul. The free spirit, perhaps more than any type among Nietzsche's figures, faces certain risks, including a lack of order that would diminish rather than strengthen it. The challenge of the free spirit is to actively recruit the drives and their cooperation so that it can be free in another respect, namely *free from* certain kinds of disabling conflicts among the drives as well as *freely enabled* and fit to realise the kind of activity described above. Although he clearly articulates the need for unity in the form of 'giving style to one's character' (*GS* 290) and even suggests how one might 'combat the intensity of drives' (*D* 109), I am not sure that Nietzsche provides us with a robust account of how such unification might come about, or how it might work out the way he envisions for those who are not only free but also – perhaps stylishly – strong.

Nietzsche himself at times appears to wonder how this is possible. In a passage titled 'The wanderer speaks', which refers to a figure featured in the title to one of the parts of *Human, All Too Human*, Nietzsche writes:

> That one *wants* to go precisely out there, up there, may be a minor madness, a peculiar and unreasonable 'you must' – for we seekers for knowledge also have our idiosyncrasies of 'unfree will' – the question is whether one really *can* get up there. This may depend on manifold conditions. In the main the question is how light or heavy we are – the problem of our 'specific gravity'. One must have liberated oneself [*Man muss sich von Vielem losgebunden haben*] from many things that oppress, inhibit, hold down, and make heavy precisely us Europeans today.

Whether or not it is possible to achieve the kind of loosening of attachment, the *levity* that would be required to achieve the perspective he anticipates,

[12] Nietzsche expresses admiration for this type, not necessarily linked with free spirits, in *BGE* 212, *GS* 290, *TI* IX 49. See discussion by Poellner, 'Nietzschean Freedom,' p. 153ff.

is surely not guaranteed, and there are certain cultural conditions and inheritances that would seem to be opposed to this, that would make at least modern Europeans more susceptible to the forces of (psychic) gravity, so to speak. About this, Nietzsche continues:

> The human being of such a beyond who wants to behold the supreme measures of value of his time must first of all 'overcome' this time in himself – this is the test of his strength – and consequently not only his time but also his prior aversion and contradiction *against* this time, his suffering from this time, his untimeliness, his *romanticism*.

In this, I think we see ideas similar to the subtle distinctions Nietzsche makes between free spirits to try to measure their freedom by their relation to the conventional views of their own time and thereby distinguish themselves reactively and those who also loosen their attachment to their own opposition, those who hold even the oppositional stance *lightly*.

While accounts of Nietzsche that emphasise the cultivation of the self are attractive[13] – both in terms of their anticipated shapely products as well as how they tidy up this philosophical problem – I am not fully satisfied with this response to the puzzle of how one might achieve unity from out of the incredible diversity that Nietzsche anticipates as both the problem and the solution to modern existence. Neither am I comfortable with going along with solving the problems another way by elaborating the transcendental conditions of agency and the 'non-formal, "qualitative" or substantive commitments necessary for freedom', in large part because I think there is simply insurmountable evidence that Nietzsche does not have a normative ideal for what *we* (rather than *he*) might call 'full personhood'.[14] There would appear to be no *one* capable of the cultivation, no *one* to be the artist of our lives, certainly no *one* distinct from the organisation one already is.

Yet another solution might be sought in the role that education, self-education, and the cultivation of taste might play in shaping, organising,

[13] See, for example Keith Ansell Pearson, 'On Nietzsche's Moral Therapy in 'Dawn',' *Continental Philosophy Review* 44, no. 2 (2011): 179–204; Michael Ure, *Nietzsche's Therapy: Self-cultivation in the Middle Works* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008).

[14] See Poellner, 'Nietzschean Freedom,' p. 154.

and coordinating the multifarious drives that we are.[15] And there are certainly passages to be found in Nietzsche's works that demonstrate he gave serious consideration of such views (e.g., *HH* II P:2; *TI* 'IX' 47), and this would seem to be evident in Nietzsche's own account of himself and how he overcame the influence of Wagner in his life and thought. But, ultimately, I think Nietzsche rather doubted that this was the definite and secure path to achieving psychic well-being. His ambivalence is expressed in *D* 119, in which he begins with the idea that self-knowledge about our constitutive elements or drives and their 'nutrition', how they themselves are fed and the ways in which they nourish, is really unknown, and seemingly unknowable:

> Experience and make-believe. – No matter how hard a person struggles for self-knowledge, nothing can be more incomplete than the image of all the drives taken together that constitute his being. Scarcely can he call the cruder ones by name: their number and strength, their ebb and flow, their play and counterplay, and, above all, the laws of their *alimentation* [*Ernährung*] remain completely unknown to him.[16]

The overall nutrition of the entity they constitute, itself appears to be the result of chance rather than deliberate cultivation. Nietzsche continues:

> This alimentation thus becomes the work of chance [*Zufalls*]: our daily experiences toss willy-nilly to this drive or that drive some prey or other that it seizes greedily, but the whole coming and going of these events exists completely apart from any meaningful connection to the alimentary needs of the sum drives: so that the result will always be twofold: the starving and stunting of some drives and the overstuffing of others. With

[15] See Rebecca Bamford, Duncan Large, and Alexander Nehamas

[16] Citation of Nietzsche's Dawn is drawn from Brittain Smith's translation: Friedrich Nietzsche, *Dawn: Thoughts on the Presumptions of Morality*, trans. Brittain Smith, vol. 5, The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche (1881; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), I have also consulted Hollingdale's translation.

> every moment of our lives some of the polyp-arms of our being grow and others dry up, depending on the nourishment that the moment does or does not supply.[17]

Associations, indeed, shape us, affect the intensity of drives and their relations to others (recall *HH* II P:5). But any choosing of associations will be done by and in accordance with the preferences of the drives that happen to be on top. In short, while human growth, change, and development are surely possible, planning it (much less *orchestrating* it) appears to be difficult if not impossible. It would seem there can be no micromanaging one's soul in this way because all 'management' of this kind will always and only be the work of whatever drive or set of drives happen to be dominant from the start.

In understanding Nietzsche's conception of the independence of the free spirit, discussed above, I think we have some suggestions for how this *might* be possible. I underscore *might* because whatever may be the case, it is certainly true that there are no guarantees here, no recipes or blueprints to follow in becoming what one is. But loosening the self for attachments, cultivating the variety of resources available would seem to make it at least *possible* that a different political or social structure for the soul might be in the offing. This much is suggested in the added preface to *HH* II P:5,[18] where Nietzsche writes:

> Just as a physician places his patient in a wholly strange environment so that he may be removed from his entire 'hitherto', from his cares, friends, letters, duties, stupidities and torments of memory and learn to reach out his hands and senses to new nourishment, a new sun, a new future, so I, as physician and patient in one, compelled myself to an opposite and unexplored *clime of the soul*, and especially to a curative journey into strange parts, into *strangeness* itself, to an inquisitiveness

[17] Illuminating discussion of this image of the polyp as it relates to Nietzsche's drive psychology can be found in Brian Domino, 'Polyp Man,' in *A Nietzschean Bestiary: Becoming Animal Beyond Docile and Brutal*, ed. Christa Davis Acampora and Ralph R. Acampora (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 42–49.

[18] Citations of *HH* are drawn from Hollingdale's translation (Cambridge University Press, 1986).

> regarding every kind of strange thing … A protracted wandering around, seeking, changing followed from this, a repugnance towards all staying still, towards every blunt affirmation and denial; likewise a dietetic and discipline designed to make it as easy as possible for the spirit to run long distances, to fly to great heights, above all again and again to fly away. A *minimum* of life, in fact, and unchaining from all coarser desires, an independence in the midst of all kinds of unfavourable outward circumstances together with pride in being *able* to live surrounded by these unfavourable circumstances; a certain amount of cynicism, perhaps, a certain amount of 'barrel', but just as surely a great deal of capricious happiness, capricious cheerfulness, a great deal of stillness, light, subtler folly, concealed enthusiasm – all this finally resulted in a great spiritual strengthening, an increasing joy and abundance of health.

But, of course, the outcome here is uncertain and there are many possibilities that emerge, including tyranny, chaos, and perhaps virtually everything in between.[19] Such risk might be inevitable and unavoidable; it might be what is required, what must be tolerated in, perhaps even loved about, the kind of experimentalism that the free spirits are supposed to exercise, the dancing they are supposed to engage in (and not only dancing but also 'steigen, klettern, fliegen' [rising, climbing, flying], all of which aim to overcome or not be subject to the pull of gravity, to hang below [*abhang*]). Experiments can be planned to greater and lesser degrees, and they are virtually always guided by what it is that we already know and already value, or at least they are not wholly independent of such. Moreover, it is possible to lose ourselves within them.[20] I'm uncertain how one plans to manage

[19] If we take the free spirit not as an individual but rather more like the spirit of an age or a spiritual capacity that might be realised by or characteristic of groups, peoples, then we might make more headway on thinking about how such organisations and reorganisations might work by looking at how Nietzsche thinks about the current independence of Europe, its resultant disintegration and its simultaneous desire to become one. Being 'a good European' might be one way of realising free spirituality in such a case.

[20] But experimentalism is not necessarily inherently good. See *GS* 356, where Nietzsche writes about contemporary Europeans who are increasingly becoming like superficial actors (rather than real human beings): 'The individual becomes convinced that he can do

the inherent riskiness of this responsibly. But such risk might nevertheless be *necessary*, and the resultant splendour that such risk-taking potentially yields might be better described as product of chance rather than deliberate calculation or determined cultivation. If this is so, then we might say that the free spirit is free in yet one more sense – cosmically free, a piece of fate and chance, care-free, and a 'free throw' of the dice.[21]

just about everything and can manage almost any role, and everybody experiments with himself, improvises, makes new experiments, enjoys his experiments; and all nature ceases and becomes art'. Translation by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974).

[21] See *GS* 277.

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Nietzsche's Second Turning

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Introduction

There is a long tradition of dividing Nietzsche's corpus into early, middle, and late periods, with *Human, All Too Human* (1878) initiating, and *The Gay Science* (1882) concluding, the middle period. Indeed, the back cover of the first edition of *GS* read, in part, 'This concludes a series of writings by Friedrich Nietzsche on the free spirit', and it is likely that Nietzsche himself wrote this material.[1] So Nietzsche himself seems to have thought of *GS* as closing off a period of his work.

This description of *GS* as concluding Nietzsche's writing on the free spirit is puzzling to us now, however, since free spirits still have a prominent role in one of the late works, *Beyond Good and Evil* (1886). What then is it that makes *GS* a transitional work? Having published a few years ago a study of *HH*[2] in which I argued for taking the periodisation of Nietzsche's work as more than just a chronological convenience, and which identified *HH* as the watershed in his development – inaugurating his middle period and, indeed, marking the point at which Nietzsche 'becomes who he is' – I would now like to consider the second great turning of Nietzsche's philosophical development. Why is it that Nietzsche, with the publication

[1] Ruth Abbey, *Nietzsche's Middle Period* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), preface.
[2] Jonathan Cohen, *Science, Culture, and Free Spirits: A Study of Nietzsche's Human, All-Too-Human* (New York: Prometheus, 2010), hereafter SC&FS.

of *GS* in 1882, heads in another direction? And what exactly is the nature of this transition in his philosophical development?[3]

In what follows, I return to *HH* to characterise two crucial and interrelated points of instability in the philosophical stance of that work. I then show how *GS* resolves these two issues and thus sends Nietzsche's philosophy in a new direction. I conclude by showing how the new synthesis provides the foundation for Nietzsche's mature work. This essay is in no way meant to be a comprehensive interpretation of the book as a whole[4]; rather, I hope to provide a framework for the interpretation of some crucial passages in *GS*, for recognising elements of intertextuality in *GS*, and for locating *GS* in Nietzsche's philosophical development.

1. First Instability in *Human, All-too-Human* – Epistemology

Positivistic faith in the truths produced by science is unmistakable in *HH*. Contrasting science and philosophy, Nietzsche writes, 'The latter wants, as art does, to bestow on life and action the greatest possible profundity and significance; in the former one seeks knowledge and nothing further – and does in fact acquire it' (*HH* 6, trans. Hollingdale). Or again:

> [O]ne believes that the more profoundly a man thinks, the more tenderly he feels, the more highly he rates himself, the greater the distance grows between him and the other animals ... the closer he will get to the true nature of the world and to a knowledge of it: this he does in fact do through science, but he *thinks* he does so even more through his arts and religions. (*HH* 29)

[3] I gave a cursory answer to this question in the final pages of SC&FS (pp. 224–228); the current essay is an expansion.

[4] For that the reader is directed to Kathleen Marie Higgins, *Comic Relief: Nietzsche's "Gay Science"* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) and Monika M. Langer, *Nietzsche's Gay Science: Dancing Coherence* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). Neither of these works pay much attention to issues of development or intertextuality (other than to note that *GS* 342 is identical with the first section of the Prologue to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*), as I do here.

The repeated use of 'in fact' (*auch*) emphasises Nietzsche's own certainty about the matter: science produces truth. At the same time, however, several sections in *HH* evince suspicion about the human mechanism for knowledge. According to Nietzsche,

> [Man] really thought that in language he possessed knowledge of the world.... [He] conceived ... that with words he was expressing supreme knowledge of things; language is, in fact the first stage of the occupation with science.... A great deal later – only now – it dawns on men that in their belief in language they have propagated a tremendous error. (*HH* 11)

Not only language, but '[l]ogic too depends on presuppositions with which nothing in the real world corresponds'. Even that pillar of scientific positivism, 'mathematics, ... would certainly not have come into existence if one had known from the beginning that there was in nature no exactly straight line, no real circle, no absolute magnitude'. (*HH* 11, cf. 19)

Nietzsche comes across here as a somewhat confused Kantian. The mind actively creates the features of the world it then finds to be true, but rather than, like Kant himself, giving up on knowledge of things in themselves, Nietzsche, perhaps 'corrupted' by Schopenhauer's claims to have accessed things in themselves via the concept of Will, finds he must contrast knowledge of things in themselves with our actual beliefs, to the utter detriment of the latter: 'That which we now call the world is the outcome of a host of errors and fantasies which have gradually arisen and grown entwined with one another' (*HH* 16). Yet science is still privileged as the best hope of humanity for whatever clarity is yet possible:

> Rigorous science is capable of detaching us from this ideational world only to a limited extent – and more is certainly not to be desired – inasmuch as it is incapable of making any essential inroad into the power of habits of feeling acquired in primeval times: but it can, quite gradually and step by step, illuminate the history of the genesis of the world as idea – and, for brief periods at any rate, lift us up out of the entire proceeding. (*HH* 16)

We are left, then, with Nietzsche in *HH* as a sort of Kantian positivist, if there could be such a thing – categorically suspicious of the very scientific truths he loudly proclaims. Such an epistemology will not long stand. Nietzsche will remain sceptical about humans' ability to know as much as we think we do, and will be a proponent of the naturalistic findings of science, throughout his career, but he will need to find some way to jibe these two proclivities.

2. Second Instability in *Human, All-too-Human* – Free spirits

As described in *HH*, the book which invents them (as Nietzsche admitted later in the preface to the second edition), free spirits (hereafter FS) exist in a state of tension too. They are defined as the avant-garde of culture (*HH* 224), leading the way by propounding conceptual innovations that the fettered spirits, who cannot think for themselves, must ineluctably follow. However, they are also presented as the avatars of science: devoted to knowledge alone (*HH* 34), understanding the truth of determinism (*HH* 107), asking always for reasons (*HH* 225 & 633), avoiding always unchanging convictions (*HH* 636), etc. These two roles – men of science and leaders of the cultural parade – involve them in conflicting commitments that reflect the instability in Nietzsche's epistemological position. As avatars of science, FS know truths. But if these truths were fixed, there would be no way for FS to continue to be the forerunners of cultural development – they would land on the truth and then stay there. Since free spirits in *HH* must keep moving in order to continue to lead the parade of culture, they must never become stuck in their opinions, and this actually implies that the truths they propound are not fixed points in the march of positivistic science.

> Opinions grow out of *passions; inertia of the spirit* lets them stiffen into *convictions*. – He, however, whose spirit is *free* and restlessly alive can prevent this stiffening through continual change, and even if he should be altogether a thinking snowball, he will have in his head, not opinions, but only certainties and precisely calculated probabilities. (*HH* 637)

This tension issues in the fact that Nietzsche emphasises the uniqueness of the opinions of the free spirits (*HH* 286), yet at the very same time gives them a common character description: 'a firm, mild, and at bottom cheerful soul' (*HH* 34), 'calm and steady in head and heart' (*HH* 285), 'desir[ing] nothing more earnestly than knowledge' (*HH* 288), 'spin[ning] out their life of monologue in a calm and cheerful mood' (*HH* 625), and so on.[5] Presumably Nietzsche would argue for a distinction between the common character type he attributes to the free spirits and the unique opinions he foresees them holding. But whether this distinction holds or not, it is clear that Nietzsche himself is quite sure he knows already what the free spirits will be like, making the attribution of uniqueness somewhat suspect.

These two axes of tension, the one pertaining to epistemology, the other to the free spirits, makes Nietzsche's own demonstration of free spirithood in Parts 6 through 9 of *HH* somewhat odd. The thoughts conveyed in these parts are individualistic, in that these are Nietzsche's own iconoclastic views of human society, but it is clear at the same time that he considers his contributions to be candidates for truth. The fact that he continues in this vein through *Assorted Opinions and Maxims* (1879), *The Wanderer and His Shadow* (1880), and *Daybreak* (1881), does not eliminate these tensions. For that, *Gay Science* is needed.

3. Continuity between *Human, All-too-Human* and *The Gay Science*

Readers of the first edition of *GS* might have thought, as they began their reading, that the thought-world and concerns of *HH* were simply being continued in *GS*, as they were through *AOM*, *WS*, and *D*.[6] Poem 35 of the 'Prelude in Rhymes' asserts that ice helps the digestion, an observation that would have fit in perfectly with *HH*'s dominant metaphor of the beneficial

[5] See SC&FS Ch. 4.

[6] This is not true, however, of readers of the second edition, for which Nietzsche added a preface noting that the book contained both 'the proximity of winter' and a 'triumph over winter' (*GS* P:1). Readers of the second edition – assuming they were familiar with *HH*'s metaphor of the coldness of science providing an antidote for an overheated culture – would thus be aware from the beginning that *GS* will be transitional.

effects of scientific coldness on the culture of an overheated age.[7] Poem 40, meanwhile, sounds very much like a description of the free spirits of *HH*, who also have no envy and no need for applause.[8]

When Nietzsche returns to prose in Book One of *GS*, he still seems to be continuing *HH*'s concerns. The very first section of the book argues that all human instinct, even 'evil', contributes to the preservation of the race, and this jibes perfectly with Nietzsche's argument in *HH* that a free spirit breaking away from convention is actually contributing to the progress of society.[9] Section 2, meanwhile, observes that people seem to have no intellectual conscience – i.e. they believe things unquestioningly – but Nietzsche's ideal is someone who craves certainty despite the ambiguity and uncertainty of life; this continues the trope of the sections that end the original edition of *HH* (e.g. *HH* 637). At the end of section 2, Nietzsche reveals his own 'injustice', namely that everybody should crave this certainty. This seems to show that Nietzsche still has hope for all of humanity, even though he recognises that only a few people will actually feel this way. And this was true of *HH* too: everyone can hold unique opinions, but in the end only a few will follow through on their individuality (*HH* 286). As in *HH*, what's needed is for people to slow down, to cease worrying about their productivity and take on the trappings of idleness.[10]

A crucial series of passages in the middle of Book One outlines the same relation between free spirits and fettered spirits as in *HH*. In *GS* 23, Nietzsche reevaluates superstition to be a symptom of enlightenment and individuality in the face of the corruption of established religion – a typical mid-period Nietzschean reversal of the standard wisdom. At the end of that section, he declares that 'The times of corruption are those when the apples fall from the tree: I mean the individuals, for they carry the seeds of the future and are the authors of the spiritual colonisation and origin of new states and communities' (trans. Kaufmann). This is precisely the

[7] See *HH* 38, 244. No less significant a reader than Cosima Wagner protested that she could not even pick up the book to read it – so cold it was that it hurt her hand. See SC&FS 71–72 and 256fn44.

[8] See SC&FS 109 ff.

[9] See SC&FS Ch. 5.

[10] Compare *GS* 6 with *HH* 285. Similarly, boredom is declared a necessary preliminary to activity in *GS* 42, just as it was in *HH*'s praise of the contemplative life in sections 284–290.

same justification given in *HH* for focusing on individuals whose originality will provide new directions for their communities (see *HH* 224). The next section, *GS* 24, repeats *HH*'s characterisation of free spirits as weak and fettered spirits as strong, along with Nietzsche's argument that the former are responsible for the possibility of change and should therefore be tolerated.[11] In *GS* 25, Nietzsche criticises a 'stupid humility' that leads people to run away from new truths because they feel unequal to them, just as in *HH* he urged potential free spirits to find courage for their task (see *HH* 292).

A section in Book Two continues a discussion of the relation between free and fettered spirits that might have been equally at home in *HH*. *GS* 76 is entitled '*The greatest danger*', and this turns out to be madness, which Nietzsche here defines as arbitrariness in judgement. However, this understanding of madness is far from pejorative. Nietzsche concedes that it is important for many people to agree in order to have a law of agreement. Still, he notes that 'impatient spirits' – especially 'explorers of truth' – bristle at this and actually take delight in madness. While it's true that society requires a certain amount of 'virtuous stupidity' (again, compare *HH* 224), 'we others are the exception and the danger – and we need eternally to be defended'. Nietzsche here precisely recreates *HH*'s division of labour between free spirits and fettered spirits, and again defends societal exceptions as good, even necessary, provided that they never want to become the rule.

Even when no longer talking directly about the cultural division of labour initially outlined in *HH*, Nietzsche seems in *GS* still focused on many of *HH*'s specific concerns. For example, Nietzsche repeats the idea that a man of renunciation, rather than merely giving something up, is in fact affirming his higher goals (compare *GS* 27 with *HH* 136-144). As late as *GS* 88, one might think *GS* was a continuation of *HH* and not transitional. There Nietzsche notes that an idea which a thinker considers a frivolity might be taken and presented seriously by an artist. This recalls the last few sections of Part 1 of *HH*, in which Nietzsche acknowledges that

[11] It is interesting that in this passage the weak, who will bring change, are described as feminine, while the strong ones who bear the threat of stagnation are described as masculine. This gendered element is missing from *HH* and complicates the traditional labelling of Nietzsche as misogynist.

illogic, injustice, and error might be necessary for creative activity (*HH* 31–33); free spirits, though, remain devoted to truth (*HH* 34).

Even after *GS*'s transitional status becomes clear at the beginning of Book Three (discussed below in section 5), plenty of sections echo ideas first expressed in *HH*. In *GS* 151, for example, Nietzsche argues that metaphysics need not be the cause of religion but the result of its collapse. Repeating his argument from *HH* 5, he argues that religion itself comes from misinterpretations of nature that require positing 'another world' (cf. *GS* 205 as well). In *GS* 154, Nietzsche observes that those who 'have no idea what [they] are living through' rush about as if drunk, but their drunkenness keeps them loose and thus they don't get hurt when they crash; 'we', however, are made of glass. These drunks resemble the lazy-minded active men of *HH*, and the 'we' unmistakably resemble the weak, fragile, free spirits of *HH*. One of *GS*'s most famous passages, in which Nietzsche urges us to 'live dangerously', sounds very much like his exhortation at the end of Part 5 of *HH* to go 'Forward!' in pursuit of free spirit-hood (compare *GS* 283 with *HH* 292). Finally, another passage from Book Four of *GS* picks up *HH*'s praise of *otium* as necessary for genuinely deep thinking (compare *GS* 329 with *HH* 282–291).[12]

4. Inklings of Change

Even in the early parts of *GS*, however, there are some hints that change is in the wind. Poem 53 mentions *HH* explicitly in its title, and might thus reinforce the impression that *GS* is continuing the concerns of that book. However, this mention is ambiguous. Here is the poem entire:

> *Human, All-too-Human*: A Book
>
> You're sad and shy when looking at the past,
> But trust the future when yourself you trust:
> Are you some kind of eagle in pursuit?
> Or just Minerva's favourite hootootoot?

[12] More echoes of *HH* in *GS* are listed on SC&FS 224.

Free spirits, the stars of *HH*, appear to be the ones being addressed: they are sad and shy when looking at the past because they have broken away from the views that would have been expected of them in their former social context (see *HH* 225); they trust the future when themselves they trust in that their becoming individuals is crucial for them to lead their society in new directions (*HH* 286 & 292). But the poem now asks which bird they resemble, an eagle or an owl? That is, are they a predator in pursuit of something, or are they blathering their wisdom passively? The latter is in fact the stance that Nietzsche praises in *HH*: free spirits do not deliberately intervene in the cultural direction of their society; all they do is announce their truths and let the natural process of cultural progress do the rest.[13] The former, though, is a new possibility: perhaps free spirits re-enter the cultural fray, diving down from their aerie perch to take a more aggressive role in the culture wars? This is the account of free spirit-hood outlined by Nietzsche in the 1886 preface to the second edition of *HH* – a first stage of detached observation, and a second stage of returning to earth – and it seems he is having some first thoughts about it in *GS*'s Prelude in Rhymes from 1882.

Another inkling of change in Nietzsche's views comes midway through Book One. Just as in the transition from his early to his middle view, it is science that is the bellwether.[14] In section 37, Nietzsche opines that science has been pursued because of three errors. The first was in order to understand God's goodness (Nietzsche attributes this motive to Newton), the second was out of belief in the utility of knowledge (attributed to Voltaire), and the third was out of belief in science's harmlessness and innocence (attributed to Spinoza). This listing recalls a passage in the early works (*SE* 6) in which Nietzsche uses this very multiplicity of motives to cast doubt on science's purity (and cf. *GS* 123). What is most surprising here is that the third motive given is precisely Nietzsche's own in *HH*. What Nietzsche seems to be signalling is that he is distancing himself from his view in *HH*, returning to his early view, and now positioning himself in (at least partial) opposition to science. This impression is furthered in *GS* 46, where Nietzsche says that our 'amazement' at the firmness of science is due to the way we contrast it with fantasy, but in olden times the morality of *mores* was

[13] See SC&FS 146–147.
[14] See SC&FS Ch. 2.

firm enough to provoke the same amazement.[15] Nietzsche thus implies that science, too, is not really firm, a diametric reversal from the positivistic passages from *HH* cited above in which firmness is precisely what he claims for it.

5. Nietzsche's Second Turning

The full flowering of Nietzsche's second turning does not become apparent, however, until Book Three of *GS*, where Nietzsche's new attitude about science gets its theoretical underpinning – perspectivism.

Book Three begins in section 108 with the first mention of God's death (more famously expanded in section 125). Nietzsche suggests that, like the shadow of Buddha which appeared posthumously on the wall of a cave, God's shadow is still with us. Rather than talk about caves or even churches, though, what Nietzsche turns to, immediately, is epistemology. He argues that we must recognise that there's no inherent order, beauty, form, wisdom, purpose, creation, etc., in the world, only chaos; rather than insert these things into the world, our goal, says Nietzsche, should be 'de-deification' (*GS* 109). Unlike in *HH*, however, where naturalising meant resisting supernatural explanations of the type offered by Schopenhauer and traditional religion[16], here in *GS* it means resisting anthropomorphic value additions to our perception of the world. Nietzsche now goes on to repeat points made in *HH* 11, 16, and 19, to the effect that the knowledge that is useful for life relies on errors (*GS* 110), and that the science of logic arises out of illogical assumptions such as taking similar things to be the same (*GS* 111). In *HH*, these criticisms of science were counterbalanced by Nietzsche's dogged insistence that science nevertheless produced truth; such insistence is conspicuous in *GS* by its absence. To the contrary, Nietzsche is now, in Book Three of *GS*, turning his powerful deconstructive weaponry against science. Now he argues that there is no such thing as genuine causation, just 'one-thing-after-another', and that even when we merely isolate something as an event, what we're actually seeing is the

[15] 'Mores (*Sitten*) can also be translated as 'custom'. For a discussion of this issue, see Rebecca Bamford's paper in this volume (footnote 7) – *The Editors*.

[16] See SC&FS Ch. 3.

effect of our own perception (*GS* 112). Indeed, in science we see not the operation of dispassionate logic, as *HH* might have claimed, but rather the effect of a long evolution of a multitude of factors: 'the impulse to doubt, to negate, to wait, to collect, to dissolve' (*GS* 113). In this same section, Nietzsche completes his reversal of his earlier view by repudiating the great 'hall of culture' that *HH* envisioned, a room so large that science and the arts could coexist (*HH* 276): 'now the time seems remote when artistic energies and the practical wisdom of life will join with scientific thinking to form a higher organic system' (*GS* 113). In the thought-world of *HH*, an opposition between science and art and/or practical life would have resulted in Nietzsche siding with science, for in *HH* art is debunked (in Part 4) and practical life is declared unsuitable for the free spirit (in the last several sections of Part 5). In *GS*, by contrast, this opposition results in the devaluation of science – science is now just one perspective among others.

What has died along with God, then, and what remains as no more than a shadow which we must still vanquish, is the notion of absolute truth. Sure enough, just after the death of God briefly mentioned in *GS* 108 has been explicated at length in *GS* 125, the attack on causation from *GS* 112 is connected explicitly with the death of God in *GS* 127. It was ancient religiosity, says Nietzsche, which promoted a belief in the will, and this in turn promoted belief in causation. At this point the connection implied in the juxtaposition of *GS* 108 with *GS* 109–114 has become explicit: the death of God, and with it the end of the illusion that a God's-eye view is possible, gives rise directly to perspectivism, the philosophy of human-eye views. And thus the tension in *HH* between positivism and incipient perspectivism is now in Book Three of *GS* resolved once and for all in favour of perspectivism.[17]

What triggered this second turning? Nietzsche's first turning was triggered, I have argued, by Wagner's triumph at Bayreuth, a cultural event that showed Nietzsche the emptiness of German nationalism and the dangers of anti-scientism. This provoked him to rethink the relationship of science and culture that he had propounded in his early works, and invent

[17] To be sure, Nietzsche does not use that term. Even in *BGE* he will do no more than refer to perspective as the condition of life. Perspectivism as a term is the creation of 20th-century scholars of Nietzsche.

scientifically educated free spirits to replace the 'republic of genius' as the agents of cultural progress.[18] I do not believe Nietzsche's second turning has as clear-cut a triggering factor as the first. Rather, Nietzsche continued thinking about his views and came to realise that the science which he championed in *HH* had its own human, all-too-human weaknesses – not as vitiating as those of metaphysics and religion, but enough to require it to give up its claim to sole possession of the truth.[19]

6. Impact of Perspectivism on Nietzsche's Conception of the Free Spirits

This resolution of the epistemological tension of *HH* by means of perspectivism in *GS* impacts Nietzsche's conception of free spirits, and this secondary effect is just as crucial for the formation of Nietzsche's mature philosophy. In *HH*, the free spirits were the agents of transformative cultural change via their role as the avatars of scientific truth. Can they still perform their role as agents of transformative cultural change henceforth, with science having been reduced to no more than perspectivally true? Indeed they can, but they will have to change their tactics. No longer can they simply launch their truths and sit back, secure in the trust that these truths will inevitably triumph over metaphysics. Rather, because the scientific perspective is just as much a perspective as any other view, the free spirits will now have to actively promote their perspectives, whose superiority will now be cashed out in terms of being life- and progress-promoting rather than positivistically true. In other words, free spirits must rejoin the culture wars in order to promote better perspectives than the ones they find in their societies.

Several passages displaying the new way free spirits will perform their function come in the aphorisms that end Book Three. For example: '*A good age for free spirits.* – Free spirits take liberties even with science – and so far get away with it, as long as the church still stands' (*GS* 180). Nietzsche is here admitting that science, like any perspective, has its flaws. However, it's still better than religion, and so presumably can still be useful to free

[18] See SC&FS Ch. 2, especially pp. 71–76.
[19] See SC&FS pp. 224–226 and p. 281n16.

spirits in their role of battering down the old ways in service of renewal and societal progress. Or again: '*Without envy.* – He is utterly without envy, but there is no merit in that, for he wants to conquer a country that nobody has possessed and scarcely anyone has even seen' (*GS* 238). The free spirits of *HH* were without envy, and Nietzsche trumpeted it as one of their best qualities. Now it appears that their lack of envy is only apparent – they have as much cupidity as anyone, but it is for something new, and thus they do not have to compete with anyone for it. Another instance of the same change in the free spirits is this: 'The *sigh of the search for knowledge* [comes from] an all-coveting self that would like to appropriate many individuals as so many additional pairs of eyes and hands' (*GS* 249). As in the previous example, this passage too betrays the free spirits as having, *contra HH*, covetousness and greed inherent in their search for knowledge – they want to have everyone involved in the search, and to have access to all of the past. In *HH*, justice – not political justice, but judiciousness in evaluating things – was the only goddess before whom free spirits would kneel (*HH* 637); in *GS*, it turns out that 'With a great goal one is superior even to justice, not only to one's deeds and one's judges' (*GS* 267). Free spirits have now apparently transcended justice – it is now only preparatory to their goal. Finally, one of the string of questions Nietzsche asks himself rhetorically at the very end of Book Three is '*In what do you believe?*', and the answer is, 'that the weights of all things must be determined anew' (*GS* 269). In *HH*, free spirits are only observers; reconfigured in *GS*, they are value-makers.

The subtitle of Book Four, 'Sanctus Januarius', epitomises the change in Nietzsche's view (and apparently in Nietzsche himself). The miracle of St. Januarius involves a vial of dried blood that becomes liquid once more; Nietzsche clearly feels that he himself is returning to life in January of 1882, after several years of difficult health. In a poem appended to Book Four as an epigraph, Nietzsche expresses his move away from the icy free spirit-hood of the middle period towards a new task for his philosophising:

> With a flaming spear you crushed
> All its ice until my soul
> Roaring toward the ocean rushed
> Of its highest hope and goal.

Free spirits, he now believes, need to lose their icy detachment and take up a new, more involved role:

> Is it our fault that we were born for the air, clean air, we rivals of the beams of light, and that we wish we could ride on ethereal dust specks like these beams – not away from the sun but *toward the sun!* That, however, we cannot do. Let us therefore do what alone we can do: be 'the light of the earth!' And so to that end we have our wings and our speed and severity. (*GS* 293)

The allusion to the philosopher-kings in Plato's *Republic*, who desire to stay in the light of the sun but know they must go back into the cave in order to enlighten their fellows, like all of Nietzsche's classical allusions, is almost surely intentional. And it allows Nietzsche to suggest, without having to say so, that free spirits too would prefer to stay aloof, in purposeless contemplation, as they did in *HH*, but they are now compelled, in order to fulfil their societal function, to return to 'earth' and the hurly-burly of improving culture. A free spirit

> fancies that he is a *spectator* and *listener* who has been placed before the great visual and acoustic spectacle that is life.... Actually, however, free spirits are those who really continually *fashion* something that had not been there before: the whole eternally growing world of valuations, colors, accents, perspectives, scales, affirmations, and negations. (*GS* 301)

Note the presence of the word 'perspectives' on this list – Nietzsche does not use it often. But here he does clearly understand that creating perspectives is what free spirits will be doing, not formulating scientific truths as in *HH*. The same move from quietism to activism is portrayed in a mock dialogue a few sections later: Character A says that the point is to find a place in the sun where one can thrive; Character B says the point is to create one's own sun (*GS* 320). Nietzsche seems here to be deliberately blocking the radical individualist interpretation of his philosophy (often associated with Ayn Rand), that people should go their own way and damn everybody

else, and pushing instead the image of free spirits as those who are creative in their own way but who nevertheless shine for all.

This, then, is the resolution of the second of *HH*'s tensions, the one regarding free spirits: Nietzsche no longer asserts a common character type for the free spirits, as he did in *HH*, but now emphasises their individuality exclusively. The extent to which he has changed can be located in the remarkable (re)appreciation of Wagner found in *GS*. *HH* had marked the moment in his career when Nietzsche turned away from Wagner, and while Nietzsche is not yet obsessed with criticising Wagner, as he will be in the later works, he has nevertheless had only criticism for Wagner in the middle works so far.[20] In *GS*, however, he suddenly delivers a lengthy appreciation of Wagner, for no other reason than his individuality:

> Let us remain faithful to Wagner in what is true and authentic in him – and especially in this, that we, as his disciples, remain faithful to ourselves in what is true and authentic in us. Let him have his intellectual tempers and cramps. Let us, in all fairness, ask what strange nourishments and needs an art like this may require to be able to live and grow. It does not matter that as a thinker he is so often in the wrong; justice and patience are not for him. Enough that his life is justified before itself and remains justified – this life which shouts at everyone of us: 'Be a man and do not follow me – but yourself! But yourself!' Our life, too, shall remain justified in our own eyes! We, too, shall grow and blossom out of ourselves, free and fearless, in innocent selfishness. (*GS* 99)

It would be too much to say that Nietzsche here acknowledges Wagner as a free spirit; the rest of the passage explains in detail just what Wagner got wrong in his borrowings from Schopenhauer. But Nietzsche clearly finds much to appreciate in Wagner's creative originality, and that alone indicates a shift in his valuation of individuality.[21]

[20] See, for example, *HH* 23, 162 and *AOM* 134, 171; SC&FS lists several more passages containing thinly disguised anti-Wagnerianism on 276fn12 and 277fn13.

[21] And it is surely no accident, but rather reflects the careful placement of sections on Nietzsche's part, that this praise of individuality in *GS* 99 comes shortly before the emergence of perspectivism in *GS* Book Three.

A passage near the end of Book Four (and thus near the end of the first published version of *GS*) sums up Nietzsche's new view linking science on the one hand and self-creation on the other. Nietzsche argues that, rather than attempt to legislate universal morality *a la* Kant's categorical imperative, we should try simply to purify our own opinions and to create our own tables of what is good. 'We, however, *want to become those we are* – human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves' (*GS* 335). For this, Nietzsche says, it is necessary to become physicists. This might seem like a *non sequitur* – to assert that science is the key to an ethical project – but what Nietzsche is doing is combining his appeal to the salubrious effects of training in science, first introduced in *HH* (e.g. 256), with the goal of unique self-creation, developed in *GS*. The transition is complete.

7. The Most Personal of Nietzsche's Books

In a letter, Nietzsche calls *GS* the most personal of his books.[22] And the book does contain a great many personal revelations. But perhaps the most striking way to observe the change from *HH* to *GS* is to notice the remarkable increase in the use of the first person singular. The first person singular appears very, very rarely in *HH*, *AOM*, *WS*, and *D*; Nietzsche will often say 'we', to include all free spirits or even all humans, but almost never 'I' or 'my'. Individualism is present in *HH* in that each person has something unique to offer, but what that might be is described in impersonal, dispassionate terms. Suddenly, however, in *GS*, instances of the first person singular become quite numerous. It appears in, by my count, roughly one of every seven passages in Books One, Two, and Three, and then, following the poem that accompanies the beginning of Sanctus Januarius, metastasises to the point where it appears in roughly half of the passages in Book Four. Clearly, individuality now matters, and Nietzsche is no longer shy about putting himself in his writing. The introduction of Nietzsche's own voice marks his return to life and his launching of the program of individualism and perspectivism.

[22] Quoted in Walter Kaufmann, 'Introduction,' in *The Gay Science*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1991).

At the beginning of Book Four – the point at which first person singular becomes the dominant voice of the book – Nietzsche introduces *amor fati*, the love of fate. This is what Nietzsche wants his life to be in this new year (i.e. 1882) – to love the world as it is, with no falsification or artificial sweetening, 'to see as beautiful what is necessary in things; then I shall be one of those who make things beautiful' (*GS* 276). In this way, by being wholly and uniquely oneself, one has a positive cultural effect.

Even when the first person is not used, Nietzsche can be seen to be talking about himself. Indeed, when we return to the poem cited above entitled '*Human, All-too-Human*: A Book', the free spirit addressed as 'you' can, in retrospect, be read as Nietzsche himself: the past he is sad and shy about looking at is the book *HH* itself, and he is urging himself to look towards the future and decide if he will be a mere hootootoot or an eagle after prey. On this reading, the fact that the title of the book is the title of the poem does not indicate that its thought-world is the thought-world of the poem, but rather that the book itself is precisely what Nietzsche is looking back at, sad and shy. In other words, he has moved on and now regards *HH* from a distance – it's just a book.

To sum up: *HH* contained the roots of perspectivism, but it is in *GS* that Nietzsche's mature epistemology first emerges from the earth. And free spirits reconceived as individualistic cultural warriors are the fruit that the tree of perspectivism bears. Having made this conceptual connection, Nietzsche now, in Book Four, presents himself as one of those cultural warriors, and thus becomes comfortable with speaking in his own, highly individualistic voice.

This strategic pattern – arguing for a theoretical connection between epistemology and free spirits first, then exemplifying that connection himself – repeats itself in *HH* and in *GS*. In *HH* the argument takes place in Parts 1–5 and the exemplification in Parts 6–9.[23] In *GS* the progression is more subtle, but I believe the rarity of first person in Books One through Three, and then the proliferation of the first person in Book Four, is quite intentional.[24]

[23] See SC&FS Ch. 6.

[24] This might explain, too, why Nietzsche went back and added Book Five to the second edition of *GS* in 1887, after publishing *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (which grows out of *GS* 342), *Beyond Good and Evil* (which, according to Nietzsche, 'says the same things as my

8. Free Spirits in *Beyond Good and Evil*

The synthesis and synergy of perspectivism and individualism established in *GS* informs the later works, where Nietzsche continues to use first person quite frequently.[25] The free spirits of *BGE* are now described not in terms of a personality type but in terms of their functioning. They still are the ones who can look at things with the fewest illusions and can endure the most truth (*BGE* 39; cf. *HH* 34 and *GS* 110). But they are now philosophers, not scientists (see *BGE* 44). And the tension in *HH* between their continual mobility and their devotion to 'certainties' has now been conclusively decided in favour of mobility. Thus Nietzsche devotes a long passage to describing all the ways in which free spirits do not remain stuck, not to a person, nor a fatherland, nor to some pity, nor to ... a science (*BGE* 41). The inclusion of science in this list is a clear sign of the success and durability of Nietzsche's new opinion about science – science is useful, but not so authoritatively true that one should remain stuck to it. To cinch the point, after a section defining free spirits as 'attempters' (*versucher*), Nietzsche writes,

> Are these coming philosophers new friends of 'truth'? That is probable enough, for all philosophers so far have loved their truths. But they will certainly not be dogmatists. It must offend their pride, also their taste, if their truth is supposed to be a truth for everyman.... 'My judgment is *my* judgment': no one else is easily entitled to it. (*BGE* 43, trans. Kaufmann)

Nietzsche no longer defines free spirits in terms of a personality type, nor as the avatars of science, but now as the avatars of perspectivism.

The next item after science in Nietzsche's list describing the freedom of free spirits is the following: 'Not to remain stuck to one's own detachment, to that voluptuous remoteness and strangeness of the bird who flies ever higher to see ever more below him – the danger of the flier' (*BGE* 41).

Zarathustra' – see Walter Kaufmann, 'Translator's Introduction,' in *Beyond Good and Evil* (New York: Random House, 1990), sec. 2. Also *GM* (which grows out of *BGE* 260). With that string having played itself out, Nietzsche now wanted to add on to *GS* to show how his own individualistic culture warrior trajectory had continued.

[25] See, for example, *BGE* 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 27, 35, 36, 231, etc; *GM* I.1–5; , etc, etc.

Rather than stay aloft observing, as in *HH*, the free spirits as reconceived in *GS* and deployed again in *BGE* are defined as culture warriors who force the will of millennia onto new tracks (*BGE* 203).

So why did Nietzsche say on the back cover of the first edition of *GS* that the book concluded a series of writings on free spirits? It's possible, though unlikely, that he thought at the time that he was done with free spirits, and that their reappearance in *BGE* in 1886 was unexpected by him in 1882. However, it is more likely that *GS* concludes not Nietzsche's interest in free spirits but in his thinking of them a certain way – *GS* concludes a series of writings on the free spirits as detached observers. As well, *GS* marks the end of Nietzsche being a hovering, uncommitted, pure knowing free spirit, and the beginning of his becoming the participant in the culture wars that the free spirit is in *BGE*. Just like the moment in section 15 of *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872) where he says we (i.e. he) are not free to merely observe but must also engage in the battle over culture, *GS* marks and justifies his re-entry into the fray.[26]

[26] I am grateful for the comments, companionship, and encouragement of participants in a reading group devoted to *The Gay Science* that met at the University of Maine Farmington in the Fall semester of 2013: Angela Hall, George Miller, Steven Pane, Steven Quackenbush, Frank Underkuffler, and Catherine Zachary.

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Mood and Aphorism in Nietzsche's Campaign against Morality

Rebecca Bamford

> Let us admit that I am writing on moods because right now I am in a mood, and it is a good thing that I am just in the mood to give a description of moods.[1]

The reasons informing Nietzsche's decision to use aphorism in his works from *Human, All Too Human* onwards remain somewhat mysterious. Graham Parkes has argued that there are both practical and philosophical reasons for Nietzsche's turn to aphorism use.[2] Practically, from the time Nietzsche began writing *HH*, his increasingly poor eyesight made it impossible for him to spend extended periods of time in writing; philosophically, the use of aphorism better supports philosophical work that is 'resolutely unsystematic and psychologically experimental'.[3] Here, I aim to shed further light on how and why Nietzsche uses aphorism as a strategic tool to further his campaign against morality. I have discussed in previous work how *D* is at once a diagnostic and a corrective medical narrative, in which Nietzsche combines two important techniques to advance his position: aphorism and

[1] Nietzsche (1864), cited in Stanley Corngold, 'Nietzsche's Moods,' *Studies in Romanticism* 29, no. 1 (1990): 67–90.

[2] Graham Parkes, *Composing the Soul: Reaches of Nietzsche's Psychology* (London: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 116.

[3] Ibid.

experimentalism.[4] Nietzsche constructs the text of *D* so that it directly contributes to the performance of philosophical work, as well as engaging in reasoned critical discussion of the issues at hand in his remarks.[5] One of the key performative dimensions of *D* is its musical structure: via aphorism, the work of *D* is enacted by the critical-experimental performances of author and readers, for example in *D* 250 and 255.[6]

My aim in what follows is to connect Nietzsche's combination of diagnostic and performative work in *D* more explicitly with his analysis of mood. The main claim I defend is that Nietzsche uses mood (*Stimmung*) to identify, and counter, the highly problematic and deeply entrenched authority of the morality of custom (*D* 9).[7] Brian Domino has previously suggested that Nietzsche's remarks on mood in *D* open up space for mood to be considered philosophically significant.[8] Building on Domino's suggestion, I flesh out a detailed account of Nietzsche's thinking on mood in *D*. As I discuss, Nietzsche gives a clear and specific explanation as to why the 'morality of mores' (*D* 9) is troubling. I first explain how Nietzsche identifies mood as playing an important role in *supporting* the authority of the morality of mores. Understanding this connection enables me to argue, second, that Nietzsche works to turn morality's use of mood against itself, in order to advance his campaign *against* the morality of mores. As I show, Nietzsche develops an argument concerning what the role of mood in sustaining the morality of mores is, and at the same time, provides an active externalist tool for producing and sustaining an alternative to the prevailing mood that morality generates and sustains.

[4] Rebecca Bamford, 'Daybreak,' in *A Companion to Friedrich Nietzsche: Life and Works*, ed. Paul Bishop (New York: Camden House, 2012), p. 145.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid., pp. 145–147.

[7] As Simon Robertson has recently discussed, translating Nietzsche's term *Sittlichkeit der Sitte* is challenging and also complicates the 'scope problem': whether Nietzsche is critical of all morality or certain forms of it, and if so, which forms. Robertson notes that the standard translation, 'morality of custom', is unhelpful and suggests 'customary life' or 'customary ethic' as alternatives (p. 83). Brittain Smith notes the same issue for his translation of *Dawn*, pointing out that Sitte can mean custom, habit, practice, etiquette, and propriety (p. 291). Smith chooses to adopt 'morality of mores', translating the plural *Sitten* as 'mores', and the singular *Sitte* as 'custom', except in the case of *D* 9. I follow Smith's translation for the sake of clarity. See: Simon Robertson, 'The Scope Problem: Nietzsche, The Moral, Ethical, and Quasi-Aesthetic,' in *Nietzsche, Naturalism and Normativity*, ed. Simon Robertson and Christopher Janaway (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 83–84; Friedrich Nietzsche, *Dawn: Thoughts on the Presumptions of Morality*, trans. Brittain Smith, vol. 5, The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche (1881; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).

[8] Brian Domino, 'Polyp Man,' in *A Nietzschean Bestiary: Becoming Animal Beyond Docile and Brutal*, ed. Christa Davis Acampora and Ralph R. Acampora (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), pp. 47–48.

The fundamental morality problem that Nietzsche develops and explores in *D* is this: morality itself is problematic. Nietzsche claims that morality stupefies us: specifically, he claims, the feeling for custom 'acts to prevent one from having new experiences and correcting old mores: in other words, morality acts to prevent the rise of new and better mores' (*D* 19). Nietzsche clearly states that with his work in *D*, he has begun the work of undermining our trust in morality (*D* P:3). However, it is unclear precisely how he undertakes this work – or indeed how morality stupefies us. Nietzsche recognises three interconnected component parts to the problem of how to undermine our faith in the morality of mores, and which he addresses. I will explain these in turn, while also unpacking Nietzsche's claim on morality as preventing the rise of new and better – healthier – mores.

The first main component of the morality problem is that challenging morality is immoral. As Nietzsche points out, engaging critically with morality is exceptionally challenging because of the degree of authority that morality holds:

> As with every authority, in the presence of morality one precisely *should* not think or, even less, speak one's mind; here, one – *obeys*! As long as the world has existed, no authority has ever willingly permitted itself to become the object of critique; and even to think of criticising morality, to consider morality as a problem, as problematic: what? was that not – is that not – immoral? … (*D* P:3)

Nietzsche's specific concern is about how to engage critically with a form of authority that can immediately dismiss such a critical project. To make his morality problem apparent to others, Nietzsche needs some kind of basis or foundation for his project. In section 3 of his Preface to *D*, he spends

considerable time discussing Kant's efforts to provide a proper groundwork for his work on morals. Nietzsche's remarks here are misleading, because they seem to be a weak commentary on Kantian ethics that invites dismissal, or at least suspicion; however, I suggest that the purpose of these remarks is to illustrate that Nietzsche feels sympathy with Kant's effort to provide a groundwork or basis for his investigation, even though he thinks that Kant's groundwork – rationality – was ultimately unhelpful. Nietzsche also suggests that a campaign against morality must challenge faith in reason (*D* P:4). As I will discuss in more detail below, Nietzsche does develop an effective alternative basis for his project: drive psychology. What we should note for the moment is that Nietzsche specifically claims that the campaign against morality involves the '*self-sublation* [*Selbstaufhebung*] *of morality*' (*D* P:4).[9]

In light of the first component of the morality problem, we must notice that we cannot simply reason our way out of morality. The second component of the morality problem is that morality is, in Nietzsche's words, 'the greatest mistress of seduction': morality is seductive because this 'Circe' of philosophers knows how to 'inspire' (*begeistern*) each of us (*D* P:3). In short, ceasing morality-based discourse is very hard to accomplish successfully. In notes on his recent translation of *D*, Brittain Smith remarks that *begeistern* may be translated as 'to inspire', 'to enthuse', and 'to breathe spirit [*Geist*] into' (p. 288). It is worth attending to the multiple senses of *begeistern* here, given that Nietzsche's specific concern is with the tremendous rhetorical power of rational moral talk, which can overpower us even without our notice, much less our assent. To illustrate this concern with moral talk, Nietzsche provides the example of anarchist discourse, asking us to notice and consider 'how morally [anarchists] evince in order to convince' (*D* P:3). This is the case even though anarchists logically should not ally themselves to any form of authority – and yet anarchists still, as Nietzsche says, end up describing themselves as good and just in order to gain authority for their position by borrowing from the authority of moral talk (*D* P:3). The same point is made in *D* 9, where Nietzsche points out that even when we develop insights into the development of morality, such insights 'stick to our tongue and don't want out: because they sound coarse!'

[9] See Domino, 'Polyp Man,' p. 43.

Two of the main component parts of Nietzsche's morality problem in *D* should now be clear: (i) challenging morality is immoral, and thus subject to immediate dismissal by the authority of morality (especially in as far as it is based on rationality), and (ii) maintaining a challenge to morality is made even more challenging by the seductive power of moral talk. Of course the second component bolsters the first component, as rational analysis of morality is dependent on language. Before enumerating the third component of Nietzsche's morality problem, let me briefly discuss how Nietzsche works to address these first two components.

Nietzsche provides a way for us to move past the first component of the morality problem by developing a new, psychological, foundation for his campaign against morality.[10] Nietzsche moves the campaign against morality to the *underground*: more specifically, he identifies the 'moral mine' of human drives as the grounding framework for his campaign (*D* P:1; *D* 119).[11] This counters the first component of the morality problem, because the shifting nature of drives – which Nietzsche describes as 'their ebb and flow, their play and counter-play' – means that we no longer have sufficient warrant to claim that there is any singular authoritative basis for morality, including that of reason.[12] Notice also that while Nietzsche

[10] Here I follow Carl B. Sachs, who shows that *D* is the significant source of Nietzsche's distinction between authority and morality, and that Nietzsche's attention to philosophy of mind and psychology – specifically his attention to drives – is significant to locating Nietzsche's development of this distinction. Carl B. Sachs, 'Nietzsche's 'Daybreak': Towards a Naturalized Theory of Autonomy,' *Epoché* (2008): 81–100, doi:10 . 5840 / epoche200813115.

[11] On Nietzsche's investigation of the subterranean in *D*, see also Bamford, 'Daybreak,' p. 141.

[12] For the purposes of this paper, I follow Sachs in holding that it is the drive psychology in *D* that enables Nietzsche to explain the 'material conditions of subjectivity', including historical, social, psychological, and biological conditions (2008, p. 82). As Sachs claims, conceptually structured mental states and their affective correlates are conditioned by unconscious drives and impulses, where the unconscious is both individual and general (2008, pp. 82–83). I also follow Paul Katsafanas' treatment of drives as embodied dispositions inducing affective/evaluative orientations, and which seek discharge by influencing the agent's perceptions (including their perceptions of reasons), affects, and reflective thought (2013, pp. 740, 742, 745, 747, 752). For the alternative view that Nietzschean drives are homunculi, see Peter Poellner (1995), or Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick (2012). Sachs, 'Nietzsche's 'Daybreak"; Paul Katsafanas, 'Nietzsche's Philosophical Psychology,' in *The Oxford Handbook on Nietzsche*, ed. John Richardson and Ken Gemes (Oxford: Oxford University

claims in *D* 19 that there are more and better mores to be uncovered as part of the campaign against morality, he does not make a specific prescription on what those mores in fact might be. While Nietzsche discusses six possible strategies for combating the vehemence of drives, he claims that drive vehemence is merely the result of one drive complaining about another, and that the phenomenon will require the intellect to take sides (*D* 120).[13] However, the next aphorism does allow us to entertain one plausible possibility concerning a new ethic in *D*. Nietzsche contends that freethinkers, and more specifically freedoers, who can 'break the spell of a custom with a *deed*', have an important role to play in history, and that such freedoers are often – wrongly – described as evil (*D* 20). Freethinking, and indeed freedoing, seem to be necessary for Nietzsche's campaign against morality.

The second component of the morality problem is more challenging to deal with, because the seduction of moral talk must be constantly overcome. It is all too easy for us to assume we have overcome morality, only to be sucked back into thinking and speaking according to the terms of morality. This would undermine any gains we have made in a campaign against morality. The incompleteness of our self-knowledge of the drives adds further difficulty here, as Nietzsche points out when he asks us to consider the consequences of adopting drive psychology:

> ... do I have to explain ... that our moral judgments and evaluations are, as well, mere images and fantasies stemming from a physiological process we know nothing of, a kind of acquired language for denoting various nerve impulses? That all our so-called consciousness is a more or less fantastical commentary on an unknown, perhaps unknowable, yet felt text? (*D* 119)

Press, 2013); Peter Poellner, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick, *The Soul of Nietzsche's 'Beyond Good and Evil'* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

[13] Domino argues that this claim means Nietzsche sees reason as the tool of one drive trying to quell another, and that it leaves Nietzsche in a similar position to Hume's position that reason is the slave of the passions. I see this claim as commensurate with Sachs' remarks on conditioning of conceptually structured mental states and their correlates, and in line with Katsafanas' account of drives as embodied dispositions. See Domino, 'Polyp Man,' p. 46; Sachs, 'Nietzsche's 'Daybreak"; Katsafanas, 'Nietzsche's Philosophical Psychology.'

Nietzsche thinks that the physiological and environmental perspective provided by drive psychology is constantly undermined by the effect that the grammatical structure of language has upon our capacity to investigate ourselves, or the world. For example, he claims that humanity consistently confuses 'the active and passive':

> 'I have no idea what I am *doing*! I have no idea what I *should do*!' You're right, but make no mistake about it: *you are being done*! moment by every moment! (*D* 120)

Nietzsche's explanation for our lack of self-knowledge critically involves language. He claims that language and its governing prejudices develop words only for 'superlative' degrees of processes and drives, not for their more subtle variations (*D* 115). For example, we have words for extreme states such as '[w]rath, love, compassion, pain' but not for intermediate, milder states or lower states; we are wholly unaware of these lower states, yet he thinks that they still form our characters and direct our actions (*D* 115). And even if we had words for these lower states, this may not help us; as Nietzsche contends – with a noteworthy play on the notion of petrification – 'perpetually petrified words' can form substantial impediments to solving problems, including the morality problem (*D* 47).

This second component of Nietzsche's morality problem is further complicated by a third component: fear. We know that Nietzsche's effort to undermine our faith in morality specifically targets the morality of custom that he terms the '*morality of mores*' (*D* 9). In reviewing Nietzsche's explanation of the morality of mores in *D* with the theme of mood in mind, it becomes immediately clear that Nietzsche is keen to discuss an important dimension of the morality of mores: the mood (*Stimmung*) of fear.[14]

[14] Someone may immediately object to my claim that fear is a mood. On this point, I follow Lars Svendsen's analysis of fear as mood. In a detailed philosophical analysis of fear, Svendsen uses work by the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman on the phenomenon of diverted fear, which is fear that is due neither to confrontation with a threatening object nor to previous exposure to such an object, in order to support a classification of at least some types of fear as mood (2008, 46-47). Specifically, Svendsen claims that low-intensity fear – which he defines as fear that 'surrounds us and forms a backdrop of our experiences and interpretations of the world' – has the nature of a mood, rather than of an emotion. Lars Svendsen, *A Philosophy of Fear* (2007; London: Reaktion Books, 2008), pp. 46–47.

Nietzsche explicitly identifies the notion of morality as developing and perpetuating this third component of the morality problem in two main stages in *D* 9. First, Nietzsche notes the phenomenon of fear as rooted in response to tradition. He describes tradition as:

> A higher authority, which one obeys not because it commands what is *useful* to us, but because it *commands*. (*D* 9)

Nietzsche points out that morality does not necessarily command what is useful; we obey whatever is commanded, and we do so out of fear. But as he also claims, there is something special about the type of fear that is rooted in tradition, especially when this is compared with other feelings of fear. He describes what is special about such fear as follows:

> It is that fear of a higher intellect that commands through tradition, fear in the face of an inexplicable, indeterminate power, of something beyond the personal – there is *superstition* in this fear. (*D* 9)

According to Nietzsche, the feeling of fear rooted in tradition is special because it is superstitious: this fear is a fear of inexplicable and indeterminate power intuited from multiple possible commands of morality. This provides one reason why superstitious fear is a mood: we don't have a fear of a particular object or experience; instead, this fear surrounds us – it is a constant background to our moral reflections, experiences, and feelings.[15] This superstitious fear of a power that each of us intuits as present – but for the existence of which we have no evidence – informs and directs our encounters with morality's commands and laws.

Given my view that superstitious fear is a mood, it is important to note that Nietzsche goes on to identify how superstitious fear operates in as part of the social context of morality in the next part of the aphorism:

> Originally, all training, all tending to health, marriage, the art of healing, agriculture, war, speaking and keeping silent, traffic with one another and with the gods belonged in the domain of morality: which demanded that one observe rules and precepts *without* thinking *of oneself* as an individual. (*D* 9)

[15] Svendsen, *A Philosophy of Fear*.

Nietzsche thinks that obedience to tradition involves thinking of oneself as living in accordance with terms of customs that are embedded in society, yet without thinking of oneself as an individual. His explanation as to why this is necessary prioritises the role of custom:

> Originally, then, everything was a matter of custom, and anyone wishing to elevate himself above custom had to become lawgiver and medicine man and a demigod of sorts: that is, he had to *create customs* – a terrifying, life-threatening, thing! (*D* 9)

To develop new customs by thinking of oneself in individual terms invites the possible wrath of the unknown power on top of possible exclusion from the customary moral community, further establishing the mood of superstitious fear within our culture. Every person experiencing superstitious fear contributes to the pervasiveness of fear within the broader social environment, even when there is no single specific object of fear with which they are confronted or to which they are responding.

Second, and importantly, meeting the conditions imposed by the authority of the morality of mores explicitly requires that 'the individual shall sacrifice' – it requires, Nietzsche claims, that the self must be overcome in order to ensure that tradition benefits regardless of the consequences for (or any particular desires of) specific individuals (*D* 9). Nietzsche's claim reinforces his broader concern that the morality of mores depends on being embedded within and supported by the obedient behaviour of a cultural community; offences against the morality of mores result in negative consequences for that community; as such, individual actions against morality cannot be tolerated. As examples in support of this claim, Nietzsche presents (i) the Socratic emphasis on individual self-control as a means to ethical living, which he classifies as truly exceptional when set against the background of the morality of mores, and (ii) the ancient Christian pursuit of individual salvation, the individualism of which appeared evil to virtuous Romans whose morality was grounded in a custom-oriented community (*D* 9). In such circumstances, individual thinking and action

provokes horror; any type of originality is considered, and considers itself, 'evil and dangerous' (*D* 9). Each of us is afraid that we might perform some anti-traditional action just as much as we fear the negative consequences for society of our performing such an action. Again, this reinforces a pervasive mood of superstitious fear.

The authority of the morality of mores, sustained by the mood of fear, seems unassailable by these lights. To solve the morality problem, Nietzsche contends that we must somehow challenge the dominion of the morality of mores. To do this, he claims that we must find a way to undermine our trust in morality sufficiently successfully that the 'subterranean' can become human once again and, as he puts it, see its 'own dawn' (*D* P:1). In short, we have to find a way to free ourselves from morality; to do so, we have to free ourselves from the mood of fear supporting morality. However, given the three main components of Nietzsche's morality problem discussed above, it is exceptionally difficult to undertake this work directly or effectively.

However, it is precisely because of his clear account of the way in which the mood of superstitious fear arises and is consistently reinforced that Nietzsche is well placed to develop a way of campaigning against morality in *D*. Because Nietzsche acknowledges that we fear our own possible performance of some anti-traditional action, we must still – logically – be capable of performing such actions, even if the likelihood of our doing so is severely curtailed by the mood of fear. The question is how we are to accomplish and encourage performance of such actions. A clue to Nietzsche's strategy is found in what Simon Robertson refers to as a 'pivotal' passage in the text:[16]

> ... I deny morality the same way I deny alchemy, which is to say, I deny its presuppositions, *not* however that there were alchemists who did believe in these presuppositions and acted in accordance with them. I also deny immorality: not that countless people *feel* immoral, rather than there is in *truth* a reason to feel that way. As should be obvious – provided I'm not a fool – I don't deny that it is best to avoid and to struggle against many actions that are considered immoral; likewise that it is best to perform and promote many that are considered moral – but I maintain: the former should be avoided and the latter promoted *for different reasons than heretofore*. We must *learn to think differently* – in order finally, perhaps very late, to achieve even more: *to feel differently*. (*D* 103)

[16] Robertson, 'The Scope Problem,' p. 82.

Nietzsche explicitly claims that he accepts that people have feelings of morality and immorality, and suggests that these feelings are non-trivial. His morality denial is made first on the basis of denial of morality's presuppositions, and second on the basis of feeling differently as a distinctive achievement with regard to morality. I therefore propose that we pay closer attention to how Nietzsche uses mood (*Stimmung*) in *D* as a way past this concern. Mood may be a major component part of the morality problem, but it is also a vital part of how Nietzsche undertakes his campaign against morality.

Stanley Corngold translates an essay written by Nietzsche at Pforta in 1864, and uses it to inform an analysis of the role of mood in Nietzsche's wider thought.[17] Corngold claims that Nietzsche's essay 'enacts the being "outside" of articulated understanding' and suggests that mood is the basis for such exteriority.[18] Let me provide a key set of claims from Nietzsche's 1864 essay, entitled 'On Mood', by way of an illustration of this concept of exteriority:

> One of the strongest inclinations of the soul, however, is a certain curiosity, a penchant for the unfamiliar, and this explains why we often let ourselves be put into unpleasant moods.
>
> But it is not only via the will that the soul takes on things; the soul is made of the same stuff that events are made of, or of something similar, and so it happens that an event that does not touch any kindred string nonetheless with its burden of mood lies heavy upon your soul and can gradually become so predominant that it cramps and compresses the other contents of the soul.

[17] Corngold, 'Nietzsche's Moods.'
[18] Ibid., p. 72.

> Thus moods come either from inner battles or from an external pressure on the inner world.[19]

Corngold suggests that for Nietzsche in this early essay, mood is ultimately a disposition in the struggle between event and thought, and that mood eventuates through writing.[20] In what follows in this paper, I explore Corngold's position on mood as disposition in the context of *D*, in order to support my claim that mood itself is Nietzsche's way to counter the stupefying effect of the mood of fear sustaining the morality of mores.

Nietzsche explicitly characterises the climate of fear in terms of mood at the end of *D* 9, using the metaphor of weather to characterise mood. He suggests that because of the fear induced by the morality of mores, 'any form of originality has acquired an evil conscience; accordingly, the sky above the best of humanity continues to this very minute to be cloudier, gloomier than necessary' (*D* 9). Following on from his analysis of the development and promotion of a culture of fear by the morality of mores, Nietzsche introduces the concept of mood as argument in *D* 28.[21] The title of the aphorism, '*mood as argument*', provides us with an important way in to understanding his approach throughout *D*. Nietzsche offers a description of how mood is used in place of argument by the morality of mores, but he also demonstrates how it is possible to use mood to challenge the authority of the morality of mores.

In *D* 28, Nietzsche compares two possible ways of explaining the experience of a 'joyous resolve to act'. The first way identifies God as the cause of all actions; the feeling of joyous resolve is God's way of letting us know that our intention to act in some particular way has received God's approval. The second way focuses on the feeling of joy inherent to the resolution to act. According to the second way, an agent unsure of how to proceed may consider several possible actions – but according to Nietzsche, the agent will ultimately choose to proceed in the way most likely to bring about the feeling of joyous resolve to act. What is important is production of the desired feeling. As Nietzsche claims in support of this position:

[19] Corngold, 'Nietzsche's Moods,' p. 71.

[20] Ibid., p. 74.

[21] In addition to aphorism 28, there are six main aphorisms in *D* in which Nietzsche discusses the concept of mood (*Stimmung*) explicitly. Smith's translation uses 'frame of mind' in *D* 146 & 150; the German *Stimmung* is consistently used in all seven aphorisms.

> Good mood was laid on the scales as argument and outweighed rationality: because mood was interpreted superstitiously as the workings of a god who promises success and allows his reason to speak through mood as the highest rationality. (*D* 28)

In the aphorism, Nietzsche shows that while superstition animates both ways of explaining the feeling of joyous resolve to act, in the case of the second possible explanation, an argument beyond the creation of a mood is actually missing. Nietzsche goes on to suggest that 'clever and power-hungry men' make effective use of mood as, or in place of, argument:

> 'Create the mood!' – with it you can supplant all argument, vanquish any counter-argument! (*D* 28)

It is important here to separate out Nietzsche's critical remarks from his positive proposal regarding mood. On the critical front, given a choice between providing an explanation and creating a mood, Nietzsche's main point in this aphorism is that creating a mood is more effective for moral authoritarian purposes than simple appeal to a god. Mood is better able to support morality's authority, because there is no argument when mood is used: there is simply further reinforcement of fear, and thus of our obedience to morality's authority. An argument, for example one appealing to divine authority, may be interrogated and dismissed using logic. It is substantially more difficult to engage critically with mood used as argument. This leaves open the possibility of working to counter the effect of a mood on mood's own terms: by fostering a different mood to that of fear.

Another worthwhile example of mood use occurs in aphorism 146. Continuing his critical engagement with the mood of fear, Nietzsche points out that 'a higher and freer' way of thinking would look beyond immediate negative consequences of our actions for others, such as feelings of 'doubt and dire distress', to more significant future benefits such as 'further knowledge' (*D* 146). Freethinking in the face of prevailing authority of the morality of mores, Nietzsche claims, is necessary because of the highly deleterious effect of that morality for individuals as well as for any community. As he writes, while living according to the morality of mores:

> ... we simultaneously communicate to our neighbor a frame of mind [*Stimmung*] in which he can *see himself as a sacrifice*, we talk him into the task for which we wish to use him. In this case do we lack compassion? But if we wish also to *get beyond our compassion* and to gain a victory over ourselves, does this not constitute a higher and freer bearing and attitude than when one feels safe once one has ascertained whether an action *benefits or hurts* one's neighbor? We, on the other hand, would, through sacrifice – in which we *and our neighbors* are included – strengthen and elevate the feeling of human *power*, even though we might achieve nothing further. But even this would be a positive increase in *happiness*. In the long run, even if this – but not a word more here! One look suffices, you have understood me. (*D* 146)

Nietzsche's major complaints in this aphorism are that the morality of mores dehumanises us, and that such morality is hypocritical. Morality pretends to sustain community, but in fact reduces each individual to playing a merely functional role in a self-sustaining economy of moral custom. Within this economy, each individual turns her neighbours into creatures who think of themselves as obedient at best, and as potential sacrifices for the alleged moral benefit of their community at worst. In this way, the mood of superstitious fear is further reinforced: it becomes even harder for an individual to challenge it.

On the positive front, as well as providing arguments against prevailing moral authority Nietzsche shows how mood can be used performatively to campaign against morality in *D* 146. Notice that just as Nietzsche's discussion in the aphorism might seem to begin to adopt problematic moral talk, for example in his mention of increasing happiness, he immediately interrupts himself. Whatever Nietzsche might be tempted to start to claim on the basis of morality, the aphorism works to resist and counter the morality of mores indirectly, by performing resistance to the hegemony of morality's authority through self-interruption, as well as by direct argumentation.[22]

[22] On *D* as a medical narrative, and specifically on how the construction of *D* as involving a performative demonstration on Nietzsche's part as to how the renewal of health must emerge from current illness, over and above explanation, see *D* 27–28 and also Bamford, 'Daybreak,' pp. 142–146.

Added to this, Nietzsche's remark to the reader at the end of the aphorism works to introduce fellow feeling with regard to his campaign against the morality of mores, and thus the possibility of new ethical community.[23] The construction of the aphorism thus opens up Nietzsche, and readers of *D*, to perception and exploration of a positive sensibility that competes with the mood of fear sustaining the morality of mores.

Both critical and performative claims are developed further in Nietzsche's remarks on mood in subsequent aphorisms of *D*. Nietzsche uses the example of tranquillity (both domestic tranquillity, and tranquillity of the soul) to claim that '[o]ur customary mood depends on the mood in which we manage to maintain our surroundings [*in der wir unsere Umgebung zu erhalten wissen*]' (*D* 283). If read with reference to the morality of mores, then the mood in question is superstitious fear, based on Nietzsche's previous analysis. However, if read with reference to the possibility of an alternative ethic, then the mood need not be that of fear. Nietzsche indicates that an alternative mood, which may motivate us in our campaign against morality, might be that of powerful kindness – which he likens to the kindness of a father (*Machtvolle Milde, wie die eines Vaters*) (*D* 473). This father is no traditional authoritarian. In a previous aphorism, Nietzsche suggests the model of a father confessor working as a humble 'doctor of the spirit' to the reciprocal benefit of himself and others, a position which Nietzsche proposes as embodying helpfulness, humility and love, yet at the same time, self-interest, and self-enjoyment (*D* 449).

In both of these aphorisms, readers are encouraged to engage in exploring the affects involved in adopting the role in question:

> To be in possession of a dominion and at the same time inconspicuous and renouncing! To lie constantly in the sun and the kindness of grace and yet to know that the paths rising to the

[23] Nietzsche returns to this theme of understanding in *EH* 'Destiny' 9, where he writes, 'Have I been understood? – Dionysus versus the Crucified. –' On Ecce Homo as a critical engagement with philosophical methodology understood as wholly dependent on a disembodied timeless rational subject, see Rebecca Bamford, 'Ecce Homo: Philosophical Autobiography in the Flesh,' in *Nietzsche's 'Ecce Homo'*, ed. Duncan Large and Nicholas Martin (Berlin: De Gruyter, Forth).

> sublime are right at hand! That would be a life! That would be a reason to live, to live a long time. (*D* 473)

While Nietzsche has to balance possibility against the present, grim, reality of a culture of fear, his description of such a possible life is strikingly positive. The construction of the aphorism and the image that it presents of an emotionally rich and constructive social climate are compelling. But the tone of the aphorism, set down in writing, is more than merely rhetorically powerful: it is a powerful transformation tool. The aphorism, in writing, becomes a feature of the environment and as such, is able to facilitate the campaign to counter the prevailing mood of superstitious fear.[24] This is especially the case if the reader, or Nietzsche himself, falters in commitment to the campaign against morality: the text remains a vital external component of the cognitive work involved in campaign participation. Because of the sheer difficulty of campaigning against morality given the three main component parts of the morality problem I described above, I think it is plausible to understand the aphoristic text of *D* – to use Mark Rowlands' terms[25] – as an environmental structure that, having been constructed to manipulate and transform our mental processes, intervenes in relevant mental processes when either Nietzsche or ourselves engage in reading it.[26]

Nietzsche's work on the theme of mood in *D* continues with a discussion of ideal selfishness as an effective alternative to the mood of fear in aphorism 552. Nietzsche uses the example of pregnancy to illustrate the point that to counter the morality of mores, we must actively cultivate a new way of being:

> Is there a more consecrated condition than that of pregnancy? To do everything one does in the unspoken belief that it must

[24] I treat Nietzsche's thinking on mood and on aphorism in active externalist terms. Mark Rowlands helpfully describes this view as 'a thesis of constitution' involving that '[a]t least some mental processes are literally constituted, in part, by the manipulation, exploitation, and transformation of appropriate environmental structures; that is, some mental processes contain these operations as constituents. Mark Rowlands, 'The Extended Mind,' *Zygon* 44, no. 3 (2009): p. 630.

[25] Ibid.

[26] On this active externalist feature of Nietzsche's writing, see also Bamford, 'Ecce Homo.'

> be for the good of the one who is coming to be in us! This has to *enhance* its mysterious value upon which we think with delight! One thus avoids a great deal without having to force oneself too hard. One thus suppresses a violent word, one offers a conciliatory hand: the child must emerge from the mildest and best of conditions. We shudder at the thought of our sharpness and abruptness: what if it poured a drop of calamity into our dearest unknown's cup of life! Everything is veiled, full of presentiment, one has no idea how it will go, one waits it out and seeks to be *ready*. (*D* 552)

Even while Nietzsche suggests here that we take responsibility for determining the outcome of the pregnancy, he also points out that our responsibility has some (drive-based) limits:

> In which time there reigns in us a pure and purifying feeling of profound irresponsibility, rather like a spectator has before the closed curtain: *it* is growing, *it* is coming to the light of day: *we* have in our hands nothing to determine, either its value or its hour. We are thrown back solely on that mediate influence of protecting. 'It is something greater than we are that is growing here' is our innermost hope: we are preparing everything for it so that it will come into the world thriving: not only everything beneficial but also the affections and laurel wreaths of our soul. – One ought to live *in this state of consecration*! One *can* live in it! (*D* 552)

In attempting to understand what Nietzsche is proposing here, it is worth noting a connection between the description of pregnancy in this aphorism to Nietzsche's earlier discussion of the polyp and its alimentation (*Ernährung*) in the discussion of drives presented in *D* 119. Regarding the polyp, Nietzsche writes:

> With every moment of our lives some of the polyp-arms of our being grow and others dry up, depending on the nourishment that the moment does or does not supply. As stated earlier, all our experiences are, in this sense, types of nourishment – seeds

> sown, however, with a blind hand devoid of any knowledge as to who hungers and who already has abundance. And as a consequence of this contingent alimentation of the parts, the whole, fully grown polyp turns out to be a creature no less contingent than its maturation. (*D* 119)

On the one hand, Nietzsche claims that we care for the 'one who is coming'. On the other hand, Nietzsche acknowledges that we cannot be wholly responsible for determining the value or the time of this 'one'. Nietzsche works to bring to our attention the limitations of our control over ourselves as well as of our control over others. Like the polyp, we are pregnant with ourselves, and we do not have complete (or even particularly good) self-knowledge. In fact we have never had perfect self-knowledge: we are always already in an expectant state. As Nietzsche remarks with regard to the concepts of thinking and action, while we might try to explain ourselves in terms of consciousness and will, we can legitimately claim to 'have no relationship other than pregnancy', which logically holds, in the context of these aphorisms, for relationships to ourselves as well as to others and to the world (*D* 552).

We polyp-agents may meaningfully pursue the 'mediate influence' of protection, given our expectant states. With this in mind, Nietzsche finally advocates a mood of ideal selfishness for ourselves and others (*D* 552). Concerning ourselves, protection involves us caring for the soul understood as a bundle of drives, guarding over it and keeping it in repose, 'so that our fructification reaches a beautiful conclusion' (*D* 552). Concerning others, Nietzsche maintains that through this mediate way of caring for ourselves, we may 'care for and guard over the *benefit of all*' (*D* 552). Mood can, though attention to our response to our surroundings, be moderated. When we are seized by a beneficial mood that promotes our fruitfulness, we may adopt the relevant social setting in which the mood is produced, whether this happens to be in solitude or in company (*D* 473).[27] Like the figure of the father confessor/spiritual doctor, we can, as pregnant creatures, be ideally selfish. Doing so, Nietzsche claims, creates quite a different mood to that of the superstitious fear produced by the morality of mores:

[27] Though as Nietzsche notes in *D* 249, the fearful person is never alone; such a person intuits an enemy 'always standing behind his chair'.

> ... the mood in which we live, this proud and tempered mood, is a balsam that extends far and wide around us even onto restless souls. (*D* 552)

We can, in other words, carefully observe our reactions to natural and social environments in order to identify what helps us to flourish. By attending to our flourishing, we can thus work to protect ourselves from the pervasive mood of fear. The more we do to explore and protect ourselves from fear, the greater the associated mood benefit, even for the 'restless' amongst us.

If this explanation is on target, it is now possible to conclude that Nietzsche provides a way past all three parts of the morality problem in *D*. Nietzsche acknowledges that the pregnant 'are *strange*', that as we are pregnant we should not find it problematic to be similarly strange, and that we 'should not be annoyed with others if they need to be so!' (*D* 552).[28] On the same basis that he defends and indeed celebrates being 'strange', Nietzsche highlights the importance of the intellectual conscience (*D* 149). He suggests that we need to acknowledge the importance of what he calls 'tiny deviant actions' (*D* 149). Nietzsche considers that a rational person of conviction might think a compromising action on their part with regard to social custom does not matter overmuch in the broader scheme of things. He gives three examples of forms of compromise: an atheist having their child baptised in a Christian church, a pacifist completing military service 'like everybody else', and a 'shameless' man marrying the woman with whom he is in a sexual relationship, solely because she has a pious family who expect a marriage to take place (*D* 149). In all three cases, it seems easier for everyone concerned simply to go along with custom. The

[28] Sachs differentiates between heteronymous subjectivity as an internalisation of domination, and an autonomous subjectivity that is capable, at least to some degree, of organising itself. He claims that, 'heteronomy and autonomy are characterised by attitudes of avoidance or acknowledgement with respect to the totality of conditions and relations which make them possible'. According to the terms of my argument on mood, we may classify heteronymous subjects as fearful and autonomous subjects as capable of moderating fear by means of sustaining different mood(s) such as ideal selfishness. Sachs, 'Nietzsche's 'Daybreak',' p. 93.

point is that all such compromise achieves is to lend greater credence to the custom as a rational form of behaviour. Deviance, even slight and seemingly insignificant deviance, contributes to the campaign against morality by contributing to the mood of ideal selfishness. We need not only to be ideally selfish, then, according to Nietzsche, but also deviant.

In this paper, I have been defending the claim that Nietzsche uses mood to undercut the highly problematic and deeply entrenched authority of the morality of mores. As the third major component of the morality problem that Nietzsche identifies in *D*, mood – specifically, superstitious fear – makes the task of posing a challenge to the authority of morality exceptionally difficult. Nietzsche's reasoned analysis of the role of mood in *D* is important: it enables him to identify that a new mood can be deployed against the function of the mood of superstitious fear sustaining the morality of mores.

However, because of the first two components of the morality problem, providing a reasoned argument is insufficient to support an effective campaign against morality. As well as explaining his view, Nietzsche needed to support it with an environmental structure to supplement and reinforce the explanation. The examples of performative interruption of morality talk and positive mood creation that I identified in *D* support the point that Nietzsche thought this necessary. Moreover, following Corngold's reading of Nietzsche's 1864 essay 'On Moods', as well as Rowlands (2009), I have proposed that the aphoristic structure and performative dimension of the text itself counts as the relevant and necessary environmental structure. Putting both negative and positive moods into writing means that Nietzsche himself can rely on the text to sustain both his critique of fear in morality, and his positive proposal for ideal selfishness.

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On Seriousness and Laughter

A dialogue concerning Nietzsche's Gay Science[1]

Katia Hay and Herman Siemens

KH Katia Hay
HS Herman Siemens

Introduction

HS: To my mind it's clear that Nietzsche is a thinker of seriousness, of great seriousness, perhaps even the first really serious philosopher. What after all could be more serious, more weighty or momentous than the philosophical task of an *Umwertung Aller Werte*?, a transvaluation of all values? And what could be more grave, solitary and painful than the subterranean labour presupposed by this task: to investigate the genealogy of our values. That is, to undermine our trust in morality, to unearth the conditions under which it arose and came to dominance, so as to be able to address the central question of *Umwertung*, namely: what is the value of our values?

But we might ask: is it worth taking all these things – the problems of morality – so seriously? To this Nietzsche responds:

> To me it seems there is nothing at all that more *rewards* being taken seriously; the reward being for example that one should

[1] This dialogue is based on the articles *Ernst* (seriousness) and *Lachen* (laughter) being prepared by the authors for the *Nietzsche-Wörterbuch*, to be published on *Nietzsche Online* (http://www.degruyter.com/view/db/nietzsche). The complex relations between seriousness and laughter in Nietzsche's writings are dealt with in detail in their forthcoming book on the topic.

> one day be permitted to take them cheerfully. Cheerfulness, or to use my language, the gay science – is a reward: a reward for a long, brave, labourious and subterranean seriousness, which admittedly is not everyone's thing. But on that day when we can say with a full heart: 'Forwards! Our old morality belongs to a comedy!' we will have discovered a new twist and possible outcome for the Dionysian drama of the 'fate of the soul' –: and he'll make good use of it, on that one can bet, the great old eternal comic poet of our existence! ... (*GM* P:7 5.254f.)[2]

KH: I find it very interesting that you refer to this passage, because I interpret it as saying almost the opposite. To me, Nietzsche seems to be claiming that morality belongs to comedy. In fact, if you think of the ways in which he addresses Kant's moral philosophy, you could almost say that what Nietzsche most condemned was precisely Kant's seriousness and the solemnity with which he presented his thought. From a Nietzschean perspective, I think, Kant's moral philosophy is so serious that it becomes ridiculous:

> And now don't talk to me about the categorical imperative, my friend! – this word tickles my ears, and I have to laugh, in spite of your so serious presence. (*GS* 335 3.562)[3]

But, more important than this, is the fact that one of Nietzsche's most persistent intentions is to make us reconsider the significance and importance

[2] References to Nietzsche's works follow the standard English abbreviations, with section / aphorism numbers and/or names, as appropriate; where necessary, page references are given for the *Kritische Studienausgabe* (= KSA, G. Colli and M. Montinari eds., Munich and Berlin: dtv and de Gruyter, 1980), as follows: *D* 15 3.42 = *Dawn* aphorism 15 in KSA vol. 3, p. 42). References to the *Nachlass*, also from the KSA, follow the notation therein (e.g. 2[13] 7.23 = note 2[13], KSA vol. 7, p. 23).Where necessary references are to the *Kritische Gesamtausgabe* (= *KGW: Nietzsche Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe* G. Colli and M. Montinari et al eds., Berlin/New York (De Gruyter) 1967ff. Emphases are original: underlining designates Nietzsche's own underlining; bold designates his double-underlining. Translations are ours, although we have leaned on Kaufmann, Hollingdale and others. Square brackets are used in quotes for the original German words or interpolations of ours.

[3] See also 26[464] 11.273: 'If Kant wanted to reduce philosophy to "science", then his will was a German philistinism: there might be plenty to venerate about this, but surely much more to laugh about'.

of laughter and joyfulness for philosophical thought. In his *Zarathustra* he explicitly says that we should learn to laugh and he affirms that '[h]e who climbs the highest mountain, laughs at all the sorrow-dramas [*Trauer-Spiele*] and sorrow-seriousness [*Trauer-Ernste*]' (*Z* I 4.45).[4]

1. Nietzsche's '*Zu Hause*'

HS: But would you not agree that it is only to the extent that we take the problems of philosophy seriously, more seriously than philosophers until now, that we can see through them and ridicule them? Ridicule them for having stopped short, for the very superficiality of their solutions?

Well, perhaps one way to settle this difference of opinion is to follow Nietzsche's advice and ask about his *Herkunft*, his genealogical provenance as a philosopher. Like so many of the great German philosophers – Hegel, Schelling etc. – Nietzsche was of protestant lineage and grew up in a pastor's family, and the pathos of pietism, that peculiarly *northern* pathos, is to be found everywhere in Nietzsche's *Jugendschriften*. Nietzsche, then, is a philosopher of the North, who knew first-hand what Weber called the '*bitteren Ernst*' (bitter seriousness) of Protestantism, the sense of despair, heaviness and pressure (*Verzweiflung, Schwere* and *Druck*) that afflicts a life concerned with salvation (*Heilssorge*): to crave certainty, but have only hope; to want knowledge and have only faith.[5] But pietism is not only about the uncertainty of salvation; it is first and foremost an emotionally charged love for the *Unbekannten Gott*, the 'Unknown God' to whom the young Nietzsche wrote a prayer. And it is in such love that Nietzsche was *zu Hause*, at home.[6]

[4] Also in *Z* III 4.192: 'Wer auf den höchsten Bergen steigt, der lacht über alle Trauer-Spiele und Trauer-Ernste'.

[5] See Andreas Urs Sommer, *Friedrich Nietzsches 'Der Antichrist': Ein philosophisch-historischer Kommentar* (Basel: Schwabe & Co Verlag, 2000), 357f.

[6] See Isabelle Wienand, 'Gebet,' in *Nietzsche-Wörterbuch*, ed. Paul van Tongeren, Gerd Schank, and Herman Siemens (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011), doi:10.1515/NO_W017186_0078. On Nietzsche's pietistic childhood and youth, see Giles Fraser, *Redeeming Nietzsche: On the Piety of Unbelief* (London: Routledge, 2002), 40–43; Bruce E. Benson, 'The Prayers and Tears of Friedrich Nietzsche,' chap. 5 in *The Phenomenology of Prayer*, ed. Bruce E. Benson and Norman Wirzba (2005), 73ff.; and Martin Pernet, 'Friedrich Nietzsche and Pietism,' *German Life and Letters* 48, no. 4 (1995): 474–486, doi:10.1111/j.1468-

Even as he outgrew his childhood religiosity, Nietzsche continued to identify with German seriousness: the '*Innerlichkeit*', the depth of thought, the manly courage of figures like Luther, Wagner, Kant and above all Schopenhauer became his new love, his new *zu Hause*. Think, for example, of how he describes Schopenhauer in a *Nachlass* note:

> He is course like Luther. He is the most stringent model of a German prose-writer there has been so far, nobody has taken language and the duty it enjoins upon us as seriously. (35[11] 7.811)

It is not by chance, then, that Erwin Rohde, Nietzsche's closest friend at university, writes in a letter of Nietzsche's 'Schopenhauerian seriousness, which inclines us to diligence and to a frame of mind that is mild, because it is free'.[7]

But Nietzsche's new '*zu Hause*', his philosophical love or love of philosophy, is perhaps best described by Nietzsche himself in an autobiographical note written in his early 20s:

> A certain philosophical seriousness kept me from drifting vaguely along the many directions of my talents, a seriousness that was only satisfied in the face of the naked truth and in fearlessness, nay an inclination towards hard and evil consequences. (69[8] *KGW* I/5.42)[8]

0483.1995.tb01647.x. On the young Nietzsche's prayer, 'Du hast gerufen: Herr ich komme' (*KGW* I/2.460f.) Fraser writes that it is 'deeply rooted in a Pietistic imagination. It is emotionally charged, unphilosophical, and it focuses upon the need and desire for salvation' (p. 43); Benson, by contrast, argues that Nietzsche lost his religious confidence around 1860, and that this prayer is a sign of his desperation.

[7] Letter of 15/2/1869, in: *Nietzsche, Kritische Gesamtausgabe Briefwechsel* (founded by Giorgio Colli und Mazzino Montinari, continued by Norbert Miller and Annemarie Pieper, Walter de Gruyter: Berlin /New York, 1975 ff.), vol. I/3.340.

[8] Contrast this with *GS* P:4 3.352. On 'deutscher Ernst' in connection with figures like Luther, Schopenhauer, Kant and Wagner as exemplars of (post-) protestant *Innerlichkeit*, *Tiefe des Denkens* and/or *heroic Kühnheit*, *Stärke* etc., see 75[20] *KGW* I/5.241; *BT 19* 1.128; *FEI* 5 1.749. Also *FEI* 5 1.749 on 'that manly-serious, heavy, hard and bold German spirit, that spirit of the miner's son Luther that was healthily preserved by the reformation'.

KH: Yes, of course. I agree that Nietzsche does, sometimes (especially in his early writings) present himself as a serious philosopher of the North, as you put it. But this is not always the case and there are many texts in which he clearly criticises his former serious pathos towards the 'naked truth'. In the late preface to *GS*, for instance, he seems to defend the opposite of what you have depicted as Nietzsche's *zu Hause*. Here, the whole concept of truth is turned upside down and Nietzsche describes that northern attitude to truth as an illness or, at best, a youthful folly:

> No, we do not fancy anymore this bad taste, this will for truth, for 'truth at any price', this youthful folly which lies in the love for truth … Today we consider it a matter of decency that we don't want to see everything naked, that we don't want to witness everything, that we don't want to understand and 'know' everything … One should cherish the *shame* with which Nature has hidden herself, under riddle and colourful uncertainties. Perhaps truth is a woman, who has grounds for not showing her grounds? (*GS* P:4 3.352)

Something similar happens to Nietzsche's view of Schopenhauer. Nietzsche criticises the way in which his philosophy negates the superficiality, sensuousness, lustfulness and joyfulness of life, which is something Nietzsche wants to affirm. And he associates this affirmation, the affirmation of life as such, with laughter. In a sense, Nietzsche is perhaps the first philosopher who takes it as his task to re-evaluate the notions of laughter and joyfulness. Nietzsche's motto could be, as he writes in *The Wagner Case: ridendo dicere severum*: to say the harsh, serious things laughing.[9]

The same goes for Wagner, whom he criticises for not having learnt to laugh about himself, like a good dramatist should do.

[9] This expression, used as the motto for *The Case Wagner* (6.13), is Nietzsche's own version of Horace's dictum: 'ridentem dicere verum, quid vetat? (What forbids us to say the truth laughing?)' (Satires I, 1, 24). On the one hand, Nietzsche establishes a parallel between the notion of truth (verum) and the notion of seriousness (severus = serious). On the other hand, Horace's 'truth' is displaced by 'the serious' when it becomes 'ugly truths' that cannot be lived with. This move distances N.s critical approach from the 'Härte' of the 'verum' in favour of self-critique or 'sich mit verspotten' (cf. *HH* 240 2.202).

> ... was this Parsifal meant to be taken *seriously*? One could be tempted to presume or even to desire the opposite, – namely that Wagner's Parsifal was meant to be cheerful, like a ... satire, with which the tragic dramatist Wagner ... wanted to say farewell to us, to himself, but especially *to tragedy*, and all this with an excess of the highest and boldest parody of the tragic itself, a parody of all the gruesome earthly-seriousness and earthly lamentation about the past ... (*GM* 5.341f.)

The spirit of gravity, the *Geist der Schwere* is also an important figure in Nietzsche's *Zarathustra*, but it is presented as something that must be overcome. Or at least, it has to go hand in hand with learning to dance and to laugh. It is not the *Geist der Schwere*, what Zarathustra wants to teach us, but *how* to laugh:

> I made laughter holy; you higher men learn from me, learn – to laugh! (*Z* IV 4.368)

So, responding to Nietzsche's *zu Hause*, I think it is important to recall the new motto of his *Gay Science*, which from 1887 says:

> I live in my own house, never imitated anybody and I laughed at the masters who didn't laugh at themselves. (*GS* 3.341)

In other words, it is not, I think, in the *northern Ernst* where Nietzsche feels at home, but rather in the *South*. This is where he wants to go, to the southern health, the *südliche Gesundheit* (41[7] 11.682). To the...

> ... far away futures, to Southerner Souths, such as no painter has ever dreamt of: there, where the gods feel ashamed of all gowns. (*Z* II 4.183)

2. Nietzsche's Philosophical Trajectory

HS: I have to concede that Nietzsche did not simply remain at home in his *northern Ernst* or in his youthful philosophical love. But I'm not so sure

we can speak of the South, of southern laughter, as his 'true' home either... I have in mind his late preface to *HH*, where Nietzsche describes how he became the *freie Geist* who wrote that book. The free spirit, he writes, must first have been a bound spirit, a spirit bound by youthful reverence and gratitude for the ground from which it grew. The liberation comes by way of a radical break or rupture, what Nietzsche calls '*die grosse Loslösung*'. It is sudden, like an earthquake: a drive, a wish, a will to go forth, anywhere, at any cost:

> A powerful, dangerous curiosity for an undiscovered world enflames and flickers in all his senses. 'Better to die than to live here' – that is how the commanding voice and seduction sounds: and this 'here', this 'at home' is everything that he had loved until now! (*HH* P:3 2.16)

So, you are right: Nietzsche did not, could not simply remain at home in his philosophical love. But if we ask, what *philosophical* form this 'great *Loslösung*' takes, it retains its northern character, it seems to me. He goes on to describe...

> ... A sudden horror and suspicion towards that which it loved, a flash of contempt towards that which was called its 'duty', a revolutionary, arbitrary, volcanic-explosive demand for wandering, for foreign places, for alienation, for becoming colder, sobering up, for icing up, a hatred of love, perhaps an iconoclastic grasp and look backwards, to the place where it had worshipped and loved until now... (ibid.)

Here, I would say Nietzsche describes the beginnings of his critique of values, the opening move of his project of *Umwertung*, in the form of an auto-critique of his own loves and attachments. But as such, it remains earnest, deadly earnest: a suspicion and contempt towards his duties, a hatred of love, but also: a sobering up, a becoming colder, an icing up of the homely hearth. Tell me: what could be more serious, more courageous, more manly, more northern or German in Nietzsche's sense than this critique that freezes and fractures the homely comforts of his youthful loves, values and duties?

KH: I do agree with what you say, but certainly this cannot be Nietzsche's last word. This whole process you are describing constitutes only, as Nietzsche himself writes, the first step, the first victory (which is still a *questionable* one) (*HH* P:5), towards that desired creation of new values.

You have described this process as an icing up (*Vereisung*); a becoming colder and more northern than ever. But in other passages Nietzsche talks about ice and relates it to a certain rigidity which, in the end, is the opposite of the philosophical standpoint he is trying to attain. For example, when Zarathustra first tries to talk to the people in the market who do not understand him, he says:

> My soul is still and clear as the mountain in the morning. But they think I am cold and a mocker of dreadful jokes.
> And now they look at me and laugh: and as they laugh, they hate me too. There is ice in their laughter. (*Z* P:5)

We can find many different types of laughter in Nietzsche's writings, and it is not always easy to define and distinguish them,[10] but a laughter that has ice in it, like the laughter of those who laugh at Zarathustra, not understanding him and hating him, does not seem to be the kind of laughter Nietzsche wants us to learn. His philosophy is not a philosophy of hatred and resentment. Nietzsche's philosophical project, we agree, is rather to liberate philosophy from all constraints. We are searching for the *great Loslösung*, as you have recalled. So I wonder if that first step you described earlier, that process of icing up doesn't contain too much hatred (perhaps even self-hatred) in it. I wonder if it is not bound to its own negativity.

In fact, in a later passage, ice is described as that which breaks bridges; it is what impedes us from moving and growing. It is precisely what doesn't allow us to become the new creators of values, – a process which Nietzsche associates with man becoming a bridge! (*Z* 4.17).

It is, thus, perhaps no coincidence that, as a counter-movement to this icing up, Nietzsche introduces the *Thauwind*: the warm winds of the South, which are able to melt the ice.[11] Indeed, once again I would say

[10] For an analysis of the different functions of laughter in Nietzsche's work see: Gerd Schank, *'Wer am besten lacht ...': Eine Studie zur Funktion des Lachens in Nietzsches philosophischer Schreibpraxis*. Forthcoming in de Gruyter.

[11] See (*Z* III 4.252).

that, despite the icy seriousness of Nietzsche's philosophy, it is the *southern delicatezza* Nietzsche is trying to introduce into philosophy; a warmth, joyfulness and passion which is lacking in northern Protestantism.

3. *Genesung* or Convalescence

HS: Again I would agree, the icing up, the critical rupture with past values and attachments cannot be the last word for Nietzsche. It is, as you say, only the *first victory*, a victory that must be conquered and re-conquered, again and again; above all a victory that must be won *against itself*, against the hatred and *self-hatred* that animates it, against the icing up one's own life as critic. Nietzsche is clear on this: it is a movement of *Entfremdung* and *Selbstentfremdung*, an alienation from one's life, it is a *sickness*. And he does welcome the *Thauwind*, the golden winds from the South that thaw this tyranny of love-hate and bring him back close to life, a healing wind that brings him back in touch with the *nearest things* and their magical touch, like the fine fur on a peach's skin. Here, Nietzsche says, he is like an *old lizard*, soaking up a few rays of winter sun on a wall, a lizard that is *still*, but not like ice; rather, he is happy and grateful for his rapprochement to life, but also grateful for the icy self-alienation and sickness he went through – 'that he did not always remain "at home [*zu Hause*] with himself" like a delicate, dull corner-dweller' (*HH* P:5).

But perhaps all this talk of Nietzsche's '*zu Hause*', of his first word – his *Herkunft* –, or his last word, of *either* North *or* South, of *either* sickness *or* health, misses the point. For Nietzsche also describes *himself* as a *Thauwind*. And where he does so – in *GS* 377 – he describes himself as homeless: *Heimatlos*: 'How *could* we be at home [*zu Hause*] in this today', 'how could we feel homely [*heimisch*] in this fragile broken time of transition [*Uebergangszeit*]'? As *Heimatlose*, we are, he says, like the *Thauwind* that breaks up the all-too-thin ice of our current ideals and realities. But as *Heimatlose* we are also of mixed *Herkunft*, too complex and manifold to be German *or* Greek, to be northern *or* southern, to be serious *or* gay: we are neither or both, a movement between, across and through all these oppositions: we are, as he puts it, *Good Europeans*.

But how can we understand this idea of homelessness, this more complex structure or movement?

KH: Indeed this is a crucial question, because it not only affects what you have called Nietzsche's homelessness – his mixed or multiple *Herkunft* – but also his whole project for the future. Nietzsche constantly problematises the meaning of the goals (*Ziele*) he envisages. For instance, when he talks about the necessity of moving towards the South in *Z*, he also says that 'the hottest South has not yet been discovered' (*Z* II 4.185). And in *Beyond Good and Evil* it seems that it is not even the South in itself that interests him, but the opposition, when he writes that we have to learn how 'to love the North in the South, and the South in the North' (*BGE* 'Peoples and Fatherlands' 5.200). The same goes for seriousness and laughter, as we can see when he writes, again in *BGE*, that 'maturity' means 'to have rediscovered the seriousness one had as a child when playing' (*BGE* 'Apophthegms and Interludes' 94 5.90). This seriousness enables the child to take the game and the rules of the game very seriously, although s/he knows that it is only a game.

What is clear to me now is that what we find in Nietzsche is always the necessity of maintaining the tension and the movement between the two poles and that it is through this tension, through the relation itself that those two poles are under constant change and redefinition. What we need to describe Nietzsche's philosophy is precisely this movement and this tension...

4. The Concept of Gay Science

HS: Indeed, and in a sense Nietzsche's *gaya scienza* is exactly this... The concept of Gay Science or *fröhliche Wissenschaft* means many different things. But I think we can speak of a certain *epistemic ideal*; not an architectonic à la Kant, or an edifice of knowledge à la Descartes, but more like a movement, an incessant alternation that includes all the moments we have touched on here.

First, there is the necessity of love and hate, of positing and opposing: *Setzen* and *Gegensetzen*. Nietzsche's early loves and attachments, his northern '*zu Hause*', then his critical rupture and liberation or *Loslösung* from them: *both* constitute a life lived *within* specific perspectives. They are *necessary* because it is only out of such loves and hates, out of our passions or drives, that knowledge can draw its energy: they are, as Nietzsche writes, 'the sources and powers of knowledge' (11[141] 9.494f.).

But they are also the 'enemies of knowledge': for the tyranny of *belief* (*Glaube*) is merely exchanged for the tyranny of critical *truth*. Both are one-sided and blind to their untruth – necessarily and passionately blind. That is their strength – but also their weakness from the perspective of knowledge. But what perspective is this, then, if it cannot occupy any specific perspective?

Nietzsche writes of 'looking into the world with as many eyes as possible' (11[141] 9.494), of 'polytropia' and 'experience in oppositions' (26[101] 11.177). It is not just from love and hate, from this position or that opposition, that the 'passion for knowledge' (*Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis*) draws its energy; rather, it is from the *tension* or 'struggle' (*Kampf*) between them (11[141] 9.495).

This ideal may be impossible or impracticable – for how can one affirm the necessity of specific perspectives from a non-specific perspective? –, but it points to an important movement or dynamic of knowledge: to occupy specific perspectives, to make inner-perspectival truth-claims, but also to break with them, to overcome each specific truth-claim, whether it is a position or an op-position – and to do so for the sake of truth!

If the *first* is associated by Nietzsche with seriousness, pressure and gravity – 'for we are weighty and serious men and more like weights than men' (*GS* 107 3.465) – the *second* is associated with lightness, flight, height, dance and above all: laughter.[12] It is by making fun of oneself (*sich mit verspotten*), understood as a form of self-critique, that one can overcome one-sided perspectives and attain – *die fröhliche Wissenschaft*.

> To be cheerful and poke fun at oneself with good humour – ridendo dicere severum [*to say harsh things laughing*], where das verum dicere [*to say the truth*] would justify all hardness – that is humanity itself. (*EH* 'Clever' 1 6.357)

[12] See especially *Z* on the 'Geist der Schwere'/ 'genius gravitationis': *Z* I 7 4.49; 3[1].44 10.58; also Marco Brusotti, *Die Leidenschaft der Erkenntnis: Philosophische und ästhetische Lebensgestaltung bei Nietzsche von 'Morgenröthe' bis 'Also sprach Zarathustra'* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1997), pp. 576–586. Also: *GS* 107; *GS* P:4 3.351f.; *BGE* 213 5.148; cf. *HH* P:4–7; *BGE* 30 (on esoteric/exoteric).

KH: This makes me realise how important it is to understand that the kind of knowledge we learn through *gay science* is not only directed to the things and phenomena of the external world, but also, and perhaps most importantly, to ourselves. It is a book about self-knowledge and self-critique. To criticise one perspective means to relativise and make fun of the way in which we might be fixated on that particular perspective or mindset; to manage to break with that rigidity also means that we are able to change something within ourselves that had remained unknown to us. In other words, it is about discovering or revealing those very drives that are behind our longing for truth and knowledge with enough lightness so that, instead of falling into despair, we might be able to modify them and thereby gain higher and deeper forms of knowledge; among others, self-knowledge.

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Nietzsche's Post-Classical Therapy

Thomas Ryan and Michael Ure

In 1887 Nietzsche added a preface to *GS*. Nietzsche took this opportunity to develop one of his most important, yet enigmatic analyses of the nature of past philosophy and to explain his own model of philosophical practice. Here he focuses on meta-philosophical questions: why do we practice philosophy; what role does it play in the making of a human life; what is its value as a human activity? Nietzsche does not assume that we should esteem philosophy or that we have yet properly understood the genesis, motives or purposes of this peculiar and perplexing type of human practice.

In the early 1870s Nietzsche, we might recall, had made an unsuccessful attempt to move from his chair in philology (or classics) to a chair in philosophy. Nietzsche's interest in the philosophical vocation spawned his attempt to write a book, simply entitled 'The Philosopher', which sought to examine and understand the philosophical life.[1] Why, Nietzsche enquired, did this rather strange practice of philosophy, etymologically speaking the love of wisdom or knowledge, which appears to prioritise 'truth' above all other ends, emerge and why do we continue to practise it? For the early Nietzsche the emergence and value of philosophy seemed especially problematic because he assumed that human existence hinged on illusions and deceptions. In a sketch entitled 'The Pathos of Truth' Nietzsche asked

[1] See Daniel Breazeale's English translation of Nietzsche's unpublished sketches for this work Daniel Breazeale, ed. and trans., *Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early 1870s* (New Jersey: Humanities Press International, 1990).

rhetorically: 'Does [man] not actually live *by means of* a continual process of deception?'.[2] If so, what are we to make of a practice that attempts to remove all the 'veils' that deceive us about nature and humanity? If we need illusions to survive and flourish, why truth rather than untruth, uncertainty and even ignorance, as he asked in *Beyond Good and Evil* (*BGE* 1)? A philosophy beyond good and evil, as he expressed it, is one that recognises that 'untruth is a condition of life' (*BGE* 4). In *D* and *GS*, Nietzsche observes that the emergence of philosophy, especially Socrates' relentless and ironic questioning of his fellow citizens' claims to moral knowledge, was never simply accepted as a necessary or intrinsically valuable cultural practice. On the contrary, as he noted, Socrates' philosophical examination of custom (*Sitte*), which revealed that its adherents could not demonstrate the rational basis of their values, shocked and angered most, while seducing a very select few with its intoxicating liberation from the constraints of authority.[3] As Nietzsche recognised philosophy competed against epic and tragic poetry and rhetoric in an effort to monopolise ancient cultural pedagogy. Nietzsche suspected then that we have failed to properly take the measure of the so-called examined life and the Socratic and Platonic claim that it is the most valuable or highest way of life.

In the 1887 *GS* preface Nietzsche takes up the threads of these earlier investigations, but now with a much more clearly formulated diagnosis of the philosophical life. Rather than seeking to answer purportedly perennial philosophical questions he attempts to explain why individuals engage in philosophy. Taking on the role of the 'psychologist', a role he repeatedly identifies as his own in this preface, Nietzsche focuses on identifying what motivates philosophers to formulate their perspectives, and more specifically the effects their concepts and doctrines have on their lives. His concern is not with the truth or falsity of their concepts and doctrines, but the effects of these on their struggle to preserve themselves and flourish. Nietzsche suggests that we should evaluate the significance of philosophical perspectives in terms of their effects on their adherents. One the one hand, he claims that from a 'scientific' or 'objective' point of view grand metaphysical perspectives of world affirmation or negation lack 'any grain

[2]Breazeale, *Philosophy and Truth*, p. 65.

[3]Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Pre-Platonic Philosophers*, trans. Gregory Whitlock (Urbana: University of Chicago Press, 2006), pp. 142–151. See also *D* 544.

of significance' (*GS* P:2). Such philosophies give us no knowledge or information at all about nature or reality; from a cognitive perspective they are vacuous.. On the other hand, if we examine these philosophies through the lens of (Nietzschean) psychology, he claims, we will discover how they function to preserve or facilitate certain types of life. Nietzsche is not centrally interested in the truth or falsity of these philosophical perspectives, indeed, he assumes that they are cognitively empty, but in whether and how they enable certain types of life to preserve themselves or flourish. Nietzsche focuses on the uses and disadvantages of philosophies for 'life'.

As a psychologist of philosophy Nietzsche aims to identify how and what types of lives philosophies help to preserve; and as an aristocratic radical, he investigates whether there are certain philosophies that enable the best human beings to achieve maximal flourishing. To what extent, he asks, do they allow life to flourish? Or, as put it in *BGE*, which dates from a year before the preface, 'the question is to what extent [is a judgement] life-promoting, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-cultivating [*Art-züchtend*]' (*BGE* 4). On Nietzsche's psychological analysis, philosophy is not a disinterested pursuit that is an intrinsic part of human nature, but an accidental or randomly generated mechanism, which may or may not enable individuals and groups to sustain their lives.

We can then distinguish two levels of analysis in this preface: Nietzsche's personal account of how and why he employed philosophy in his own efforts at self-cure and his general explanation and assessment of the motives underpinning past philosophies. At the most general level we might frame his model of philosophy as therapeutic. That is to say, Nietzsche claims that philosophy is a practice analogous to medicine: it aims to cure the sick. Baldly stated in this way, however, Nietzsche's account seems to merely recycle the ancient Hellenistic schools' model of philosophy. This conception of the goal of philosophy was widespread in the classical and Hellenistic period. The Hellenistic schools – Cynicism, Epicureanism, Stoicism and Scepticism – all conceive philosophy as a practice through which philosophers and their students might achieve individual health or flourishing (*eudaimonia*). For these schools the point and purpose of engaging in philosophy is to achieve *eudaimonia* or human flourishing. '[I]n this period', as Nussbaum explains, '[there is] broad and deep agreement that the central motivation for philosophizing is the urgency of human suffering,

and that the goal of philosophy is human flourishing, or *eudaimonia*'.[4] Philosophy, on this account, is a discipline that ought to teach one how to live well, not only to reason or speak well. 'Philosophy', as Seneca pithily states, 'teaches doing, not saying'.[5] As we shall see, however, Nietzsche claims that 'philosophy' or the 'will to truth' alone is not sufficient to achieve human flourishing.

Yet even as he recycles the Hellenistic schools' therapeutic model of philosophy Nietzsche also criticises their *application* of it. Nietzsche shares their ethical *eudaimonism*: human flourishing ought to be philosophy's goal. He argues, however, that most past philosophies singularly fail to achieve this end. Nietzsche's claim is not just that they fail to achieve their therapeutic purpose, but that they unwittingly reinforce the illnesses they purport to cure. Nietzsche's criticism cuts much deeper than contemporary critics of the therapeutic ambitions of ancient philosophy. Bernard Williams typifies the conventional criticism that ancient philosophies fail to realise this ambition because philosophy has no necessary connection to human well being. '[C]an we really believe', he once asked, 'that philosophy, properly understood in terms of rigorous argument, could be so directly related to curing real human misery, the kind of suffering that priests and doctors and – indeed – therapists address?'[6] He answered this question with a decisive 'no'. '[W]e are', he opined, 'surely bound to find the Epicureans too rationalistic, the Sceptic too procedurally obsessed, the Stoics ... too unyieldingly pompous for us to take entirely seriously, not just their therapies, but the idea of them as philosophical therapists'.[7]

Nietzsche, by contrast, derives from these ancient philosophies' lessons about the nature of this kind of activity. We should conceive most ancient philosophies, including the allegedly therapeutic philosophies, he suggests, as analogous to fevers, cramps, swellings and so on: i.e. as signs of bodily or physiological disorders. Nietzsche's gambit is to conceive these schools as failed therapies that exacerbate the illnesses they purport to cure. Rather

[4]Martha Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 15.

[5]Seneca, *Epistles*, trans. Richard M. Gummere (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2002), XX.2.

[6]Bernard Williams, 'Do Not Disturb,' *London Review of Books* (1994): 25–26.

[7]Ibid., p. 26.

than correctly diagnosing psychological and physiological disorders, Nietzsche argues, Classical and Hellenistic philosophies misunderstand them. He implies that the Classical and Hellenistic philosophies are in fact symptoms of the illnesses they purport to cure. They misdiagnose human illnesses and develop 'cures' that deepen the malaise. He canvasses the idea that many past philosophical ideals of human flourishing may express and perhaps reinforce human weakness and sickness. Rather than mastering human illnesses past philosophies succumb to these selfsame afflictions. Nietzsche's diagnosis still leaves open the question whether we might conceive philosophy as a practice that can contribute to human flourishing.

In this essay we want to examine the 1887 second edition of *GS*, including the first four books of 1882, Nietzsche's preface and the concluding book five, to explore both sides of this issue: *viz.*, his analysis of the Hellenistic philosophies as *failed* therapies and his alternative post-classical, experimental therapy. In Nietzsche's perspective philosophy can realise these ambitions not by identifying truths about the world in-itself (metaphysics), but through a true account of what beliefs, illusions, and deceptions the individuals and the species need in order to flourish. To achieve this end Nietzsche suggests we need to experiment with different beliefs and practices to determine which we can successfully 'incorporate' or make part of a flourishing life. The ultimate question about the best condition of life, he claims, can only be answered 'through experiment' (*GS* 110). For Nietzsche value experimentation holds the key to human flourishing.

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Nietzsche's first explicit analysis of Hellenistic philosophies in *GS* occurs in *GS* 12, where he considers the broader question of the aim of science (*Vom Ziele der Wissenschaft*). In this aphorism, Nietzsche turns his attention to the way modern culture 'frames' science. He suggests that certain moral judgements unthinkingly determine science's current aims and that this particular moral framing is not necessary. Furthermore, he argues that modern science reproduces the Stoic's desire for '*as little displeasure as possible*' (*GS* 12, emphasis in original). Nietzsche then makes the paradoxical and startling claim that science can serve the Romantic ideal of excessive pain which enables excessive pleasure.

Nietzsche claims that science currently serves the negative hedonistic aim of eliminating pain from life. Science aims to secure a painless life. 'Modern science', as he puts it in *HH*, 'has as its goal: as little pain as possible, as long life as possible – thus a kind of eternal bliss, though a very modest kind in comparison with religion' (*HH* 128). Nietzsche's question is: '*Should* this be the aim of science?' In answering this question he draws on the Romantic motif of excess, famously encapsulated in William Blake's *Marriage of Heaven and Hell*: 'The road of excess leads to the palace of wisdom'.[8] In this Romantic vein, Nietzsche maintains that 'pleasure and unpleasure are so intertwined that whoever wants as much as possible of one must also have a much as possible of the other – that whoever wants to learn to "jubilate up to the heavens" (shout with joy to the heavens) must also be prepared for "grief unto death"'. Nietzsche quotes from the Clärchen's *lied*/song in Goethe's storm and stress play *Egmont* (*'Himmelhoch jauchzend, zu(m) Tode betrübt'*).

Schopenhauer also canvasses this notion that the highest joy and the greatest despair are inseparable. In *The World as Will and Representation* Schopenhauer maintains 'excessive joy [*Unmaßige Freude*] and very severe pain occur always in the same person, for they reciprocally condition each other'. Predictably, Schopenhauer frowns on this Romantic excess. Schopenhauer argues that it takes suffering to its highest pitch on the basis of a delusion. Excessive joy, he claims, hinges on a basic, human-all-too-human 'error or "delusion"' (*Wahn*): 'the delusion that we have found something in life that is not to be met with at all, namely permanent satisfaction of the tormenting desires or cares that constantly breed new ones' (*WWR* I 318). Schopenhauer points to the common experience that the advent of a long-desired happiness might initially give one 'excessive' joy, but this rapidly disappears when we realise that it cannot deliver on its promise of permanent satisfaction. Immoderate joy derives not from the event itself, he argues, but from anticipating that it is herald of a new dawn in which we will no longer suffer from ordinary cares – or, in Schopenhauer's terms, from the painful agitations intrinsic to the will to life. In

[8]'Without Contraries is no progression. Attraction and Repulsion, Reason and Energy, Love and Hate, are necessary to Human existence. From these contraries spring what the religious call Good and Evil. Good is the passive that obeys Reason. Evil is the active springing from Energy. Good is Heaven. Evil is Hell'.

short, he claims excessive joy derives from the always mistaken belief that we will no longer have to will or strive again. When we discover that this is a false dawn, he observes, we pay for our excessive joy with equally bitter pain. According to Schopenhauer, delusory anticipations of a sorrowless life explain wild oscillations between manic joy and melancholic despair. Schopenhauer's negative hedonism, his assumption that we necessarily aim for happiness understood as the absence of will, predisposes him to shun the rollercoaster ride of the emotions.

Schopenhauer then shows how Stoicism attempts to free us from this emotional rollercoaster by eliminating the delusion or false judgement that 'external' circumstances (fame, wealth, health and so on) matter to our *eudaimonia* (or flourishing). Stoics judge 'externals' as indifferent (*adiaphora*) or at most as 'preferred' indifferents. On the Stoic view, emotions derive from false value judgements of externals. By rejecting these false judgements, Stoics believe it is possible to meet every event with equanimity (*Gleichmuth*); they experience neither pleasure nor displeasure because, in Epictetus' famous maxim, they do not demand that things happen as they wish, but wish that they happen as they do happen.[9] Schopenhauer applauds the Stoics' attempt to liberate humans from the passions, but he denies that this is possible in this world.[10]

Nietzsche shares Schopenhauer's conception of Stoic philosophy as a therapy that attempts to 'obtain the greatest possible painlessness in life' by 'sacrificing the keenest joys and pleasures' (*WWR* II 150). The Stoics, Nietzsche observes, believing that the pleasures are intrinsically tied to distress, and wishing to get off this emotional rollercoaster, 'desired as little pleasure as possible in order to derive as little pain as possible from life' (*GS* 12). 'Pleasure [*voluptas*]', as Seneca explains, 'unless it has been kept within bounds, tends to rush headlong into the abyss of sorrow'.[11] In Schopenhauer's words, the Stoic wise man (sage) therefore 'always holds himself aloof from jubilation and sorrow and no event disturbs his *ataraxia* [or tranquillity]' (*WWR* I 88). The aim of Stoic ethics is 'a life as painless as possible, and thus as happy as possible' (*WWR* II pp. 158–159). Stoics

[9]Epictetus, *Manual*, 8

[10]Michael Ure, 'Sublime Losers: Stoicism in 19th Century German Philosophy,' in *The Routledge Handbook of the Stoic Tradition*, ed. John Sellars (London: Routledge, 2014).

[11]Seneca, *Epistles*, L.23.

maintain that philosophy can free us from the emotional tumult that derives from mistakenly valuing externals. By correcting our false judgements of the high value of such externals it frees us from both the pleasure of attaining such ends and the distress of failing to attain them or losing them. We should observe, however, that while the Stoics argue that in freeing ourselves from our oscillation between pleasure and distress we open ourselves to a higher or true joy (*gaudium*). Stoic *ataraxia* or tranquillity, with its freedom from the passions, opens onto 'true joy' (*verum gaudium*).[12] Stoic 'joy' (*gaudium*), consists not in pleasure (*voluptas*), or the satisfaction of desires, but in being 'lifted above every circumstance'.[13] Stoic joy *is ataraxia*. Stoics claim the sage can attain it through philosophy, which in demonstrating his completely self-sufficient ensures that nothing can assail or disturb him.

Schopenhauer and Nietzsche develop radically different response to Stoicism's 'joyful wisdom'. Schopenhauer claims that there is 'intrinsic merit' in Stoics aiming to 'silently and patiently bearing what is inevitable, [and remain] the same while others pass from jubilation to despair and from despair to jubilation' (*WWR* II 159). However, as we have noted, he argues that while this is a laudable goal it is not realisable in this life. Schopenhauer's judgement turns on his metaphysical presupposition. If his metaphysics of the will to life is correct, desire or will is unceasing and ineradicable. Like the Stoics one might aim to free him/herself from the passions through the use of their reason, but this aim is necessarily defeated. The Stoics assume that the correct use of reason can deliver 'joy' or 'tranquillity' in the sense of elevation above the burdens and sorrows of life. Schopenhauer argues that this is not possible because reason is only an instrument of the will, and desires must therefore always intrude upon the sage's tranquillity (See *WWR* I pp. 90–91). For Schopenhauer, therefore, the only radical cure for life's suffering is not Stoic reason (or philosophy), but the complete denial of the will. The suffering of the body, he suggests, cannot be 'philosophized away by any principles or syllogisms' (*WWR* I p. 91). Tranquillity or happiness is not possible in this life.

By contrast, Nietzsche rejects the Stoic/Schopenhauerian goal of tranquillity. Earlier he likened the sage's tranquillity to 'the monotony of a

[12] Seneca, *Epistles*, L.23.4.
[13] Ibid., L.23.3.

cloudless sky' (*WS* 313). In *GS* 12 Nietzsche distinguishes Stoicism's joyful wisdom from its 'Romantic' alternative. He suggests that his contemporaries still face the same choice as that which confronted the ancients: 'either *as little displeasure as possible*' or '*as much displeasure as possible* as the price for *the growth of a bounty of refined pleasures and joys that hitherto have seldom been tasted*'. Nietzsche poses an either/or: either Stoic tranquillity at the price of a diminished capacity for pleasure; or the 'Romantic' intensification of joy at the price of greater suffering. He maintains that all contemporary political parties, explicitly or otherwise share the former Stoic aim of establishing a painless existence. Nietzsche's believes that even socialist utopianism offers nothing more (or less) than the elimination of suffering from social life. He also claims that science hitherto has been pursued in the name of the Stoic ideal of *ataraxia*. Science, he explains, is 'better known for its power to deprive man of his joys and make him colder, more statue-like, more stoic'.[14]

We can discern two separate issues in Nietzsche's analysis of science and stoicism. First, he claims that science can become a deliverer of great pain and as a consequence also, by his lights, a source of hitherto unknown joys. Science achieves this by liberating us from the metaphysical and moral

[14] We might note first note that Nietzsche's identification of Stoicism with statue-like impassivity is problematic. It is far from clear that Stoic tranquillity necessarily entails withdrawal from social life or impassivity. Epictetus, for example, explicitly counselled that a Stoic 'ought not to be unmoved [*apathês*] like a statue, but ... should maintain [his] natural and acquired relationships, as a dutiful man and as a son, brother, father, citizen'. (*Discourses* 3.2.4 see Long, *Epictetus*, p. 232). On this view, by making it possible to remain undisturbed Stoic philosophy enables Stoics to better fulfil their 'natural' duties. Nietzsche's claim that science makes one 'more stoic' is puzzling. It is difficult to see any logical entailment between 'science' and 'stoicism'. As we have seen, Stoic philosophy seeks to minimise or eliminate pain through an evaluative shift that rejects the importance or value of 'externals'. One 'classic' expression of this Stoic re-evaluation is indifference toward death. It is far from clear how 'science' entails this evaluative shift. On the contrary, in aiming to prolong life science appears to assume that death is not a matter of indifference. More broadly, by eliminating or minimising natural hazards (e.g. disease, famine) it seems that science aims to establish conditions of existence that make it possible for individuals to more effectively pursue and realise the 'externals' (health, fame, wealth etc) that Stoicism deems 'indifferent'. It is precisely because science assumes that externals matter greatly to the quality of human life that it is oriented towards discovering techniques that protect human existence. Science hardly attacks the foundations of the emotions or counsels *apatheia*!

beliefs that have served as consolations. According to Nietzsche, this 'great liberation' allows individuals to treat life as 'an experiment of the seeker for knowledge' (*GS* 324). That is, science both dissolves stultifying metaphysical beliefs and provides an 'experimental' framework within which individuals can experiment with different ethical practices in search of new joys. Since the outcomes of such experiments are, according to Nietzsche, genuinely open, they necessarily run the risk of failure – of delivering great pains.

More importantly for our present purposes, in making this case Nietzsche confirms his anti-Stoic ethical ideal. In *D*, Nietzsche applauds Stoicism as a type of ethical *eudaimonism*, but he now makes clear that he does not endorse its ideal of flourishing. Nietzsche opposes Stoicism's conception of happiness or flourishing as tranquillity or equanimity. Nietzsche applauds Stoicism's ethical *eudaimonism*, but argues that it pursues a questionable notion of flourishing or happiness: *apatheia* or *ataraxia*. By contrast, Nietzsche aims to develop an ethical *eudaimonism* that replaces *ataraxia* with an alternative ideal: the maximisation of suffering for the sake of the maximisation of joy (maximax). For the Stoics of course the passions are the greatest source of suffering. As is well known the Stoics claimed that we might achieve *ataraxia* by denying the judgements of the passions that invest value in the external world. By denying the value of externals, by conceiving love, friendship, status, wealth as 'indifferents', Stoics prevent themselves from becoming hostages to fortune. The sage remains perfectly tranquil regardless of how the wheel of fortune may turn because he does not value such externals. Nietzsche's rejection of Stoicism necessarily entails a revaluation of the passions as constituents of human flourishing. If we are to maximise the sources of distress for the sake of maximising our joy, as Nietzsche urges, then we must also revalue those passions that make us hostage to fortune.

Nietzsche suggests that science 'might yet be found to be the *great giver of pain*! – and then its counterforce might at the same time be found: its immense capacity for letting new galaxies of joy flare up!' (*GS* 12). Nietzsche's point is enigmatic. Hitherto, as he observes, science has made us more stoic, more statue-like by eliminating those metaphysical beliefs that engendered a range of disturbing emotions – fear, hope, etc. If science is to be a great giver pain in the requisite sense then it must engender new

passions or new sense of the high value of externals. He appears to be suggesting that science can become a great giver of pain insofar as it can deprive the species of the metaphysical beliefs or consolations that hitherto have made life itself and the individual's own existence meaningful or valuable. As Nietzsche acknowledges elsewhere, his own 'science' certainly achieves this end. We should note that he only suggests that these new forms of joy *might* be discovered. Nietzsche acknowledges that a counterforce to nihilism, as he later calls it, is a yet to be discovered possibility, not a necessity. In this respect, Nietzsche's 'joyful science' remains a promissory note.

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Nietzsche's rejection of the Stoic goal of tranquillity extends to the *teloi* of the other Hellenistic schools. Each school endorses a philosophical way of life characterised by perfect peace of mind and seeks to rid the mind of distress through the practice of philosophy. In general Nietzsche maintains that ancient philosophies 'arrived at their propositions ... from a desire for tranquillity or sole possession or sovereignty' (*GS* 110). As noted, the Stoic sage achieves a peace of mind that cannot be disturbed by the vicissitudes of fortune at the cost of a diminished capacity for pleasure. The Epicureans advocate a way of life punctuated by the least pain and distress. This is achieved through the extirpation of allegedly unnatural desires – for fame and immortality, for instance – the impossibility of definitively satisfying which renders them a necessary source of distress. As a result, the Epicurean gives up the pleasures which attend their (temporary) satisfaction. Of the desires they recognise as natural, including hunger and thirst, the Epicureans recommend the simplest means of satisfaction: bread and water rather than a lavish feast. This achieves both the pleasure of satisfying a desire and accommodates the Epicurean to a life with the smallest of desires. It cures both the pain of hunger and the anxiety associated with the fear that one might not be able to fulfil one's desire for luxurious food in the future. The Epicurean achieves a minimum of pain at the cost of renouncing all but the barest pleasures. The Sceptics argue that philosophical discourse itself is the source of mental distress and pursue peace of mind by suspending all judgements, including value judgements. The Sceptic has

no philosophical reason to deviate from conventional (non-philosophical) custom and so lives an everyday life. What makes the Sceptic's way of life philosophical is that, since he refuses to make or hold value judgements, the Sceptic rejects that anything which befalls him is a good or an evil. He thereby escapes the thought that he is the victim of evil and avoids the distress this thought would cause. The Sceptic achieves this diminution of distress at the cost of giving up the pleasure which attends the thought that he is enjoying a true good. Like the Epicurean and the Stoic, the Sceptic trades away the possibility of pleasures in return for the diminution of possible pains. Nietzsche does routinely praise scepticism concerning unconditional moral judgements: in these cases scepticism is necessary to see through the illusion of moral claims. But this scepticism is only a means to a higher end: possessing one's instincts, rather than being possessed by them.[15] The sceptic who stays a sceptic errs by eliminating them instead. Nietzsche illustrates this point in *D* 477, in which a speaker 'emerges out of' moral scepticism 'braver and healthier than ever'. The speaker 'feels best' where 'a sharp win blows, the sea rises high and there is no little danger to be faced'. Put in terms of Nietzsche's Odyssean allusion the point seems to be that the seafarer must possess his instincts (not eliminate them) in order to navigate stormy waters.[16]

Nietzsche broadly condemns past philosophies of happiness (*Glückes*) in *BGE* as offering merely 'recipes against [the] passions, ... good and bad inclinations insofar as they have the will to power and want to play the master' (*BGE* 198). In this passage Nietzsche explicitly mentions both Stoicism and Aristotelianism, but his target is all *eudaimonistic* moralities, insofar as they caution against the '*danger*' of the passions. In the language of the preface, such moralities only lead 'towards the sun, stillness, mildness, patience, medicine, balm in some sense' (*GS* P:2).

Nietzsche's point is not only that these philosophies are symptomatic of a certain sickness, but that they reinforce the unhealthy conditions which they purport to cure. The Hellenistic schools offer merely a palliative treatment to the problems of human weakness and suffering. Nietzsche

[15]Donald Rutherford, 'Freedom as a Philosophical Ideal: Nietzsche and his Antecedents,' *Inquiry* 54, no. 5 (Forthcoming): p. 526.

[16]Jessica Berry, *Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

has in mind the philosophical exercises through which the Hellenistic schools aim to treat human ills. The case of Epicurus, 'who was suffering continually', is paradigmatic (*GS* 45). The Epicureans, as noted, seek a life with the least pain and distress. They cultivate this life by a number of strategies. Most famously, the Epicurean withdraws from the bustle of the city in favour of a quiet life in the garden. The garden provides an environment more conducive to disciplining one's desires in accordance with one's 'natural' requirements. Rather than cure the Epicurean of the 'impoverishment of life' that, Nietzsche claims, motivates her flight to the garden, the seclusion of the garden *further impoverishes* her life. Other Epicurean practices share this characteristic: their purpose is to diminish the Epicurean's investment in worldly affairs. The Epicurean's life shrinks to fit within the narrow bounds of the Epicurean ideal. Nietzsche's 'philosophical physician', on the other hand, 'risks the proposition' that the stakes of philosophical thought are 'health, future, growth, power, life' (*GS* P:2). *His* attempt at a philosophical therapy – one that will grant a 'new happiness [*Glück*]' (*GS* P:3) – will aim to serve and promote the continual expansion and growth of life even at the risk of great pains.

In book five of *GS* which, alongside the 1887 preface, constitutes the second edition of *GS*, Nietzsche curiously describes Epicureanism as 'essentially romantic' (*GS* 370). In this section, Nietzsche returns to his distinction, sketched in the preface, between philosophies symptomatic of an impoverishment of life and those which express an overflowing superfluity of life, and uses 'romanticism' to designate the former. By aligning Epicureanism with romanticism in *GS* 370, Nietzsche makes clear that his alternative to modern science's negative hedonism, diagnosed in *GS* 12, is not a simple return to romanticism.

In *GS* 370, Nietzsche does not expand on the relationship between romanticism and Hellenistic philosophy, except to note that his identification of Epicureanism with romanticism is a position he came to only 'gradually'. The preface to *GS* sheds more light on this: in it, Nietzsche autobiographically describes an 'incautious and pampering spiritual diet, called romanticism' (*GS* P:1). This diet, according to Nietzsche, induced a nausea which 'prescribed' a 'determined self-limitation' and a 'radical retreat into solitude' (*GS* P:1). Although Nietzsche identifies the Hellenistic restraint and limitation of the passions as a symptom of illness, he never-

theless concedes that under some circumstance it can serve a therapeutic purpose. The interaction between these two alleged forms of illness point the way towards Nietzsche's conception of philosophical health.

In the preface to *HH*, written the year before that of *GS*, Nietzsche anticipates the latter's account of philosophical health. In particular, he recounts the conditions of the health of the free spirit. The free spirit must undergo a 'great liberation' including, amongst other qualities, coldness, sobriety and 'a hatred of love' which is 'at the same time a sickness that can destroy the man who has it' (*HH* P:3). Nietzsche describes the free spirit gradually recovering from this sickness and coming to question the value of renouncing the passions. Nietzsche addresses the convalescent free spirit thus:

> You shall become master over yourself, master also over your virtues. Formerly *they* were your masters; but they must be only your instruments beside other instruments. You shall get control over your For and Against and learn how to display first one and then the other in accordance with your higher goal. (*HH* P:6)

Here Nietzsche stresses the instrumental value of adopting the Classical aversion to the passions: the free spirit learns 'the sense of perspective in every value judgement' and 'the *necessary* injustice in every For and Against' (*HH* P:6). The subjugation of the passions is not an end in itself, according to Nietzsche, as it was for the Hellenistic schools. The free spirit *uses* Classical therapies to free himself from enslavement to the passions (a condition Nietzsche diagnoses as 'Romantic'), but asserts a more adroit self-control by purposively deploying the passions, rather than deadening them (see *D* 560).

We can discern three stages in Nietzsche's therapeutic cycle. The first stage, which he characterises as romantic, involves the incautious and indiscriminate investment in the passions. This investment both allows for, and inevitably produces, the romantic excess of joy and pain. In the second stage, which Nietzsche identifies with the restraint of the Hellenistic philosophies, one moderates, thins out, or extirpates the passions in order to lessen the pain (and joy) of our passionate involvements. In order to restrain the passions, the Hellenistic philosophies develop a range of

philosophical strategies for exercising self-control and, in particular, control over one's 'For and Against'. For the Hellenistic philosophies, these strategies are successful inasmuch as they universally weaken the passions. For Nietzsche, they have the effect of freeing one from the control of the passions. Importantly this freedom, once won, does not imply *apatheia* or *ataraxia*, as it did for the Hellenistics. Rather, it affords one control *of* the passions, which can be deployed 'in accordance with [one's] higher goal' (*HH* P:6). Thus, rather than the indiscriminate proliferation of the passions or the indiscriminate abnegation of the passions, the third step of Nietzsche's therapy is the purposive cultivation of passionate engagement.

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As noted, Nietzsche counterposes his own ethical ideal to the Stoic ideal of *ataraxia*, the divestment of the passions, and argues in *GS* 12 that science can be made to serve either. We can now see more clearly how science might produce 'new galaxies' of joy. Science liberates individuals from the belief in a metaphysically grounded moral law. In place of eternal and universal moral prescriptions, Nietzsche proposes that individuals adopt ethical practices that allow them to flourish. Importantly, constitutional difference between individuals and types give rise to differences in the conditions most conducive to flourishing. Harnessing the passions, as Nietzsche's therapy allows, enables individuals to experiment with different ethical practices and through such experimentation, discover what beliefs, practices, and environmental conditions they need in order to maximise joy.

The philosophical therapist or physician does not offer prescriptions (*Vorschriften*) backed by metaphysical truths, but recommendations (*Empfehlungen*) in the form of condition imperatives: 'if you wish to flourish pursue such-and-such a course of action'. Nietzsche suggests that philosophical physicians can develop therapeutic recommendations as experientially testable propositions. That is to say, he claims that philosophical physicians' recommendations should be the result of and subject to a type of experimental testing. Nietzsche's draws directly on the Hellenistic model of ethics in developing this notion of ethical experimentation. 'So far as *praxis* is concerned', he observes, 'I view the various moral schools as experimental laboratories in which a considerable number of recipes for

the art of living have been thoroughly practised and lived to the hilt. The results of all their experiments belong to us, as our legitimate property' (*KSA* 9:15[59]). In order to discover whether the various recipes for the art of living are conducive to health or sickness, Nietzsche suggests, we must put them into practice and observe whether they have a regular set of effects on our health. Nietzsche's therapist draws heavily on therapeutic knowledge derived from 'experience' rather than mere 'knowledge'. The Nietzschean physician, as he puts it, lives 'with a head free of fever, equipped with a handful of knowledge and a bagful of experiences' (*D* 449). Through such experimental testing, Nietzsche implies, the physician can develop reliable knowledge about what contributes to the species' flourishing in its current context. Nietzsche's therapist, in short, replaces metaphysically grounded moral laws with empirically tested health recommendations.

He also identifies this as an important breakthrough in our method of evaluating moral principles. Nietzsche claims that since we cannot know in advance whether a new rule or principle will facilitate our flourishing the only way to evaluate this is by way of experiment. Experimentation, he claims, is a learning process. Nietzsche proposes experimentation as a means of 'moral' or 'practical' learning. We must put rules or norms into practice in order to determine their effects and evaluate their worth. Nietzsche argues that in order to determine the value or necessity of a traditional or new morality we must experiment with the form of life it prescribes. We can measure moralities, Nietzsche implies, by testing them in practice and comparing the results of such experiments in living (*D* 61). Without sustained experimentation, he argues, we cannot compare and judge the relative value of these forms of living. Experimentation is one of the keys to judgement. 'The men of the future' Nietzsche remarks 'will one day deal in this way with all evaluations of the past; one has voluntarily to live through them once again, and likewise their antithesis - if one is at last to possess the right to pass them through the sieve' (*D* 61).

Nietzsche suggests that these experiments test the effects of different types of 'morality' on human life. To elucidate this point he draws an analogy between moralities and climates: just as different climates enable different types of species to flourish so too different moralities allow different ways of life to flourish (*GS* 7). By extension, of course, while a given climate will facilitate the growth and propagation of a number of species, it

will also extinguish or circumscribe the development of others. A tropical climate is the perfect condition of existence for a range of flora and fauna, but it is fatal to those that require a temperate climate. The outcome of the millennia of experimentation Nietzsche envisages will be comprehensive knowledge of how moralities contribute to growth of 'the plant man' (*BGE* 44), what type of plants it is possible to grow and their optimal conditions. Since universalist moralities have proscribed such experimentation, Nietzsche argues, we are in fact ignorant of the full range of value perspectives that might act as conditions of existence and therefore also of the full scope of human diversity or 'beauty'. We can only discover these alternative conditions of existence and their effects by experimenting with different ways of life. Universalist moralities necessarily restrict such experimentation, and limit the range of plant types while eliminating or excluding many others. By following universalist moral prescriptions it as if the species had compelled itself to live in one particular climate zone while shunning the whole range of other possible climates and the forms of life that they allow to flourish. Nietzsche censures previous *eudaimonistic* moralities, including Stoicism and Aristotelianism explicitly, for 'generalis[ing] where one must not generalise' in 'address[ing] themselves to all' (*BGE* 198). Their universalism makes these moralities 'unreasonable in form' and 'not by a long shot "science", much less "wisdom"' (*BGE* 198). Nietzsche helps himself to knowledge of the effects of these moralities on the lives of their practitioners. As noted, he considers the ancient moral schools experimental laboratories – the ethical *content* of each is to be tested experimentally. In certain situations, Stoic or Sceptical practices may well prove useful. He does not thereby adopt their unreasonable universalist *form* – their metaethical commitment to a single model of *eudaimonia*.

Nietzsche conceives his ethical experimentalism as a way of discovering an array of as yet unexplored climates and their forms of life. We may have completed our physical geography, but we have barely begun to map our moral geography. For this reason he conceives this experimentalism as the promise of new dawns – days that will reveal new, unexplored human possibilities. Nietzsche prefaced *D* with a phrase from the *Rig Veda*: 'There are so many days [*Morgenröthen*] that have not yet broken'. In the sphere of values, Nietzsche implies, our situation is analogous to Columbus' still searching for new continents: we have not yet mapped the whole realm

of 'beauty'. Our current map identifies only a small portion of our moral geography. There are so many new days ahead of us, he implies, because we have barely begun to discover these new types of human flourishing. 'As surely as the wicked [*Bösen*] enjoy a hundred kinds of happiness of which the virtuous have no inkling' he writes 'so too they possess a hundred kinds of beauty: and many of them have not yet been discovered' (*D* 468). Through value experimentation Nietzsche aims to discover many different types of unknown pleasures.

In *GS*, Nietzsche proposes that instead of following metaphysical moralists and contemplating allegedly eternal forms we investigate moralities scientifically: their genesis, evolution and outcomes. 'Everything that humans have viewed until now as "conditions of their existence"', he asks rhetorically, 'has this been researched exhaustively?' (*GS* 7). What moralities has the species followed and how have these shaped their development? Nietzsche's science of morals involves tracking historically all the many values and practices that have given life a certain shape, appearance and direction, all of the different 'perspectives' on life. Nietzsche identifies these different value perspectives as 'conditions of existence' that have shaped human life in a variety of ways. Yet because of the predominance of metaphysical approaches to morality, Nietzsche believes we still know very little about the genesis and effects of moralities as conditions of existence.

Nietzsche sees this historical science of morality as a prolegomenon to, or preparation for, other research questions. He maintains these histories should identify the effects or consequences of these values and practices. We might ask, for example, 'How has morality as a condition of existence, a so-called "moral climate", nurtured or impeded the human drives?' Nietzsche's metaphor implies that morality establishes the basic conditions that shape the human drives and that some moral climates might be more 'favourable' than others. In other words, Nietzsche's idea of morality as a condition of existence opens up the possibility that we can measure the value of moralities in terms of the way in which they shape, nurture or develop human drives. Nietzsche emphasises that human drives '*still could grow*' in very different ways depending on the moral climate. Could we provide them with a better, 'sunnier' climate? What conditions might enable these drives to flourish?

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The ethical experimentalism that Nietzsche develops throughout the free-spirit trilogy reaches its apotheosis in *GS*. *GS*, a science of human flourishing, is his response to failed philosophical therapies of the past and his model of philosophical practice of the future. It offers a framework within which ways of life can be tested experimentally and their effects on an individual's drive structure 'scientifically' analysed. In this essay we have argued that Nietzsche, while consciously adopting Hellenistic philosophy's therapeutic project, rejects the Hellenistics' aversion to the passions. He develops a competing *post-Classical* therapy that reflects a positive reappraisal of the role of the passions in human flourishing. This therapy produces an individual capable of experimenting with different modes of living, who might discover 'new galaxies' of joy.

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On Nietzsche's Theory of the Passions in his Middle Period

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My overall aim in this article is to enquire into Nietzsche's treatment of the passions in his middle period. Although Nietzsche writes extensively about the passions in these works he does not subject them to a systematic presentation. Yet if we attend carefully to what he says, it is possible to draw out a coherent position from behind his scattered discussions. On doing so, we are then able to appreciate the role that this theory plays in Nietzsche's project of self-cultivation. This project concentrates on the free-spirited quest for knowledge, which can be characterised as a therapeutic one: Nietzsche claims that the suffering that characterises life is the result of previous attempts to anaesthetise pain; the so-called 'cures' these attempts yielded worked all too well, but they addressed only the perceived symptoms, and in turn led to far worse problems from which man now suffers. Man is in ill-health and the free spirits are those physicians of the soul who seek cures that will restore him to good health (*D* 52).[1] These cures are to be sought in the quest for knowledge, principally by destroying metaphysical and moral beliefs and thereby making man better aware of himself (since he cannot attend to his true needs if he misunderstands himself).

My thesis is that any attempt to understand Nietzsche's project of self-cultivation requires us carefully to identify and analyse the theory of the passions that informs his discussions in the middle period. Nietzsche's diagnosis of the passions reveals that we have misunderstood, and abused, them in order to alleviate suffering; to a large extent, the problems from

[1] References to Nietzsche are to the Cambridge University Press editions.

which man now suffers have arisen as a result of certain attitudes towards the passions, namely that they are either pure and can be fully known or they are mysterious and unknowable. Among other things, the task of self-cultivation is to change these attitudes so that we can overcome the passions and become responsible for them; for what matters are the actions that they bring about and the kind of person they make us become. This is most clearly observed in the example of pity, in which Nietzsche's nuanced attack is usually judged to be wholly negative with emphasis placed on egoism and the harmful effects of pity. By examining Nietzsche's interrogation of pity in this broader discussion of overcoming the passions, we will be better placed to understand that pity has a positive role, what it means to take responsibility for it and, by extension, for us to be responsible for our passions generally.

In the first section, I will show how Nietzsche radically rethinks the relation between the passions and reason in his middle works, my aim being to highlight the importance of the passions in the free spirit's quest for knowledge. The second section will highlight Nietzsche's criticisms of pity. Section 3 will enquire into the overcoming of the passions as the immediate task of self-cultivation, though I will only focus on the need to moderate and master the passions and will not extend my analysis to consider the complex transformation of passions into joy. Finally, in the fourth section, I will consider how Nietzsche recasts the question of responsibility in terms of the passions, and I will again use pity as an example of this.

Before beginning my enquiry, it is necessary to clarify my use of two terms. First, for the sake of simplicity I refer to the 'passions', although Nietzsche interchanges this word with 'affects' and 'feelings'. Second, Nietzsche's use of the word *Mitleid* (literally 'suffering-with') is almost always translated into English as 'pity', whereas Schopenhauer's use of *Mitleid* is always translated as 'compassion'. Differences between compassion and pity have been observed: for example, to pity someone can denote superiority and condescension, which is not the case with compassion; and one can also feel self-pity, whereas compassion is always other-directed. Differences such as these have invited the question as to whether or not Nietzsche's critique of Schopenhauer's moral philosophy accomplishes what it sets out to achieve. However, this is not my concern in this article. Although I will use the respective translations of *Mitleid*, my aim is to understand Nietzsche's theory of the passions and the role of pity within it.

1. The Passions and Reason

One of Nietzsche's principal aims is to make us better aware of ourselves, for he argues that the task of self-cultivation can only take place once we have removed our metaphysical conceptions about the subject. In the ancient world, the human subject came to full self-presence in a cosmological context. The subject lived in a world that was understood as a rational, meaningful cosmic order and it came to self-presence by finding meaning in this order. In Plato, for example, this is attained through the Forms: objects attain their reality through their participation in the Forms, and this is also the way in which these objects become intelligible to us. The same Forms, therefore, structure both the things themselves and our comprehension of them, and so the Forms unite the order of being with the order of knowledge and understanding. In contrast, the shift to the modern subject in the seventeenth century was one in which the existence of the subject was assured, but everything else was placed in doubt. In the absence of the certainty of a meaningful, rational cosmic order, the modern subject came to self-presence by drawing back, and understanding itself in abstraction, from the world. This self-defining subject was tasked with a key role in epistemology and ontology: epistemologically, the modern subject has served as an objectifying ground of knowledge; ontologically, the ground of the subject's relation to the world is now to be found in the subject itself. But this subject can only apparently serve these functions because it is abstracted from the world on the basis of mistaken metaphysical beliefs such as those in an 'ego', 'free will' and 'spirit'.

It is in *Daybreak* that Nietzsche first conceptualises the self as a multiplicity of fluctuating drives. 'Drives' is the term Nietzsche uses to explain man's desires, impulses and passions. It is a deliberately general term that encompasses man's basic instincts, because the drives can be purely physical; however, although most of the drives are unconscious, a few of them come to consciousness and can be identified in language. Nietzsche's drive psychology allows him to conceptualise the subject as a multiplicity in which the feeling of unity is an affect of the organisation of the drives.

The subject is not a principle of organisation that lies behind the drives and organises them, rather, the subject is nothing but the totality of drives and their relations. These relations are characterised as a struggle, in which drives compete with each other for dominance because drives are either dominated by other drives or they enjoy exercising their dominance. Each drive has its own one-sided perspective and is motivated towards a particular end: to establish its perspective as the norm. Consciousness is only a surface expression of the struggle, and not a very accurate one: '[it] is a more or less fantastic commentary on an unknown, perhaps unknowable, but felt text' (*D* 119). We are aware of some of the drives but not of the totality of the drives and, therefore, so much of what constitutes thought remains hidden from us: 'However far a man may go in self-knowledge, nothing however can be more incomplete than his image of the totality of *drives* which constitute his being' (*D* 119). Not only are we not aware of the totality of the drives, we also do not fully know the relations between them and, therefore, which drive or drives dominate.

It is in terms of this economic model of drives that Nietzsche conceptualises the relation between reason and the passions. Nietzsche does not attempt to clarify the difference between passions and drives and often uses the terms interchangeably. As Robert Solomon notes, 'emotions, like all psychological phenomena, should be considered essentially physiological phenomena and, in particular, manifestations of *drives*'.[2] Although Nietzsche does not explicitly clarify the difference, it is helpful to note the following: drives are dispositions towards or away from something, and passions are the feelings that accompany these drives; these feelings might be those of inclination or repugnance, the joyful feelings of the self-assertion of a drive, or the feeling of an organisation of drives (for example, in experiencing ourselves as a unity). We cannot think of drives as passion-free, and neither can we think of passions in abstraction from drives. Far from being different in kind, or inferior, to the intellect, the passions are also constitutive of the self as opposed to belonging to the self. The intellect, which traditionally is thought to control the passions, is relegated to being 'only the blind instrument of *another drive*' (*D* 109):

[2]Robert C. Solomon, *Living with Nietzsche: What the Great 'Immoralist' Has to Teach Us* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 74.

> While 'we' believe we are complaining about the vehemence of a drive, at bottom it is one drive *which is complaining about another*; that is to say: for us to become aware that we are suffering from the *vehemence* of a drive presupposes the existence of another equally vehement or even more vehement drive, and that a *struggle* is in prospect in which our intellect is going to have to take sides.

The real activity of thought takes place in the struggle between drives, and what we call the intellect is the specific set of power relations between the drives at each moment. When we reflect on our motives (our desires, passions, impulses and reasons), what is really happening is that one drive is struggling with another.

This demotion of consciousness reflects the fact that we barely know ourselves because we cannot have a complete image of the totality of the drives. It is not only the drives and their struggle that we cannot know, Nietzsche also claims that drives require 'nutrients' in order to survive, and the drives' nutritional needs are, in most cases, also hidden from us. Nietzsche explores this in *D* 119: whether drives are starved and looking for sustenance, or seeking to exercise their dominance over other drives, they feed off experiences, whether these experiences are while we are dreaming or awake. The way in which experiences provide nourishment for drives happens indiscriminately, and what feeds some drives starves others; those that remain undernourished wither and die, whereas those that exercise their strength can become tyrannical.

Nietzsche claims that because this physiological process is hidden from us, there is 'no *essential* difference between waking and dreaming' when we interpret the drives and what nourishes them (*D* 119). Indeed, we would have to consider which drive is interpreting: every drive is a one-sided perspective, that is to say an interpretation, on the world and as the drives struggle for dominance; this means that the same drives that constitute the subject also interpret (or give meaning to) the world. This means both the subject and the (meaning of the) world are constituted concurrently.

The passions, being manifestations of the drives, are included along with error and self-deception as the causes of false, metaphysical beliefs (*HH* 9). Illogical thinking is the product of 'blind desire, passion or fear'

which have coloured and distorted the way we look at the world, fuelling the moral, aesthetic and religious demands we make (*HH* 16). However, for Nietzsche *all* thinking, not only illogical thinking, is firmly rooted in the drives and passions as well as language and everything that attributes value to life (*HH* 31). Nietzsche's drive psychology draws attention to the material conditions of subjectivity, for he claims that drives are social, political and cultural as well as biological. Drives are not, in themselves, good or bad, but become so by entering into relations with drives that have already been attributed values and meaning. Despite the moderating influence of the scientific spirit, there is no such thing as a purely logical, value- and passion-free understanding of man and the world.

Nietzsche explains the emergence of moral feelings and concepts as follows: children learn moral feelings by first observing adults' inclinations and aversions to actions and then by imitating them. In time, repeated imitation renders these feelings natural and then meaningful; only afterwards are moral concepts applied as a justification of these inclinations and aversions (*D* 34). Moral judgements and evaluations are therefore inherited in the form of feelings: 'The inspiration born of a feeling is the grandchild of a judgement – and often a false judgement' (*D* 35). It helps to appreciate the importance of this on Nietzsche's later philosophy, as Brian Domino notes: 'How to read our intellectual mood, and how to overcome the decadence that corrupts our readings, is the task of Nietzsche's later works, especially *Ecce Homo*. The value of this is that it allows for moods to be philosophically important'.[3]

It is in terms of this naturalistic psychology that Nietzsche understands self-cultivation. Despite the multiplicity of conflicting drives, as noted we experience ourselves as a unity, which happens when a dominating drive (or group of drives) imposes order on the other drives. Such a unity is never complete because drives are constantly struggling with each other, but it is unity we should constantly strive for. Self-cultivation is a matter of intervening in order to reorganise the drives. The task is to generate allegiances of drives which allow for the flourishing of the totality of drives. The intellect might be a blind instrument, but it has an important role in

[3]Brian Domino, 'Polyp Man,' in *A Nietzschean Bestiary: Becoming Animal Beyond Docile and Brutal*, ed. Christa Davis Acampora and Ralph R. Acampora (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 48.

signalling the different kinds of allegiances of the drives. The subject is a physical being that is dominated by passions and not an ego ruled by reason. It is mistaken to treat the passions and reason as different in kind, and to think of the passions as inferior to reason; this attitude misunderstands that the passions are an important condition of knowledge and to deny the passions can have a detrimental effect on reason. The cultivation or organisation of the intellect and the passions is crucial to the free spirits' quest for knowledge.

2. Nietzsche's Critique of Pity

Though pity is only one of the passions that Nietzsche examines in these works, it has special importance because of the role it has in the works of Schopenhauer and Rousseau. Until recently, however, scholarship on Nietzsche's critique of pity tended to incorporate these middle works into a broader narrative that includes his later works, often reading the entirety of his critique in light of Zarathustra's final act: his rejection of his pity for the higher men. However, it is in the middle works, and their devotion to the mild-tempered cultivation of the self, that Nietzsche carries out his most extensive and forensic critique of pity. This has been more closely observed in recent scholarship, particularly by Ruth Abbey, Martha C. Nussbaum, Robert Solomon and Michael Ure.[4] In this section, I will review some of the key aspects of Nietzsche's critique of pity. My principal aim is to exemplify the careful attention Nietzsche gives to the passions in his middle period; but my analysis will also enable me, in Section 4, to distinguish between Nietzsche's interrogation of the passion and his attack on the moralisation of it.

[4]See for example: Martha C. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Ruth Abbey, *Nietzsche's Middle Period* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Robert C. Solomon, 'Nietzsche and the Emotions,' chap. 7 in *Nietzsche and Depth Psychology*, ed. Jacob Golomb, Weaver Santaniello, and Ronald L. Lehrer (New York: State University of New York, 1999); Solomon, *Living with Nietzsche*; Robert C. Solomon, *Not Passion's Slave: Emotions and Choice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Michael Ure, 'The Irony of Pity: Nietzsche contra Schopenhauer and Rousseau,' *The Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 32 (2006): 68–91; Michael Ure, *Nietzsche's Therapy: Self-cultivation in the Middle Works* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008).

One of the aims of Nietzsche's method of historical philosophising in *Human, All Too Human* is to expose and undermine oppositional thinking. This is set out in the book's first aphorism, in which oppositional thinking is argued to be the driving force behind metaphysics, and which metaphysics has overcome by discovering 'a mysterious source ... in the "thing in itself"' (*HH* 1). Oppositional thinking in morality is expressed in terms of good and evil. However, given the importance of Schopenhauer's moral philosophy, and the critical role of acts of selflessness, the main moral opposition that Nietzsche sets up is between egoism and non-egoism. He does so, however, not simply to undermine Schopenhauer's moral and metaphysical philosophy, but to alert us to the danger and irresponsibility of thinking of a passion as something that is pure and can be fully known.

For Schopenhauer, humans are essentially egoist, which he defines in *On the Basis of Morality* as a self-preserving 'craving for existence and well-being' (p. 131), a blind drive to live. He distinguishes this from 'self-interest', which is an egoism informed by the faculty of reason.[5] Egoism, by contrast, is connected to man's innermost being: 'Accordingly, everyone makes himself the centre of the world, and refers everything to himself' (p. 132). For an action to have moral worth, it must be done only for the sake of another, so that the other person's well-being or suffering is '*directly my motive*' as opposed to subordinating their well-being or suffering to my own (p. 143). The only phenomenon that satisfies this criterion is compassion, which is 'the immediate *participation*, independent of all ulterior considerations, primarily in the *suffering* of another, and thus in the prevention or elimination of it' (p. 144). As far as Schopenhauer is concerned, this identification is not achieved by imagining myself in the other person's place. It is the other person who is suffering, not me; but I suffer '*with* him and hence *in* him', feeling his pain *as his* (p. 145). In identifying with the person suffering, Schopenhauer believes the barrier between the ego and non-ego breaks down such that the other person's distress and suffering is now also mine. For Schopenhauer, compassion is metaphysical: the difference between ego and non-ego is erroneous because the same essence manifests itself in all things; it is only in suffering with another that we pierce this illusion and recognise our own true, inner selves (p. 209).

[5] Arthur Schopenhauer, *On the Basis of Morality*, trans. Arthur Brodrick Bullock (1840; New York: Dover, 2005).

It is this 'Schopenhauerian sense' of pity that Nietzsche targets (*HH* 99), and his method of historical philosophising aims to localise the valuing of pity as nothing more than a fashion that is having its day. In *D* 132, examining the effect of Christianity on modern European society, he observes that Christianity originally promoted the egoistic drive of seeking one's own personal salvation in the next life. However, as this belief, and the dogmas that rested upon it, held less sway over the religion, a subsidiary belief in love (e.g. love thy neighbour) became more dominant. Sympathetic affects, in other words, were an unexpected product of Christianity. The target of Nietzsche's attack on the moralisation of pity is not Christianity itself, but '*The echo of Christianity in morality*' (*D* 132). The liberation from Christianity's belief in personal salvation led to the promotion of charitable love, which resulted in a 'cult of philanthropy' (*D* 132). Nietzsche cites Voltaire, Comte and Mill, as well as Schopenhauer, as examples of those who have promoted sympathetic affects such as pity as the key determinants of what constitutes moral behaviour. Nietzsche defines morality in these terms: 'Everything that in any way corresponds to this body- and membership-building drive and its ancillary drives is felt to be *good*, this is the *moral undercurrent* of our age; individual empathy and social feeling here play into one another's hands' (*D* 132).

The body- and membership-building drives weaken the individual because they focus his attention away from his own needs and towards the needs of society, and it is against this that Nietzsche develops his therapeutic project of self-cultivation. To a great extent, he does so by undermining the moral opposition, arguing that there is no such thing as an unegoistic action or disinterested contemplation, and that 'both are only sublimations' that only reveal themselves under close examination (*HH* 1). Nor is it the case that egoistic drives are good and unegoistic drives are bad. He acknowledges the usefulness of types of benevolence such as good-naturedness, friendliness and politeness of the heart, which contribute towards a healthy culture. Although they are mostly egoistic, such positive and socially friendly dispositions, which are expressed with the smiles of eyes, handclasps, and comfortable manners, are 'the continual occupation of humanity, as it were its light-waves in which everything grows' (*HH* 49). This is not the case for the more celebrated types of benevolence: pity, compassion and self-sacrifice. The central thesis of Nietzsche's attack on the

moralisation of pity is to argue that we cannot act in a purely unegoistic way.

Nietzsche rejects the notion of acting out of selflessness because it is based on 'a false explanation of certain human actions and sensations' (*HH* 37). We misunderstand human nature if we think of pity as a transparent passion of pure selflessness, and this is partly a problem of language: the single word 'pity' betrays the complexity of the passion, which is constituted by so many subtle interests and meanings: 'how coarsely does language assault with its one word so polyphonous a being!' (*D* 133).

Nietzsche claims that the person who pities is not interested in the well-being of the sufferer but in their own well-being. In *D* 133, he gives the examples of a stranger who has fallen into a river and someone we might despise who is spitting blood. In these examples, I pity the person because I do not consider him to deserve his pain. But although I am consciously concerned for the other person, unconsciously my acts of pity are 'the most purposive counter-motions' (*D* 133). The fact that he is suffering but does not deserve to be reminds me of my own vulnerability and fragility and it is this that induces my own pain. Thus, pity, which is neither good nor bad in itself, arises as a purposive counter-motion in response to the suffering of the pain that I feel, not the pain I witness. It is an affective response to an imagined pain (the person in the water does not feel pity for himself because his pain is real). But my pity is not a simple passion and does not have a single motivation: it might also be that I jump into the river because of the pressure to show a degree of heroism; it might be because of the pleasure I anticipate in the recognition of my act of heroism; or perhaps it is because I wish to prove myself adequate to the danger that threatens my vulnerability.

Although my analysis in this section concentrates on the central thesis in Nietzsche's attack on pity, which is to reveal the traces of egoism in pity, all of his comments attempt to reveal the complexity of the passion. In *D* 138, for example, he considers the different drives that combine to find their expression in pity: he describes pity as an act of 'benevolent revenge' and emphasises the superiority that the feeling affords. Love and reverence for someone who was previously honoured and admired becomes tenderer if that person is discovered to be suffering because the gulf between the two is bridged and the person now suffering is no longer superior. This more

tender love gives the one who pities pleasure: 'This capacity to give back produces in us great joy and exultation ... we have the enjoyment of active gratitude – which, in short, is benevolent revenge' (*D* 138). The gratitude previously felt towards the man who is suffering is now no longer beneath him but is meaningful to him; moreover, the one who pities has an elevated position to the object of pity, and the pleasure he feel is his enjoyment at this superiority.

The importance of imagination and Nietzsche's psychological investigation into pity in this aphorism is a direct attack on Schopenhauer's compassion. As noted above, for Schopenhauer, compassion is metaphysical and not an act of the imagination, yet his defence of compassion is suspiciously psychological. Nietzsche is therefore attacking Schopenhauer's compassion in terms that he believes are found in Schopenhauer, even though Schopenhauer would have argued otherwise. But more importantly, the main attack in this aphorism (*D* 133) is that morality is understood in terms of which we are consciously aware, whereas Nietzsche is drawing attention to the many unconscious processes taking place at the same time. This allows him to defend those who are less capable of feeling pity against charges of immoralism: it may simply be that those who are more disposed to feeling pity have stronger imaginations for danger; they might concern themselves less with others' matters; they might have suffered more and, as a result, are able to endure more pain; or perhaps 'being soft-hearted is painful to them, just as maintaining a stoic indifference is painful to men of pity' (*D* 133).

In addition, Nietzsche argues that a person who suffers is motivated by egoism when seeking the pity of others. Of course, this does not happen in all cases and Nietzsche does not cite the examples of the man who has fallen into the water or the despised person coughing up blood; he illustrates this point with children who wail in order to be pitied, invalids and the mentally afflicted who make a point of 'displaying their misfortune' (*HH* 50). These are examples of people in a weakened state but whose suffering is imagined and not real, unlike the man who has fallen into the water for he is not seeking our pity, but our help. For those who are weakened and consider themselves to be powerless, one power is still available: the power to hurt others by compelling them to share in suffering: 'in the conceit of his imagination he is still of sufficient importance to cause af-

fliction in the world' (*HH* 50). The relationship between pity and egoism is therefore subverted further because the one who pities and the one who seeks to incite pity have egoist motives.

A stronger interpretation of the central thesis in Nietzsche's critique of pity emphasises the egoism that motivates all actions and argues that the person suffering is only a means to securing one's own satisfaction. According to this interpretation, egoism denotes a selfish concern for oneself and to value pity is to misunderstand human nature. However, as is evident in *D* 133, a more moderate interpretation is possible. According to this interpretation, it is not simply the case that the one who pities uses the person suffering as a means to an end; rather pity is a strategic response by which one protects oneself. It follows that the individual who pities is very much affected by, and concerned for, the person suffering, but cannot help that all experiences are pleasurable or painful and the expression of pity is still pleasurable for its being self-assertion.

3. Overcoming the Passions

With regard to the passions, Nietzsche claims that the most immediate task of self-cultivation is the overcoming of the passions in order to generate 'the most fertile ground' on which cultivation can take place (*WS* 53). A theme that is explored extensively in the free spirit works is the threat posed by recalcitrant passions to the quest for knowledge and the need to protect this quest by moderating them. We see this, for example, in the artist who embraces his 'sudden excitations', and who has a hatred for the cool detachment of science; the artist's changeable mood expresses the 'vehemence and unreasonableness of a child', and although this might produce great works of art, it leads to an impoverished existence. Nietzsche cites Homer and Aeschylus as examples of artists who 'lived and died in melancholia' (*HH* 159). Nietzsche explains:

> A man who refuses to become master over his wrath, his choler and revengefulness, and his lusts, and attempts to become master in anything else, is as stupid as the farmer who stakes out his field beside a torrential stream without protecting himself against it. (*WS* 65)

Overcoming is achieved, in great part, by strengthening the contemplative element in man, which Nietzsche describes as 'a higher task' and as 'one of the most necessary corrections to the character of mankind' (*HH* 285). Rationality, in other words, distinguishes the higher men from the lower men: the higher men are those who have achieved mastery over themselves; the lower men are those in whom vehement passions often lead reason astray.

Overcoming the passions does not mean suppressing them. We misunderstand human nature if we seek to alienate, suppress or extirpate the passions. This is the dangerous legacy of Christianity, which Nietzsche likens to a bad dentist who only treats dental problems by extracting the tooth (*WS* 83). Similarly, the Christian abhorrence of sensuality was cured by trying to remove certain passions without having a proper understanding of them. Like the dentist, Christianity misdiagnoses the problem and provides a single, damaging cure to the pain that leads to far worse problems whose symptoms take time to appear. However, the difference between them is that the incompetent dentist has, at least, correctly targeted the object of pain. The Christian's actions, on the other hand, have more dire consequences, for what is suppressed are not the passions themselves but an understanding of them (see also *D* 39 and *D* 50). The passions are all-too-human and do not disappear; they remain powerful, uncontrolled and unknown because they mutate into 'repulsive disguises' (*WS* 83). It is through such a lack of understanding that the passions have been allowed 'to develop into such monsters' (*WS* 37) and man has become ignorant and fearful of them. As Graham Parkes observes: 'It is a maxim of depth psychology that when something of one's own is constantly denied it becomes alien, other, and thereby disturbing – if not terrifying'.[6]

Overcoming the passions means subduing them. The difference between subduing and suppressing the passions is subtle, but crucial: it is a matter of moderating them while retaining, and harnessing, their vitality. Nietzsche offers six ways of controlling a dominating drive (or group of drives) (*D* 109): first, by starving drives of their nutrients, that is, by avoiding opportunities for gratifying a drive and so weakening it; secondly, by imposing strict regularity in its gratification; thirdly, by giving into the

[6] Graham Parkes, *Composing the Soul: Reaches of Nietzsche's Psychology* (London: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 147.

wild and unrestrained gratification of the drive in order to generate disgust with it; fourthly, by associating the gratification of the drive with some very painful thought so that future gratification of the drive is experienced as pain; fifthly, either by directing one's energy into other endeavours, or tiring oneself or perhaps subjecting oneself to new stimuli and pleasures; and finally, most dramatically, by weakening and depressing all the drives. On this final point, Nietzsche gives the example of the ascetic who, in order to starve his sensuality, starves his vigour.

The task of self-cultivation is not solely reliant on the individual, but requires a healthy culture. This radically complicates the enquiry into cultivation of the passions and extends beyond the scope of this article, but it is helpful to note one such example, which refers to the second way of controlling dominating drives. Passions such as pity and fear, which can be expressive of weakness, need to be discharged periodically and under controlled conditions: 'And in the long run a drive is, through practice in satisfying it, *intensified*' (*HH* 212). For Plato, the frequent discharging of passions can nurture them, hence the censorship, and later banishment, of almost all the arts in *The Republic*. Nietzsche agrees with the threat posed by frequent discharging of the passions (*HH* 212), but whereas Plato sought to prevent this, Nietzsche praises Greek culture for regulating the discharge of these passions by establishing a tradition of festivals that embraced the passions (*AOM* 220). Nietzsche speculates that there may still be a remedial use for festivals (*GS* 7), but it would have to take account of the changed relation between art and life, since art is something we only have the time to enjoy as a recreational activity (*WS* 170).

The subduing of the passions is not the final goal but a necessary first step. Nietzsche warns that if the passions were only subdued, this would give rise to 'all kinds of weeds and devilish nonsense' (*WS* 53). The goal of self-cultivation is not a dispassionate, disinterested individual removed from life: Nietzsche distinguishes between the individual who abandons himself to the vehemence of his passions and a 'deep-rooted passion, passion which gnaws at the individual and often consumes him, [which] is a thing of some consequence' (*HH* 211). The latter is attained as subdued passions become less violent and more controlled, but without losing their strength. The goal of self-cultivation is 'a firm, mild and at bottom cheerful soul, a temper that does not need to be on its guard against malice or

sudden outbursts' (*HH* 34).

Fertilising the ground for self-cultivation requires more than subduing the passions; they must in turn be transformed or harnessed:

> The man who has overcome his passions has entered into possession of the most fertile ground; like the colonist who has mastered the forests and swamps. To sow the seeds of good spiritual works in the soil of the subdued passions is then the immediate urgent task. (*WS* 53)

I will not say much about the transformation of the passions in this article. My main interest is in the initial steps of moderating and mastering the passions. However, Nietzsche establishes a controversial relation between joy and suffering, which acknowledges the positive value of suffering. Against pity and its multiplication of pain, Nietzsche advocates sharing in joy (*GS* 338). Imagining, and rejoicing in, the joy of others is a dominant passion in the higher types (*AOM* 62). According to Nietzsche, such joy is precluded by pity because the reverse side of pity is suspicion of the joy of one's neighbour (*D* 80). Such joy is egoist, because one will feel pleasure from rejoicing in the joy of another, but this other-directed passion is an expression of strength, not weakness.

4. Taking Responsibility for the Passions

Nietzsche persuasively undermines the traditional notion of responsibility by arguing that most of the struggle between drives happens at an unconscious level, and so we are poor observers of ourselves. We can nonetheless refer to Nietzsche's project of self-cultivation as an *ethics* because he recasts the question of responsibility in terms of the drives and passions. This point has not been discussed much in scholarship on self-cultivation, though Robert Solomon is a notable exception. We cannot bear any measure of responsibility for ourselves and carry out the work of free spirits until we also learn to take responsibility for our passions. This poses the question: how can we take responsibility for our passions when we do not know ourselves? Nietzsche's psychology of drives substantiates the claim that we are constantly deceiving ourselves.

One of the ways in which we can take responsibility is by having a better understanding of the passions, which helps to establish a familiarity with them. Nietzsche targets two problematic ways of viewing the passions: first, because passions go against rational will, this has led many to consider them irrational and alien; that is, as something that happens to us and do not belong to our 'true selves'. Secondly, such as the example of Schopenhauer's compassion, others believe that passions can be pure and selfless actions possible. In the first case, if we believe passions are mysterious and unknowable, we absolve ourselves of responsibility because we believe we cannot be held responsible for passions that happen to us (e.g. as we might say we 'fall in love'). Nietzsche addresses this problem by conceptualising thinking as the relation between drives and also by revealing the cognitive structure of passions such as pity. In the second case, as we saw in Section 2, Nietzsche persuasively argues that to think of compassion as pure and fully knowable is dangerous because erroneous: the passion is far more complex than Schopenhauer assumes and there are always traces of egoism. To base morality on a passion demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of human nature as well as great irresponsibility in the desire to idealise a passion in this way (i.e. to use it as the basis of an entire moral philosophy). In short, to treat passions as pure generates a false sense of responsibility and to think of them as irrational and mysterious is a dereliction of responsibility.

So how can Nietzsche integrate the question of responsibility into the task of overcoming the passions? This is a far-reaching question, and any adequate answer would require careful consideration of factors that go beyond the scope of this article. But I will attempt to sketch an answer to it using what we have seen about pity as an example. Before doing so, I will comment on Nietzsche's observation about the value of pain. Nietzsche identifies pain as an important species-preserving force. Pain encourages caution and teaches us 'how to live with reduced energy, too: as soon as pain sounds its safety signal, it is time for such a reduction – some great danger, some storm is approaching, and we do well to "inflate ourselves" as little as possible' (*GS* 318). The way in which we respond to the anticipation, sight or experience of pain varies greatly among individuals and generations. Nietzsche claims that primitive man lived in an age of fear and had to become violent in order to survive. This transformation was achieved

through 'training in bodily torments and deprivations' and primitive man understood the value of cruelty and pain in achieving this (*GS* 48). When primitive man witnessed pain being inflicted on others, his only thought was for himself. In contrast, modern man has a hateful attitude towards pain and cannot bear even the thought of it; he thinks of pain in the same way he thinks of toothaches and stomach aches (that is, by seeking to be rid of it) and not in terms of 'great pains of the soul' (*GS* 48). Nietzsche notes that this particular attitude towards pain has been developed, not as a result of painful experiences, but in the absence of them.

It is in this context that we can now return to Nietzsche's critique of pity. As we saw in Section 2, he undermines the high value accorded to pity principally by making us aware of the complexity of the passion, which contains traces of egoism not only in the person who feels pity but in the person who seeks to incite it. Indeed, egoism is not opposed to pity but is in fact a condition of it. Nietzsche's analysis serves as a justification for viewing pity with caution for, although it is not innately harmful, it can be bad and destructive. However, this is not the only message to emerge from his analysis of pity in the middle period, and we need to distinguish between his analysis of the passion and his attack on the moralisation of it. In the context of self-cultivation, we need to make this distinction even though Nietzsche often conflates the two.

Pity, like any passion, is a strategic response, a way of orientating ourselves in the world; in the case of pity, it is a response to suffering and/or weakness. This relation is developed in *D* 134, in which Nietzsche observes that pity multiplies suffering, because in addition to the suffering experienced by the person who is pitied, the one who pities also suffers with him and experiences his own pain. This is presupposed in Nietzsche's attempts to expose traces of egoism in pity, for example when he argues that pity is a response to the imagined suffering of the one who pities, unlike the real suffering of the person spitting blood or the person who has fallen into the water. We also saw that pity is related to weakness as, for example, in the case of children crying for attention and invalids and the mentally afflicted who moan and complain, all for the same purpose of inciting pity in others (*HH* 50). It is because of the relation between pity and suffering (real or imagined) and/or weakness that Nietzsche claims that if pity dominated for a single day, mankind would perish from it: 'He who for a period of

time made the experiment of intentionally pursuing occasions for pity in his everyday life and set before his soul all the misery available to him in his surroundings would inevitably grow sick and melancholic' (*D* 134).

Although most of Nietzsche's analysis of pity is negative, it is not wholly negative, and this is one of the ways in which the middle period differs from his later works. Nietzsche claims that we should '*manifest* pity, but take care not to possess it' (*HH* 50). The intuitive reading of this claim, which is based on the traditional interpretation of his critique of pity, is coloured by his later position. If, for example, we were to say that someone manifests decency but does not possess it, what we mean is that they are a dissembler and their behaviour is not to be taken at face value. Thus, pity would be something that we should use strategically to impress others, but should never be anything more than a feigned reaction. Such modes of relations are masks that the free spirits wear, one of the 'three hundred foregrounds' that allow them to live in solitude and to experiment without offending the base community; pity then, would be a disposition that is necessary for the survival of the noble type (*BGE* 284).

However, in the middle period, we are better placed to understand the claim in the light of the above remark about pain (i.e. that it is an important species-preserving force that sounds a safety signal that it is time for a reduction – *GS* 318). This provides us with a counterintuitive, yet nevertheless true, reading of Nietzsche's claim in *HH* 50: manifesting pity, which means openly expressing it to ourselves (and perhaps others) rather than obfuscating and suppressing it, is the only means by which we become aware of our pity and deal with it, rather than possess it (i.e. holding onto it and nurturing it). The manifestation of pity is both a warning (I openly express my pity and become aware thereby that this passion is building in me) and a call to action (I initiate practices that will limit it). This ultimately amounts to the fact that we need to be emotionally honest and sensitive with ourselves to prevent the pathological building up of passions that might distort or debilitate us. In the interests of self-cultivation, pity has an important and *positive* role in calling attention to suffering or to an expression of weakness in general; this requires further diagnosis, and so we are responsible for exploring this suffering and/or weakness that pity has signalled to our attention.

This is why Nietzsche criticises the individual who uses his weakness

and suffering to win the pity of others and to hurt them. Nietzsche's point is not simply that the person suffering has egoist motives: the greater problem is that the person suffering is behaving irresponsibly. Rather than exploring, and addressing, the problems that have led to his suffering he is capitalising on his current situation by indulging in his powerlessness and seeking consolation. To adopt this perspective is irresponsible because indulging in powerlessness is a choice one makes. Similarly, an individual should learn to become aware when he feels pity in order to understand why he feels pity and how best to respond to it. Nietzsche argues that the most effective consolation is to let those who suffer know that consolation is not possible (*D* 380): 'Well, the recipe against this "distress" is: *distress*' (*GS* 48).

Nietzsche's drive psychology is economic before it is political: before we devote ourselves to strategic performances of feigned passions, we had better attend to the delicate balance of forces in the depths of ourselves. That is to say, the passions we manifest are signs for us before they are signs for others. An economic model, then, is concerned with managing the economy of drives that I am and reading the signs that they display. Drive psychology is concerned with the behaviour of drives and what hinders and facilitates them, the unities they form and which drive or group of drives is dominating. Self-cultivation aims at the healthy development of joyful drives; in this ethics of self-cultivation, those drives that are joyful and to the self's advantage are good, those that are to the self's disadvantage are bad. The concern with pity is the way in which it impedes development. The ethical task for each of us is to learn to read our own signals and to react appropriately to them.

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Lumping It and Liking It

On reading the works of Nietzsche's middle period

Ruth Abbey

1. Introduction

Periodisations are perilous and must be handled with care. Like all heuristic devices, periodisations simultaneously reveal and conceal. When using them, we should be appreciative of the revelations they permit while remaining mindful that other insights will be concealed. This caution seems especially a propos in the study of Friedrich Nietzsche, who alerted us to the homogenising tendencies of even concepts and words in his 1873 essay *Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense*. Periodisations are bound to just magnify this procrustean tendency. In this article, I examine what we mean by the phrase 'Nietzsche's middle period' and begin by outlining the standard demarcation. I note the increase in scholarly engagement with the middle period writings, paying particular attention to Paul Franco's recent book on this period. In response to this increasing engagement, I distill a hermeneutical issue for interpreters of the middle period, asking whether it is necessary to treat these works as separate units, as practitioners of what I label the separation method claim, or whether they can legitimately be treated as a group of texts. I call this latter approach the lumping method.

2. The Middle Period

Nietzsche's middle period comprises *Human, All Too Human* (1878), *Assorted Opinions and Maxims* (1879), *The Wanderer and His Shadow* (1880),

Daybreak (1881), and the first four books of *The Gay Science* (1882). This period is demarcated at one end by contrast with Nietzsche's early writings and their enthusiasm for Wagner and Schopenhauer and at the other by *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (1883) and Nietzsche's subsequent writings. In these writings we find *TL*'s warning about the homogenising tendencies of language reiterated in Nietzsche's caution that 'the unity of the word is no guarantee of the unity of the thing' (*HH* 14, cf. *WS* 11). It is echoed in his complaint about how coarsely language 'assault[s] with one word so polyphonous a being [the being in question here is pity]' (*D* 133).

While these middle works are not a monolith, there is some warrant for treating them as a group, demarcating them from what went before and what came after. At a very basic level, the text of *HH* just looks different from the four long essays that comprise the *Untimely Meditations*, marked as it is by breaks between pieces of writing of different lengths and peppered as it is with aphorisms. More substantively, Keith Ansell-Pearson and Duncan Large observe that the first volume of *HH* 'is remarkably different in tone and outlook from his previous published work. Wagner was repulsed by Nietzsche's new philosophical outlook, and even Nietzsche's closest friends wondered how it was possible for someone to discard their soul and don a completely different one in its place'.[1] Regarding the other end of the periodisation, in a note on the back cover of the first edition of *GS*, Nietzsche depicted the middle-period works as a set, declaring that 'this book marks the conclusion of a series of writings by FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE whose common goal is to erect *a new image and ideal of the free spirit.*'[2] And it is undeniable that there is something sui generis about

[1]Keith Ansell Pearson and Duncan Large, eds., *The Nietzsche Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), p. xxiv; See also Robin Small, *Nietzsche and Rée: A Star Friendship* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 31–33; Jonathan Cohen, *Science, Culture, and Free Spirits: A Study of Nietzsche's Human, All-Too-Human* (New York: Prometheus, 2010), 250n5; Gary Handwerk notes that *AOM* and *WS* 'caused nothing like the same consternation among friends and foes that *HH* had elicited: the primary reaction was apparent indifference'. Gary Handwerk, 'Translator's Afterword,' in *Human, All too Human II and Unpublished Fragments from the Period of Human, All too Human II (Spring 1878–Fall 1879)*, trans. Gary Handwerk, vol. 4, The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), 581.

[2]Richard Schacht, 'Introduction,' in *Human, All too Human* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. xxi.

what followed book four of *GS*. *Z* is different in tone, form, genre and, to some extent, content from anything that went before. This book about transitions was written at a transitional stage of Nietzsche's thinking.

The forces propelling Nietzsche to change his thinking and which delineate the early writings from the middle works are several, both in number and in type. They include his reassessment of Schopenhauer, his growing disenchantment with Wagner – with his Catholicising tendencies, German nationalism, and commanding ego – Nietzsche's burgeoning friendship with Paul Rée who encouraged him to read the French moralists and English thinkers like Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer; the attraction of the aphorism as a writing style, the deterioration of his health, and the subsequent resignation of his teaching post.[3]

The idea of such a periodisation was originated by Lou Salomé, whose *Friedrich Nietzsche in seinen Werken* was published in 1894. Whatever the particular factors that stimulated Nietzsche to revise some of his ideas at this time, Salomé detects in him a constitutional compulsion to intellectual self-alienation and self-overcoming. As she sees it, whatever the specific catalysts were, Nietzsche felt compelled to distance himself from ideas with which he was familiar and to try on new possibilities.[4] Indeed, the chapter of Salomé's book in which she adumbrates the tri-partite periodisation of Nietzsche's writings is entitled '*Seine Wandlungen*'. Her English translator renders this as 'Nietzsche's Transitions', but 'changes' or 'transformations' are other possible renderings. The epigraph Salomé gives to this chapter is the third last passage from *D* entitled 'Shedding one's skin'. It reads 'The snake which cannot shed its skin perishes. So it is with minds, which are prevented from changing their opinions: they cease to be minds' (*D* 573).[5] So in the middle writings we see Nietzsche changing many of his opinions: his enthusiasm for Wagner, Schopenhauer, metaphysics, and many things

[3]For a helpful assemblage of these biographical factors, see Cohen, *Science, Culture, and Free Spirits*, pp. 51–56.

[4]Lou Andreas-Salomé, *Nietzsche*, trans. Siegfried Mandel (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2001), p. 52.

[5] *Sich häuten. – Die Schlange, welche sich nicht häuten kann, geht zu Grunde. Ebenso die Gesiter, welche man verhindert, ihre Meinungen zu wechslen; sie horen auf, Geist zu sein.* Hollingdale (1982) and Brittain Smith (2011) both translate Geist as spirit here, but I agree with Salomé's translator, Siegfried Mandel, that mind is more apposite.

German drops away.[6]

The simile of the snake shedding its skin is not ideal here, however. Just because Nietzsche's enthusiasm for these things fades, it does not mean that they disappear entirely from his concerns. On the contrary: he continues to wrestle with them – throughout the middle writings and those beyond. These preoccupations are not sloughed off – despite some of Nietzsche's own self-representations. Indeed, the suitability of the snake shedding its skin as a simile for Nietzsche's intellectual transitions is undermined by Salomé's own account of his thinking. She is too subtle and perceptive a reader of Nietzsche to suggest that each of the three periods she discerns represents a clean and complete 'epistemological break' with the earlier one. She points out, for example, that in his last phase Nietzsche returns to some of the concerns of his first, but approaches them in a different way. Robin Small's close study of the relationship between Nietzsche and Rée during these years also shows that the changes in Nietzsche's interest did not occur over night but had been in preparation for some time.[7] Thus in employing Salome's tri-partite periodisation of Nietzsche's writings, it is necessary to acknowledge that the boundaries between Nietzsche's phases are not rigid, that some of the thoughts elaborated in one period were adumbrated in the previous one, that there are differences within any single phase, and that some concerns pervade his oeuvre.

When I published my book on Nietzsche's middle period in 2000,[8] very little attention had been paid to two of these works in particular – *HH* and *D* although *HH* had had, and continues to receive, slightly more

[6] A better way of expressing this might be that he is thinking about what Germany at its best represents. A passage from the notebooks of Summer 1878 suggests this where Nietzsche mentions Friedrich the Great, Beethoven, Bach, and Goethe admiringly. Could each in his different way embody 'the truly German qualities' while Wagner is not German? (*KSA* 8:30[149]). Taken from Friedrich Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human II and Unpublished Fragments from the Period of Human, All Too Human II (Spring 1878–Fall 1879)*, trans. Gary Handwerk, vol. 4, The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), p. 335. As Handwerk's notes indicate, a revised version of this passage appears as *AOM* 298 (*KSA* 8:39[167]; Handwerk p. 359), but the contrast to Wagner has been dropped. A contemporaneous passage from the notes tends in the same direction, adding Mozart to the list of Germans with which to contrast Wagner (*KSA* 8:30[167]; Handwerk p. 359).

[7] Small, *Nietzsche and Rée*, p. xx.

[8] Ruth Abbey, *Nietzsche's Middle Period* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

attention than *D*.[9] Since I lamented the dearth of attention to the middle-period writings, more attention has been paid by scholars to these fascinating texts. In 2000, Kathleen Higgins published *Comic Relief*, which was a study of *GS*. 2005 saw the publication of Robin Small's *Nietzsche and Rée: A Star Friendship* which shed immense light on Nietzsche's thinking during this time through an examination of his relationship with Rée. In 2008 Michael Ure produced *Nietzsche's Therapy: Self-Cultivation in the Middle Works*.[10] There has been a book on *HH* by Jonathan Cohen, a book on *GS* by Monika Langer,[11] and a book on *D* is in preparation by Rebecca Bamford. Several articles[12] and a number of book chapters[13] that focus on the

[9] Cf. Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter, 'Introduction,' in *Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. vii; Handwerk disagrees on this ranking of relative neglect, deeming *HH* to be 'the least well known, least critically digested of Nietzsche's major works'. Handwerk, 'Translator's Afterword,' p. 364; Schacht suggests that Walter Kaufmann's treatment of *HH* I and II and *D* has contributed to their neglect in English-language scholarship on Nietzsche. Schacht, 'Introduction,' p. xiii.

[10] (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2008). Although it appears in his bibliography, Ure writes as if my book doesn't exist when he announces his aim 'to bring Nietzsche's middle period out of the shade from which it has been undeservedly consigned' (p. 1). He sheds different light on these works than I do, to be sure, but ignoring my earlier attempt to do the same is peculiar. The proximity of his later introductory claim 'to demonstrate that the middle period is neither an intermezzo between *BT* and *Z*, nor simply a prelude to his later works' (p. 7) to my own that 'the middle period is not the mere intermezzo between the *UM* and *Z*, nor simply a prelude to Nietzsche's 'mature' works' (p. xii) is insufficiently acknowledged.

[11] Monika M. Langer, *Nietzsche's Gay Science: Dancing Coherence* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); I discuss this book in Ruth Abbey, 'Review of 'Nietzsche's Gay Science: Dancing Coherence' by Monika Langer,' *Philosophy in Review* 31, no. 1 (2011): 46–48.

[12] See, for example, Iain Morrison, 'Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality in the 'Human, All Too Human' Series,' *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 11 (2003): 657–672; Carl B. Sachs, 'Nietzsche's 'Daybreak': Towards a Naturalized Theory of Autonomy,' *Epoché* (2008): 81–100, doi:10.5840/epoche200813115; Keith Ansell Pearson, 'On the Sublime in 'Dawn',' *The Agonist* 2, no. 1 (2009): 5–30; Keith Ansell Pearson, 'Nietzsche, the Sublime, and the Sublimities of Philosophy: An Interpretation of 'Dawn',' *Nietzsche-Studien* 39 (2010): 201–232; Two articles that pay attention to the middle-period works appeared in the same year as my book. See Amy Mullin, 'Nietzsche's Free Spirit,' *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 38 (2000): 383–405; Bernhard Reginster, 'Nietzsche on Selflessness and the Value of Altruism,' *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 17, no. 2 (2000): 177–200.

[13] See, for example, the relevant chapters in Paul Bishop, ed., *A Companion to Friedrich Nietzsche: Life and Works* (New York: Camden House, 2012).

middle period writings have appeared. The Free Spirit Trilogy initiative at Warwick University in the UK has hosted a series of conferences on these writings. Post hoc is not, of course, propter hoc and I'm sure that even without my prodding, scholarly attention would have gravitated to these works, given the massive interest in and importance of Nietzsche. In this article, I reflect primarily on Paul Franco's 2011 book *Nietzsche's Enlightenment* (hereafter NE) because this is the most sustained and wide-ranging treatment that the middle period writings have received since my book.[14]

3. A Hermeneutical Debate

Focusing on Franco's book also allows me to raise an important hermeneutical question for students of the middle period writings.[15] The title of the current article comes from Franco's suggestion that despite paying lip service to the idea that the works of the middle period should not be treated as an homogeneous whole, I tend 'to lump the[m] ... together', often failing 'to register crucial differences between them' (NE p. 231n9). Franco is basically correct – I do proceed by looking at common themes and shared concerns across these works and pay next to no attention to differences between or among them. But context is significant. When I wrote, there was no single study of the middle period writings in English. My explicit aim was to draw attention to this trove of (unevenly) neglected treasures. Expectant that future interpreters would disagree with some, if not all, of my claims, what concerned me more was that there would be future commentators.

Whereas I drew out the similarities and shared concerns across the middle period writings, Franco contends that 'Nietzsche's thought undergoes tremendous development over the course of the middle period, from his repudiation of Wagner, Schopenhauer and romanticism in *Human, All Too Human* to his questioning of the ascetic aspects of the free-spirited

[14] Paul Franco, *Nietzsche's Enlightenment: The Free-Spirit Trilogy of the Middle Period* (London: University of Chicago Press, 2011).

[15] For these two reasons – scope and method – I don't engage with Ure's work in great detail. His scope his narrower, focusing on the theme of self-cultivation, and tracing it back to Hellenistic and Stoic traditions and forward to psychoanalysis. He follows the same 'lumping' method as I do.

quest for knowledge in *GS*' (NE p. xiv). In contrast to, and correction of, my lumping tendency, he proceeds book by book, devoting a chapter to each of the three works. What I am calling his separation method allows Franco to track changes from one book to the next and thus affords insights that my lumping method precludes. Also a proponent of what I am calling the separation method, Cohen expresses puzzlement that there are so few studies of Nietzsche that focus on his books 'as units of interpretation'.[16] He counsels that 'Attention to individual works is our best plan for understanding Nietzsche'[17] and concludes his study of *HH* with a chapter on the work's literary integrity.[18] Cohen further contends that what I am labelling the separation method can eliminate the inconsistencies I note in the views Nietzsche expresses in the middle period writings.[19]

Harbouring no in principle objection to considering each book on its own, I would also propose that if we are to be fully attentive to possible differences among the middle period writings, it should be acknowledged that the work currently known as *HH* actually amalgamates three writings. Its first volume was published in 1878 under the title eventually given to the work as a whole. What became Volume II comprises two shorter writings, with *Assorted Opinions and Maxims* (*Vermischte Meinungen und Sprüche*) appearing in 1879 and *The Wanderer and His Shadow* (*Der Wanderer und Sein Schatten*) making its debut the following year. These three writings were not fused into a single, two volume work until 1886, when Nietzsche also provided a Preface for each volume. Cohen's study acknowledges this, confining itself largely to *HH*, or what became Volume I and discussing 'The Problem of Volume II' separately.[20] Franco, by contrast, collapses the two volumes of *HH* into a single unit, giving these three books just one chapter to share. A strict application of the separation method would treat the middle period writings as a quintet, rather than a trilogy.[21]

[16] Cohen, *Science, Culture, and Free Spirits*, p. 14.

[17] Ibid., p. 236n6, cf. 18, 22.

[18] Ibid., pp. 175–203.

[19] Ibid., p. 236n6 cf. 21. He does not, however, bear this out with any discussion of the putative inconsistencies nor their resolution via the separation method.

[20] Ibid., pp. 196–202.

[21] Handwerk suggests that *AOM* and *WS* were later fused as the second volume of *HH* because so many copies of both remained unsold (p.581). His Afterword to Volume II considers some of the similarities and differences between the two volumes (Handwerk 2013).

Despite harbouring no principled objection to considering each book on its own, I am prima facie sceptical that there is a lot of significant change from one middle period writing to the next. This is partly because Nietzsche penned these works in such rapid succession – five writings between 1878 and 1882. I'm dubious about how much significant change any thinker can undergo in such a short period, having already changed his mind significantly on a number of issues. While there *could* be major changes from one book to another, the burden of proof rests with those who posit such changes. The separation method also seems to presume that each work from this period is a paragon of internal consistency. As I read it, however, Nietzsche does change his mind and develop or refine his ideas within each of these writings. Richard Schacht's remarks about *HH* apply to all of the middle-period works: all are 'very much the product of a mind in transition, moving in many different directions and in many different ways…'.[22] And just as Ansell Pearson has underlined *D*'s experimental nature,[23] I see this characterisation as applicable to all the middle-period works. This is a period of immense intellectual transition and fermentation for Nietzsche, but it's not clear that each individual book is a marker of such change.

My prima facie scepticism about significant change from one book to another, and the corollary that they need to be discussed separately, is compounded by Franco's specific claims about what these changes were. Several of these are scrutinised below.

4. Human, All Too Human

One way in which Franco's work is superior to my own is his use of Nietzsche's notebooks to illuminate some of the claims made in the published works. I drew occasionally on his letters for further insights into what Nietzsche might have been thinking at the time, but were I doing this analysis again, I would follow Franco's example and explore the notebooks

But even if the former outweigh the latter, a proponent of the separation method should as least consider treating these as separate works.

[22] Schacht, 'Introduction,' p. xi.

[23] Keith Ansell Pearson, 'Editor's Afterword,' in *Dawn: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality*, trans. Brittain Smith (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), pp.365, 407.

too. Another way in which Franco's presentation of these works is superior to my own is his inclusion of a Preface which discusses some of the works before *HH*. It is preferable not to treat the middle-period works as if they appeared out of nowhere.

Franco delves back into those earlier writings in order to emphasise the rupture *HH* effects. 'This book would mark Nietzsche's *decisive* break with his earlier philosophy and with the two figures who had the greatest influence on it, Arthur Schopenhauer and Richard Wagner' (NE p. 1, emphasis added). With this development, 'the cord was definitively cut and Nietzsche declared his independence from Wagner, Schopenhauerean pessimism, and all forms of romanticism in one fell swoop' (NE p. 1). Yet shortly after, Franco points out that *HH* was originally conceived of as the fifth *Untimely Meditation* (NE p. 11), which throws claims about decisive breaks, cut cords, and fell swoops into doubt. At the very least this suggests that Nietzsche did not see there to be such a radical rupture between the two phases. Cohen makes an observation about fungible titles in this period that is also relevant here, saying 'More evidence that *Human, All-Too-Human* is brewing in the period of *Untimely Meditations* can be found in the notebooks, where a list of planned *Untimely Meditations* … includes titles that surface in *Human, All-Too-Human* as chapter headings'.[24] This further suggests that Nietzsche himself did not envisage such a dramatic diremption between the two phases.

But on closer inspection it emerges that Franco cannot sustain his thesis of radical break, noting elsewhere that *HH* carries 'echoes of something like Schopenhauer's contemplative ideal' (NE p. 24) and that 'Nietzsche still remains under the spell of Schopenhauer' in valuing nonegoistic motivation.[25] I suspect that in advancing claims about decisive breaks, cords cut, and fell swoops, Franco has been too powerfully impressed by Nietzsche's physical flight from the first Bayreuth festival in 1876, which he seizes upon as symbolic of the changes in this period (NE pp.1, 38). But physical flight is one thing; psychic or intellectual flight is harder to achieve. I would argue that despite his many claims about overcoming Schopenhauer's and

[24] Cohen, *Science, Culture, and Free Spirits*, p. 193, cf. 247n41, 248n42.

[25] Franco also claims that *HH* harks back at one point to a view of language contained in *TL* (p. 236n25) which further challenges any notion of a strong or strict break between the periods (p. 58).

Wagner's influence, both figures remained important internal interlocutors throughout Nietzsche's career, not just the middle period. This is not to suggest that he shared their views on all things but rather that they remained among the dominant thinkers he was doing battle with. Wagner and Schopenhauer were two of those who set the agenda for many of Nietzsche's career-long intellectual preoccupations.[26] Consider here Nietzsche's own claims about Schopenhauer's looming presence over *HH*: 'The end was the value of ethics, and I had to fight this issue out almost alone with my great teacher, Schopenhauer, to whom *HH* ... addresses itself as though he were still alive'.[27] Nietzsche's preoccupation with Wagner is amply testified to by the unpublished writings from the middle period. His name appears repeatedly in the notebooks and even when Wagner is not mentioned, he is still obviously on Nietzsche's mind.[28]

Treating the three components of *HH* separately from *D* and *GS* allows Franco to discover that 'the theme of culture represents not merely an overlooked aspect of *HH* but the key to the book as a whole and the axis around which all of the other reflections contained in it – on metaphysics, morality, religion and art – revolve' (NE p. 16, cf. 54). Franco's evidence that culture's centrality has been overlooked by other commentators reduces to a footnote observing that my book's index lacks an entry for culture (NE p. 234n11). There he also cites some interpreters who do take culture seriously. I agree that the question of culture is crucial for Nietzsche – indeed, I can't imagine what it would mean to deny such a claim. While

[26] Julian Young, *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 3; Michael Gillespie, *Nihilism Before Nietzsche* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996), p. 183; Christopher Janaway, *Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's Educator* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).

[27] *HH* P:5. As Handwerk sees it, *HH* 'shows the continued influence upon Nietzsche's thought of Schopenhauer' (AHH 1 p. 378). But just as we should question any image of Schopenhauer's influence being sloughed off in the middle period, so Cohen raises useful doubts about how fully signed up to Schopenhauer Nietzsche was in even his earlier writings (p.237n10; 244n21). See also Paul Raimond Daniels, *Nietzsche and the Birth of Tragedy* (Durham: Acumen, 2013), 63–70, on some of the ways in which Nietzsche departs from Schopenhauer in *BT*.

[28] For an argument about the persistence of Wagnerian themes in Nietzsche's writing, see Julian Young, *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Religion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Cohen issues salutary reminders on this too, pointing out Nietzsche's ambivalence about Wagner before the middle period (pp. 74, 245n32, 247n42, 251n19).

it is true that my index contains no entry for culture, sometimes a concern is so pervasive for a thinker that it can't be boiled down to a list of specific page references.[29] But what I am less persuaded of is that culture as such is a central concern for *HH* in the way it wasn't for Nietzsche's earlier writings. Thus Gary Handwerk contends that 'Persisting [into *HH*] from the time of *Unfashionable Observations* ... is an ongoing interest in the nature and workings of culture...'.[30] But surely culture was also a major issue for *BT* too. Surely it is a career-long preoccupation for Nietzsche.[31] So again, I'm not sure that Franco's separation method is what reveals this otherwise concealed claim about the importance of culture for Nietzsche. If what the separation method reveals is that this concern is new to *HH*, then it strikes me as incorrect.

It is also noteworthy that Franco provides no definition of what Nietzsche means by 'culture' in *HH*. Defining culture is, of course, no easy feat, but if Franco is to put the concept of culture front and centre of his analysis, it seems incumbent upon him to venture some sort of definition.[32] And given his claim above that Nietzsche's remarks about metaphysics, morality, religion, and art pivot around the central organising idea of culture, this needs to be a definition that shows the separation of these things from culture. Because otherwise, those commentators who have talked about metaphysics, morality, religion, and art in *HH* are talking about culture too.

No doubt Nietzsche's ideas about what makes a culture strong, vibrant, or healthy change across the course of his works. As Cohen says, 'The explicit objective of the early works is to improve German culture and foster its growth'. What changes with *HH* are Nietzsche's views about cultural improvement[33] as well, I would add, as his shift from a German-centric view to a wider European perspective. Cohen offers a very helpful account

[29] As I have observed elsewhere, the index to John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice* contains no entry for rights. See Ruth Abbey, 'Rights,' chap. 4 in *Political Concepts: A Reader and a Guide*, ed. Iain MacKenzie (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), p. 114.

[30] Handwerk, 'Translator's Afterword,' p. 575.

[31] Cf Cohen, *Science, Culture, and Free Spirits*, pp.81, 242n13.

[32] For a nice attempt to grapple with what Nietzsche means by culture, see Jeffrey Church, 'Two Concepts of Culture in the Early Nietzsche,' *European Journal of Political Theory* 10, no. 3 (2011): 327–349, doi:10.1177/1474885111406388.

[33] Cohen, *Science, Culture, and Free Spirits*, pp. 19–20 cf. 61–62, 81.

of the changed relationship between science and culture that we witness in *HH* compared to the earlier works. With *HH* 'Nietzsche presents science as the hero of culture's liberation'.[34] As Cohen carefully lays out, this switch comes about because Nietzsche redefines and revalues science and develops a new conception of culture. Rather than being corrosive of culture by amassing 'an encyclopedia of aimless and disorganised facts',[35] science is now welcomed for piercing illusions and demanding of its practitioners a host of intellectual virtues.[36] Nietzsche also loses his concern with culture's unity of style and becomes more tolerant of a diversity of cultural influences and expressions.[37]

When Franco follows this line of thinking – what is new is not a concern with culture, but Nietzsche's ideas about how to strengthen it – he moves onto firmer footing. Franco suggests that in *HH*, 'the free spirited knower replaces the artist-priest as the bearer of higher culture' (NE p. 54 cf. 16). He reads *HH* as urging that art 'be superseded by science as the fundamental activity of human beings' (NE p. 40), but later clarifies that supersession is not obliteration. Art will continue to play a role in the higher culture of the future that Nietzsche imagines, longs for, and hopes to expedite (NE pp.41, 44, 47). Franco further suggests that the 'end of art' thesis belongs to Volume 1 of *HH*, but is modified in *AOM* (NE pp.44, 119). This suggests again that a consistently-applied separation method would need to treat these as separate works. Elsewhere I have proposed a different interpretation of the relationship between science and art in *HH*, claiming that even in the first volume of that work, Nietzsche is unable to relinquish art altogether. Art's proper place in a more scientific or enlightened age is one of the issues that churns throughout this book, with Nietzsche taking different and seemingly contradictory stances on this question both across and within *HH*, *AOM* and *WS*. As I note there, given that the cultural eras he so admires for their scientific achievements – ancient Greece and the Renaissance – also displayed spectacular artistic achievements, it would be strange and even unhistorical for him to insist that art and science could

[34] Cohen, *Science, Culture, and Free Spirits*, p. 51.
[35] Ibid., p. 67.
[36] Ibid., p. 65.
[37] Ibid., pp. 66, 69–76, 187.

not flourish together.[38] His career-long admiration for Goethe also challenges any necessary competition or conflict between the two endeavours. So while science does enjoy Nietzsche's admiration and respect in *HH*, it doesn't replace or supersede art in any neat or schematic way. Instead, Nietzsche is wrestling with the question of what a desirable relationship between them is – both in the larger culture and, of course, in his own breast.[39] His shifting and seemingly inconsistent views of art across these works provide but one illustration of my claim above that while this is a period of immense intellectual transition and fermentation for Nietzsche, each separate book is not necessarily a milestone of such change.

5. Daybreak

Notwithstanding Franco's own language of decisive breaks, cut cords and fell swoops, when contrasting *HH* with *D*, *HH* becomes a transitional work, 'born of Nietzsche's struggle against Wagner's romantic view of culture'. *D*, on the other hand, represents a 'complete breakthrough' (NE p. xi). Later, however, the breakthrough seems to begin with Book 2 of *D* (NE p. 69]). Franco reminds us that *D*'s original title was *The Ploughshare* and points out that Nietzsche had been kicking this title around for the last five years (NE p. 57). The fact that Nietzsche also entertained this as a possible title for *HH*[40] suggests once again that he did not see this as a breakthrough work at the time, but rather as more continuous with his other thinking in this period. It is also noteworthy that the final section of *HH* both paves the way for *WS*, by sketching the figure of 'The Wan-

[38] Ruth Abbey, 'Human, all too Human: A Book for Free Spirits,' chap. 4 in *A Companion to Friedrich Nietzsche: Life and Works*, ed. Paul Bishop (New York: Camden House, 2012), pp. 127–128.
[39] Here Handwerk's observation that 'the "artist" described in general terms in *HH* often turns out to refer in the notebooks specifically to Richard Wagner' (Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human II and Unpublished Fragments from the Period of Human, All Too Human II (Spring 1878–Fall 1879)*, 583) is helpful. Their synecdochal relationship might mean that when Nietzsche is critical of art, he is using the term as a substitute for Wagner, but when he is thinking about art more generally, or other forms of art, or other artists, he becomes less critical of it.
[40] Rebecca Bamford, 'Daybreak,' in *A Companion to Friedrich Nietzsche: Life and Works*, ed. Paul Bishop (New York: Camden House, 2012), p. 143.

derer' and ends with imagery of the morning (*den Geheimnissen der Frühe*; *des Philosophie des Vormittages*). Although the term *Morgenröthe* is not used there, the matinal imagery at the end of *HH* could explain why Nietzsche was so willing to seize on the line from the Rigveda to supply *D*'s epigraph and title.[41] But whatever the explanation for his final choice of title, the fact that both *WS* and *D* carry echoes of the closing section of *HH* suggests continuities rather than breaks.[42]

If the central concern of *HH* is culture, then that of *D* is morality according to Franco. Culture is not abandoned altogether as an interest as Nietzsche moves from *HH* to *D*, but it does not enjoy the pride of place, and of problematisation, that it occupied in *HH*. Conversely, while a concern with morality was not missing from *HH*, it has come to occupy the bulk of *D* (NE pp.58, 83). Here Franco's failure to define culture, and to give us some sense of where it ends and morality begins, becomes a more serious lacuna, because if we are to follow him in recognising such changes in the passage from *HH* to *D*, we need a clearer sense of what form they take. Is a discussion of pity, for example, a discussion of culture, morality or both? (I would say both). Even though this is the chapter about the book where culture plays a less important place in Nietzsche's analysis, Franco does take some steps toward formalising what he thinks Nietzsche means by culture, drawing on 'one of the cardinal tenets of Nietzsche's earliest thinking about culture: namely, that a genuine culture is marked by the unity of inner and outer, content and form'.[43] But this raises the question

[41] Ansell-Pearson traces this further back, saying that 'He had been intrigued by the prospect and promise of a new dawn since the time of his early reflections on the ancient, pre-Platonic philosophers'. (EA pp. 366–67).

[42] *WS*'s title also seems to have been in preparation at the time of *HH*. In a note from Spring – Summer 1878, Nietzsche muses 'If someone wants to have his own corporeal personhood, he must not resist having a shadow as well'. (Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human II and Unpublished Fragments from the Period of Human, All Too Human II (Spring 1878–Fall 1879)*, 320 (28[53]). As I interpret this, embodiment is part of the human condition just as its denial has been part of the religious and metaphysical traditions that Nietzsche criticises throughout this work. Accepting one's humanness means accepting embodiment and that means accepting one's shadow.

[43] NE p. 83. On the very next page Franco refers to the family's 'crucial role in cultural transmission' (NE p. 84) but in the chapter on *HH*, he implied that Nietzsche's reflections on women and the family were not part of his discussion of culture (NE p. 50). So again, his failure to outline what he means by culture when attributing it such great importance creates confusion

posed above – hasn't Nietzsche always been thinking about culture? If so, how is this the key to unlocking the meaning of *HH* (as opposed to his other writings)? And if for Franco, pace Cohen, Nietzsche's conception of culture has not changed from the early works to the middle period, what are we to make of the language of decisive breaks?

But rather than just asserting that morality is a larger concern in *D* than it was in *HH*, Franco might once again be on firmer footing with his more nuanced claims that Nietzsche adopts a different approach to morality in *D* (NE p. 59). Among the changes Franco discerns are that Nietzsche starts to diverge from Rée's utilitarian approach;[44] he develops a more complex view of the self; and he attacks the cult of philanthropy and the valourisation of unegoistic motives and actions (NE pp. 59–60, 63). These last two shifts are, moreover, related to one another because on Franco's reading, what leads Nietzsche to deny the possibility of altruism is that the multiplicity, complexity, and opacity of the self make it impossible to know with any certainty what our motivations are (NE pp.60, 73–74).

Thus one of the things that Franco finds to be 'genuinely new' is *D*'s 'critical attitude toward the morality of pity'. As this implies, *HH* 'did really not question the *value* of such [nonegoistic] motivation and action'.[45] Franco's assertion will surprise readers of *GM* where Nietzsche claims exactly the opposite. Describing *HH* he says:

> the point at issue was the value of the non-egotistical instincts, the instincts of compassion, self-denial, and self-sacrifice … It was here precisely that I sensed the greatest danger for humanity, its most sublime delusion and temptation … Here I sensed the beginning of the end … the constantly spreading ethics of pity … was the most sinister symptom of our sinister European civilisation… (*HH* P:5)

There is, of course, no prima facie reason why we should take Nietzsche's word for what he was up to in his own work. He might be misremembering

[44] However, as early as *HH* 34, 103, and 227, Nietzsche was expressing doubt about a utilitarian approach to morality, which suggests that this was not introduced by *D*.

[45] NE p. 60, emphasis original, cf. 73. This is, as I understand it, a difference between *HH* and *D* that Clark and Leiter also identify (D pp. xxiv–xxv)

or misrepresenting *HH*. But when we return to the text, we find numerous question marks placed over the value of pity which bear out Nietzsche's claim to have begun doubting its value in *HH*. In Section 47, for example, he writes of 'people who out of empathy with and concern (*Mitgefühl und Sorge*) for another person become hypochondriac: the species of sympathy (*die Art des Mitleidens*) that arises in this case is nothing other than an illness'. Of course it could be argued that this passage casts doubt on a species of pity only, not the emotion as such. I argue that, at least in his middle period writings, Nietzsche is never wholly critical of pity, and that he distinguishes among its higher and lower manifestations.[46] But leaving that larger claim to one side, in *HH* 50 Nietzsche moves to a more encompassing critique of pity, praising La Rochefoucauld and Plato for recognising the way it enfeebles (*entkräfte*) the soul. He accuses pity-seekers of gratifying their sense of power: 'they possess, at any rate one power: the power to hurt'. (*HH* 50) This passage surely represents one way in which Nietzsche criticises the morality of pity in a work written prior to D.

To complement his exposé of the motives of pity-seekers, in the passage entitled 'Sympathisers', Nietzsche suggests that pity's givers also derive a sense of superiority from their actions. When good fortune replaces bad and rejoicing is called for, these sympathisers suddenly find themselves less empathic, feeling superfluous and even displeased by their loss of superiority (*HH* 321). A related passage from *AOM* is entitled '*Mitfreude*' – as opposed to *Mitleid* – and remarks on how rare are those individuals who will rejoice in others' success. By contrast, 'the lowest animal can imagine the pain of others' (*AOM* 62). Later in that same work Nietzsche makes a characteristic gesture of comparing the present unfavourably with the past, declaring that in antiquity, they 'knew better how to rejoice: we how to suffer less ... we employ our minds rather toward the amelioration of suffering and the removal of sources of pain' (*AOM* 187).[47] The valourisation of pity is part and parcel of contemporary culture's preoccupation with suffering rather than joy, showing again that when analysing pity, Nietzsche's approach is both cultural and moral. As he says in *WS*, 'the high value pity has come to be accorded presents a problem' (*WS* 50). A dozen passages later he refers to 'that curious philosophy which derives all morality from pity' (*WS* 62), showing that the high esteem in which pity is held is a philosophical problem, as well as a cultural and moral one. Nietzsche's point of reference here is likely to be Schopenhauer, illustrating again that his influence had not been sloughed off with the advent of the middle period.

All of this indicates that Nietzsche held pity in low esteem in the three texts he wrote before *D*. His attack on pity escalated and intensified with *D*, to be sure, but Franco's claim that what is 'genuinely new' is *D*'s 'critical attitude toward the morality of pity' is threatened by a close encounter with these works. Rather than yielding insights that are unavailable via the lumping method, on this question of Nietzsche's critique of pity, Franco's separation method is misleading if it causes him to claim that Nietzsche's critique of pity originated with *D*.[48] We find instead that these three works – *HH*, *AOM* and *WS* – had begun to question the value of nonegoistic motivation and action.

As noted above, another initiative Franco identifies in *D* is its development of a more complex view of the self. The self comes to be understood as a multiplicity, which challenges any notion of a unified personality. This greater awareness of the self's complexity forces Nietzsche to modify the psychological egoism he advanced in *HH*. It also means that any unity a self displays is an achievement, not a given, and so Nietzsche begins to craft an aesthetic approach to the self (NE p. 60). However, Franco concedes that 'there are glimmers of this notion of the aesthetic self' in *HH* (NE p. 60, cf. 70, 78), which suggests that the more multiple view of the self is probably there too. I agree that these ideas are not unique to *D*, and in addition to the passage from *HH* Franco points to (57) (NE p. 70), it is worth noting that Nietzsche writes of moral and religious feelings as 'rivers with a hundred tributaries and sources [*Ströme mit hundert Quellen und Zuflüssen*]' yet people impute a false unity to these complexes (*HH* 14). Toward the end of that work the image of tributaries re-appears in a paragraph called 'Greatness means giving direction'. It declares that all great

[46] Abbey, *Nietzsche's Middle Period*, pp.64, 68–70.

[47] Another passage in *AOM* chastises pity's presumption that it knows the best cause of and cure for another's suffering (*AOM* 68). Women's garrulous sympathy is noted in *AOM* 282.

[48] I agree with Franco (2011) that the compassion evident in many of Nietzsche's own remarks 'complicates the conventional picture of his philosophy as devoid of compassion' (p. 90). Indeed, I make a similar point in a more extended way (Abbey 2000, p. 61–3) but Franco completely ignores the chapter I devote to pity in the middle period. Ure does too, despite having a whole chapter on pity in the middle period in his book.

and abundant spirits are so because of their many tributaries. 'All that matters is that one supplies the direction which many inflowing tributaries [*so viele Zuflüsse*] then have to follow' (*HH* 521). Yet later in that work Nietzsche recommends against treating 'oneself as a single rigid and unchanging individuum' (*HH* 618). *AOM* contains a passage that is surely confessional, in which an historian, who is contrasted to metaphysicians, feels 'happy to harbor in himself not "an immortal soul" but many mortal souls' (*AOM* 17). Once again, the evidence suggests that the idea of a multiple self is not the initiative of *D*.

Both of these ideas – of a non-unified self and of an aesthetic approach to the self – seem to have originated in religious views and practises. In Book 3 of *HH*, 'The Religious Life', Nietzsche recounts the need some have felt to tyrannise 'over certain parts of their own nature, over segments or stages of themselves' (*HH* 137). A few passages later he describes how ascetics and saints turn against a 'so-called "enemy within"' (*HH* 141). The terms 'ascetic' (*asketisch*) and 'aesthetic' (*ästhetisch*) are nearly as similar in German as they are in English! As these ideas about the multiplicity of the self and the need for an aesthetic approach to the self are present in *HH*, we must ask again what the benefit of treating the works separately as opposed to thematically is? Isn't there a danger in this case of occluding some of the concerns of *HH*? This brings us back to the larger hermeneutical question of this article, which is the value of the separation as opposed to the lumping method.

The many points of continuity between *HH* and *D* that Franco himself acknowledges reinforce this larger question about the fruits borne by the separation method. For example, Franco contends that Nietzsche continues to advance the thesis about the original innocence and unaccountability of action that he introduced in *HH* (NE pp.73, 90). The grounds for this thesis shift, however, are as follows: in *HH* it was the inevitably egoistic nature of action whereas in *D* it becomes the complexity and consequent opacity of the self (NE p. 73). But if the complex notion of the self is already present in those earlier works, then this need not signal a shift in Nietzsche's reasons for advancing this thesis. I would also argue that Nietzsche does not fully adhere to a notion of psychological egoism in *HH*. I would contend, moreover, that many of Nietzsche's assertions about the omnipresence of egoism in *HH* are designed to attack the culture of philanthropy, with its privileging of love for others over love for the self. With regard to other lines of continuity between the two works, Franco contends that Nietzsche's views on the nature of knowledge persist from *HH* to *D* (NE p. 93). Both works are also said to exhibit an intellectualist approach to history (NE p. 62). The desire for power which plays 'an important role in Nietzsche's explanation of human conduct' in *HH* 'plays an even greater role' in *D* (NE p. 65, cf. 80). *D* likewise preserves *HH*'s concern with culture, although this is a more subordinate theme in the former work. And in both works Nietzsche is an enthusiast for the enlightenment tradition (NE p. 83). With so many shared elements across these works, what is the benefit of the separation method for interpreting them?

6. Conclusion

I make no claim to have reviewed here all the points of difference between what Franco treats as the three books of the middle period because my aim in discussing his book has been primarily methodological. And my claim is not that there are not, nor could not be, any differences among the middle period writings. Rather, it is that Franco charges that my work 'often fails to register crucial differences between them [the middle period writings]' (NE p. 231n9) yet points to few, if any, substantive points on which our readings differ. He repeatedly acknowledges, moreover, points of continuity among these writings which suggests that my lumping method is not always as worrisome as he makes it out to be. If the lumping method is not always problematic, the key issue becomes on what topics is it misleading or obfuscatory?

Franco also ignores many of the areas of agreement between us, or rather, he fails to acknowledge the many points at which he effectively echoes things I said a decade ago. For example, his introduction claims, correctly, that Nietzsche's middle works 'disclose a Nietzsche who is different from the popular image of him and even from the Nietzsche described in the secondary literature' (NE p. x). Claims like this abound in the introduction to my book.[49] Franco notes that Nietzsche's first use of the term

[49] See, for example Abbey, *Nietzsche's Middle Period*, xiii.

'the herd' comes in *GS*, without reference to my own claim about this,[50] nor to my wider discussions about the form elitism takes in the middle period writings.[51] Franco suggests that Nietzsche does not think that women are 'suited for knowledge or science' (NE p. 121) without reference to my own chapter-long discussion of this question. He discusses a passage from *HH* about the origin of justice (NE p. 29), without any engagement with my extended treatment of this issue in the middle period writings.[52] He describes as 'striking' Nietzsche's praise of moderation in the middle works (NE p. 35) while ignoring my own discussion of its presence there.[53] In all these cases, my lumping method and Franco's separation method yield the same observations. It therefore behooves Franco to demonstrate why my lumping methods yields inferior conclusions about these texts compared with his separation method.

There are, no doubt, a range of issues that concern Franco on which my work is silent, but that is simply because I made no claim to provide an exhaustive account of the middle-period works. I do not, for example, devote special attention to the figure of the free spirit in these works nor how its profile might change from one book to the next. But as I argued in 2000, these are rich and fruitful works and so there is room for many and varied interpretations of them. Yet we fail to convey just how rich and fruitful they are if we ignore or misrepresent what other interpreters have said about them.

[50] Abbey, *Nietzsche's Middle Period*, p. 18.
[51] Ibid., pp. 18–19; pp. 93–98.
[52] Ibid., 46–50.
[53] Ibid., pp. 52–53.

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Nietzsche's Other Naturalism

A reading of the fifth book of Daybreak

Frank Chouraqui

Introduction

Current Anglo-Saxon Nietzsche scholarship is dominated by naturalism. Naturalism contains a metaphysical claim, namely that all phenomena are natural, and an ethical claim, that value is identical with existence and therefore, that the opposition of good and evil should be absorbed into the opposition of existence and inexistence. There is also an implicit claim connected to the former, namely, that existence is nature. From these three basic claims, most naturalist readers of Nietzsche deduce the existence of a paradox in his thinking: if what there is is identical with value, what is it that allows Nietzsche to judge as much as he does? Sure enough, he judges what he calls illusions and this much is consistent with the equation of inexistence and negative value, but this only moves the question one step down the road. If the inexistent is truly inexistent, why should Nietzsche judge it? Why does losing it require any effort? Of course, illusions do exist (as illusions), but precisely insofar as they exist, they do not justify their removal. This is endless. This serves to establish what I think are the stakes involved in calling Nietzsche a naturalist. Those stakes are primarily metaethical and ontological. Naturalism should concern us because it makes the entire Nietzschean critique of judgement problematic. Secondly, because it refuses to enter into ontology, it should concern us even more, or at least concern those who believe that Nietzsche's ambiguous relationship to judgement can only be solved at the ontological level

(after all, this ambiguity is best encapsulated in the constant talk of fatalism, and the paradoxical command for one to 'become who they are', to do with the meaning of being).

Even though the upshot of this is that ontology and metaethics must, in my view, constitute the horizon of the discussion of Nietzsche as a naturalist, what I will focus on here is the value of naturalism as an interpretive framework for Nietzsche's theoretical philosophy. In the background, I will retain the assumption that this predicament inherited from the naturalist readings is not a fatality, and that liberating ourselves from the epistemic naturalist Nietzsche would reopen ways of making sense of his metaethics and ontology.

I contend that the paradox described above relies on two unattended assumptions that one finds in naturalism, but not in Nietzsche: the first is that all that there is is properly characterised as nature. The second is that nature is properly understood as 'the object of the natural sciences'.

There is a standard response to my accusation that the naturalists make unattended assumptions, for the first assumption at least. A naturalist would object that talking about 'all that there is' in any sense other than the naturalist sense would involve collapsing into metaphysics. But rejecting metaphysics is different from not doing metaphysics. And it seems that naturalism suffers from an etymological prejudice that dies hard: that physics spares us metaphysics. As a result, naturalism leaves us with is an implicit and naïve metaphysics that dare not speak its name; call it metaphysical bad faith. Metaphysical bad faith is a real danger to the naturalist, but it may be avoided. The problem, as I will try to show, is that avoiding it makes naturalism viable but trivial: it makes key concepts such as 'nature' and 'science' so vague and indeterminate that naturalism amounts to the trivial and circular claim that all there is is nature and nature is all there is. These are, in my opinion, the Charybdis and Scylla of naturalism, and they must inform a consistent naturalist's position: how can one see Nietzsche as a naturalist without either making unwarranted metaphysical assumptions or making naturalism trivial and/or circular?

1. The Naturalist Argument

Although he does not express this concern in these terms, it seems to me that the naturalist Nietzsche scholar who shows the sharpest awareness of this predicament is Brian Leiter. In a recent article entitled 'Nietzsche's Naturalism Reconsidered', Leiter does not reconsider his original naturalists reading of Nietzsche so much as he clarifies it by way of a response to some of his critics.[1] In addition to Leiter's distinctive concern for consistency, the facts that this is such a recent article, that it purports to assess the road travelled since the introduction of the theme of naturalism in the Anglo-Saxon scholarship in the 90s, and that it addresses objections that have cropped up along the way, make this article a viable paradigmatic example of the naturalist readings of Nietzsche. This is how I will use it in this paper.

I say that Leiter is aware of the double constraint posed to naturalism because he insists in describing Nietzsche as *a certain kind of* naturalist, and he makes it clear that the qualifications he appends to the label 'naturalist' in the case of Nietzsche offer solutions to several interesting challenges that have been raised against it. For Leiter, Nietzsche is altogether a 'Humean', (p. 582) 'Methodological', (p. 577) 'Therapeutic' (p. 582) and 'Speculative' (p. 577) naturalist.[2] For all of these qualifications, Leiter has good textual evidence and I will not challenge any of them in particular. What I am concerned with, however, is whether the resulting naturalistic position assigned to Nietzsche passes successfully between the aforementioned Charybdis and Scylla, that is, whether it succeeds in avoiding both triviality and metaphysics.

I will argue that it fails this test, but it does so in a peculiar way. Leiter's naturalism contains enough ambiguity for it to be interpreted as falling prey to triviality or to metaphysics, but I am unsure of which. I do, however, provide an argument in which it is impossible for Leiter to avoid both sides at the same time. Given this indeterminacy, I believe that the principle of charity requires that we pursue the strongest possible position,

[1] Brian Leiter, 'Nietzsche's Naturalism Reconsidered,' chap. 25 in *The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche*, ed. Ken Gemes and John Richardson (Oxford University Press, 2009).

[2] Unless otherwise stated, page references are to Leiter, 'Nietzsche's Naturalism Reconsidered'; See also: Brian Leiter, *Nietzsche on Morality* (London: Routledge, 2002).

so I will take seriously the possibility that Nietzsche's naturalism, as construed by Leiter, offers something like a metaphysics. After all, it is Leiter's project, not mine (and I think, not Nietzsche's), to get rid of metaphysics thus conceived. My argument will therefore focus on the *quality* of the purported metaphysics, and its loyalty to Nietzsche's texts. As suggested above, I find that the resulting metaphysics is naïve and distinctly at odds with a great number of Nietzsche's published writings. I will focus, for this last point, on a reading of *Daybreak*'s Book V. It goes without saying, therefore, that even though I am myself convinced that all of Nietzsche's corpus stands against naturalism as construed by Leiter, my present argument has force, if it has any at all, only with reference to the texts of *D*'s Book V.

1.1. Naturalism as an inconsequential qualification

Naturalism defined with reference to the natural sciences

Let me begin with the problem of indeterminacy. It seems to me that if it is to avoid any metaphysics, naturalism must be merely formal (or it risks making theoretical assumptions) and contextually determined (or it risks making essentialistic assumptions). Leiter recognises the requirement of formality when he emphasises that Nietzsche is an M-naturalist (Methodologial Naturalist), and the requirement of circumstantiality as well, when he defines naturalism with reference to the natural sciences. Whether these two moves are sufficient is debatable however, for it seems that Leiter's understanding of M-naturalism is indeed quite substantial, and that the reference to science is as problematic as the concept of science itself, a problem Leiter barely touches upon.

In this section I examine both criteria with the assumption that they do indeed avoid metaphysics. My argument is that in doing so, they also lose any meaning and make 'naturalism' a trivial determination.

Let me begin with the reference to science. It is, I think, obviously insufficient if we are to take a reference to science to be (as it should if it were to avoid metaphysics) non-essentialist. Science, in this context, just means the practice of those we call scientists. That is to say, it is determined by two practices: the practice of science, and the practice of language, especially our use of the word 'scientists'. One doesn't need Nietzsche to know that such practices are entirely historically determined. The problem, of course,

becomes that in order to meaningfully attribute naturalism to any philosopher, one has to make 'science' either a predetermined object (which contradicts the non-essentialist requirement) or a determinate but unknown object: there is an essence of science that is being discovered as science progresses. In any case, naturalism thus defined runs into three problems:

1) It is a useless denomination, as it makes it hard to see what, in this definition, any non-naturalist philosophy would look like.

2) It submits philosophy to science not only in principle but in practice too. Even if this is a plausible position, it is not an interesting one, especially bearing in mind Leiter's repeated and important demand that when uncertain, we assign to Nietzsche the most interesting and fruitful position. Here, Nietzsche's naturalism would only make him a superfluous subscientist.

3) It conflicts with Leiter's other construal of Nietzsche's naturalism, namely that it is a *Speculative* M-naturalism. As speculative, Nietzsche's M-naturalism must be different from science the way it is practised, for science only speculates in order to test empirically its hypotheses. At best, if we were to force the parallel, we could say that Nietzsche is a scientist in the sense that he produces scientific hypotheses (educated guesses), but not in the sense that he deploys any methods or scientific deduction to test these hypotheses. Nietzsche would therefore be some sort of 'mutilated' scientist whose work would be limited to the first step of any scientific process only. Besides, if Nietzsche is a speculative naturalist in this sense, this makes it hard to see how he can still be a methodological one, since most (if not all) of the scientific method concerns testing procedures. One way to keep speculative and methodological naturalism together would be to say that Nietzsche's speculations are naturalistic because they assume that they can be tested the way the sciences test their own hypotheses. This is still subject to the two prior objections for it submits philosophy to the practice of science and makes the qualification of naturalism useless for distinguishing Nietzsche's philosophy from any other philosopher's: what philosopher would not accept that their theories be tested by science, when they are continuous with it? It could be that Nietzsche would be different from other philosophers insofar as he believes any sound philosophical

theory should be testable scientifically, but besides ample textual evidence to the contrary, this only assumes a certain essentialism regarding science (at least some methodological essentialism, the idea that the historicity of the sciences does not affect their methods, which is a view no philosopher of science I know would accept), and in any case (bearing in mind Leiter's concern for doing away with the 'silly' Nietzsche (p. 594)), makes Nietzsche's philosophy really quite boring, as a failed attempt at being science.

The problem with submitting philosophy to science resides in this simple fact: *science* is not naturalistic, only philosophy can be. Naturalism relies on the belief that *all that there is* (a specifically philosophical topic) is nature. Science, of course, makes no claim about 'all that there is'. Neither is science concerned with establishing what nature is, but in establishing how nature functions. Secondly, it is involved with a progressive discovery of nature, which would be rendered impossible by any a priori definition of what nature is. Yet, speculative naturalism requires such an a priori definition. Even defining nature vaguely as 'that which is observable' involves a reference to possibilities. And as we suggested above, any reference to possibilities involves either an open future of discovery, and therefore, the impossibility to define nature a priori, or a predetermined idea of science, which amounts to a metaphysical claim.

Naturalism defined methodologically

It seems therefore that the formal characterisation of naturalism may offer more promise. This states that Nietzsche's naturalism is only methodological, and that it therefore makes no assumptions, but only gives itself some rules and procedures. Assuming for a moment that M-naturalism need not be also speculative (something Leiter correctly regards as necessary for separate reasons), this makes philosophical naturalism a form of scientific practice. In this case, Nietzsche is very bad at it, he who did not make any specific experiment to test any of his theories. Let us throw in the speculative denomination now, and Nietzsche becomes construed as providing scientific hypotheses. But scientific hypotheses are, as we noted, recognisable as scientific only by their testability. That is to say, such theories as Nietzsche's, if regarded as scientific hypotheses, are either recognisable out

of a comparison between the essence of the hypothesis and the essence of science (collapsing into essentialism), or they cannot, in practice, be recognised as naturalistic (i.e. testable scientifically) until confirmed by science, either making the attribution of naturalism to Nietzsche and uninteresting speculation about Nietzsche's personal intentions, or making Nietzsche's philosophy redundant by submitting it to the progress of science.

Leiter's response to both my objections about the contextual reference to science and the formality of naturalism would probably be to point out that the criterion he uses to define science and M-naturalism escapes them. The criterion is causation. Indeed, as far as I can see, he uses the reliance on causation as the last remaining specificity of naturalism in his response to objections from Janaway and others. In this view, what distinguishes Nietzsche's philosophy is the centrality of 'causal explanations' we find in his work. This does offer a response to my objection according to which speculative and methodological naturalism may be incompatible: it seems causation is central to speculation and it is also a methodological principle. Leiter insists forcefully on the fact that Nietzsche's theories are 'mainly modelled on science in the sense that they seek to reveal the causal determinants of these phenomena' (p. 585) and 'Nietzsche emulates the methods of science by trying to construct causal explanations of the moral beliefs and practices of human beings' (p. 588). These are claims intended to secure the connection of Nietzsche's work to the work of science, by saying that they share causality. Which theory doesn't? Leiter acknowledges this question when he responds to Gemes and Janaway's remark[3] 'that seeking causal explanations is not enough to establish methods continuity with the sciences – as [Gemes and Janaway] put it, "Just because astrology seeks to give causal explanations we would not say it shares a continuity of methods with the sciences"' (p. 587). And indeed, Leiter himself declares that causal explanation was found in many other explanatory systems, good and bad (like 'intelligent design theory', 'astrology', 'religion' and 'morality'). So, while discussing the famous passage of the *Twilight of the Idols* entitled *The four great errors*, Leiter points out that when Nietzsche talks of 'the "error of imaginary causes" ... it is clear that he wants to distinguish

[3] Christopher Janaway and Ken Gemes, 'Naturalism and Value in Nietzsche,' *Philosophy & Phenomenological Research* 71 (2005): p. 731.

genuine causal relations from the mistaken ones that infect religious and moral thinking' (p. 586).

In other words, what makes Nietzsche a naturalist is not his causalism, but it is the *kind of causes* he regards as valid. These, Leiter says in response to Gemes and Janaway, are determined with reference to their compatibility with existing science. So it seems what makes Nietzsche a naturalist is that he seeks to propose speculations that are compatible with the sciences, and the solutions implied in pointing to the criterion of causalism vanish. This is only kicking the can down the road, for it would be generally recognised, I think, that *any* discipline seeks to avoid conflict with the sciences, whether it is about their notion of cause, or about their content. Even creationists are more often heard complaining that evolution is bad science, or 'only a theory' rather than opposing science as such.[4] Besides, it is quite clear that astrology declined when its theories became contradicted by the theories of science, showing that it is sensitive to scientific causality just like any other field (Nietzsche is quite clear that the advances of science are involved in our nihilistic inability to believe in the supernatural anymore, suggesting a clear awareness that any domain of explanation seeks not only causal explanation, but also the compatibility with science). Indeed, if we remember how Leiter's concept of naturalism demands that naturalism be both methodological and speculative, it is hard to see how astrology (an example he takes over from Janaway and Gemes), in its ignorance of the (alleged) non-scientificity of its concept of cause (which was only made obvious later), was not, itself, a form of speculative naturalism. Saying that naturalism is minimally the commitment to a scientific notion of cause is therefore not sufficient to distinguish Nietzsche's or any one else's philosophy from other theories. But indeed, naturalism contains another claim, which in Leiter's argument is here explicit, there hidden: a naturalistic philosophy not only seeks compatibility with the findings of science, it also *limits* itself to them. Besides the fact that it places philosophy in the complete dependence on the sciences, its value is entirely derived from that of

[4]And even if there are cases of good-faith believers who recognise that science conflicts with religion, and decide to believe religion, thereby recognising that their belief is superstitious, this would still make all the rest naturalists alongside Nietzsche. It would indeed be a poor victory indeed to be able to call Nietzsche a naturalist only because he opposes obvious superstition; calling him a philosopher would be enough.

the science that confirms it, and therefore would violate Leiter's imperative of saving the 'interesting Nietzsche' (Nietzsche would always be less interesting than science and made redundant by it). This assumes an essential, permanent and visible difference between science and non-science, which essentialises it. It requires a metaphysics of science.[5]

Another problem with limiting philosophy to the realm of the sciences comes from the fact that the natural sciences have always relied on philosophy to take care of questions that were not (or not yet, the difference is unimportant here) within the purview of science. In short: the natural sciences *are not* naturalistic, only some kinds of philosophy are. This is simply due to the fact that naturalism makes a metaphysical claim about *everything* – namely, that it is natural. And claims about everything are emphatically not scientific claims. There is something in naturalism (a theory of everything) that is not exhausted by the reference to science.

1.2. Naturalism as Metaphysics

So, the method of naturalism becomes causalism, where, as we shall see, its metaphysics is determinism. Yet, causalism needs qualifying with reference to the scientific concept of 'natural causes', a concept that changes constantly as the concept of nature changes, under the advances of science. Leiter's view, of course, is different: he claims that naturalism can be both methodological *and* speculative because (I assume), the advances of science do not affect the *concept* of nature and therefore, there is a stable concept of natural causes which applies descriptively as well as speculatively. This, however, involves a deterministic metaphysics, a prejudice about the concept of nature that distinguishes naturalism (which assumes what nature is) from the sciences (which don't). Indeed, Leiter himself recognises that this is not a viable position and he declares explicitly that 'an important virtue of M-naturalism is that it does not purport to settle a priori questions about

[5]The best candidate for such an a priori and stable criterion of demarcation is Popper's criterion of falsification (a criterion which is itself philosophical and not scientific). Alas, it is well known that it is a criterion that can only apply a posteriori (a falsified theory is thereby recognised as scientific, but also useless) and therefore fail to satisfy the speculative dimension of Leiter's description of naturalism, or a priori through an essentialist view of the theory: for it is a matter of determining in advance the *abilities* of a statement, its ability for falsification.

ontology, deferring instead to whatever works in the explanatory practices of the sciences' (p. 586). Although predominantly wishful, this strong emphasis on the non-intrusive character of method, namely the assumption that methods do not predetermine their result (even partly), allows the naturalist to evade the objection. But, what we just said makes it plain, I think, that it does so at the cost of the speculative character of Nietzsche's alleged naturalism: naturalism cannot be speculative in any significant way without pre-judging of what nature is. As a result, it falls back into the other objection: M-naturalism, now detached from speculation, is a useless qualification.

Janaway expresses this problem more clearly than I ever could when he notes that Nietzsche must be seen as both an M-Naturalist and a therapeutic naturalist, and that these two qualifications conflict.[6] Leiter's response is to separate method and objects (the real world which therapy is concerned with) with a strong membrane, implicitly based on a strong opposition of form and content, observation and reality.

Beside the fact that Nietzsche spends a great many of his best pages contesting this opposition, as we will aim to show, this seems to be a recourse Leiter gives up himself when he makes explicit the continuity between methodological causalism and metaphysical determinism: method seems to determine strongly its object. Leiter is aware of an objection of this sort when he understands Christa Acampora's remark[7] that the belief in causality is metaphysical as asking 'whether Nietzsche is not a skeptic about what he takes to be the underlying metaphysics of modern science?' (p. 592). In fact, Leiter does not address this critique. Instead, he returns to Janaway, claiming that he makes the same criticism as Acampora, albeit in a more cogent way, by pointing out that Nietzsche talks of the will to power as involving interpretation. I take Leiter's implication that Acampora and Janaway's criticisms are similar to indicate Leiter's awareness of my own criticism: that we must not assume that observation (determined by method) is fully external to its object (here, the will to power seen as a biological *and* interpretive principle). Of course, the translation of Acampora's point into Janaway's critique of the externality of interpretation and its object is misleading, because it allows Leiter to reduce the objection to a philological problem regarding the importance we must give to the will to power. However, even if we might grant that one should de-emphasise the will to power, we shall see that well before any elaboration of the will to power, *D* makes very explicit the necessity to reject the externality of contemplation and its object. Indeed, there is much to bet that the will to power became elaborated in order to fulfil this requirement, and therefore, that this requirement should not vanish just because the will to power should. I do not see him provide any response to the substance of the objection however.

[6] Christopher Janaway, *Beyond Selflessness: Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

[7] Christa Davis Acampora, 'Naturalism and Nietzsche's Moral Psychology,' chap. 17 in *A Companion to Nietzsche*, ed. Keith Ansell Pearson (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006).

This issue is of course connected to the problem Leiter raises early in his paper with relation to Janaway's criticism regarding the compatibility of M-naturalism (he calls it 'Humean' naturalism there) with Nietzsche's therapeutic project, which is 'to get select readers to throw off the shackles of morality' (p. 584). Leiter's response to Janaway is to point out that 'we do well to recognise, and separate, the (alleged) therapeutic and Humean Nietzsches, as Janaway, alas, fails to do' (p. 585). For Leiter 'what Janaway fails to establish is that one can not, in fact, separate out the Humean Nietzsche's philosophical positions (about agency, motivation, the origins of morality, etc.) from the mode of presentation that is essential to the Therapeutic Nietzsche's aims' (p. 585). This may be the case, but it is not clear that the onus should be on Janaway to establish this (although it could be easily done, with reference to *D* V for example). In fact, all that Janaway's (and my) position requires, is to point out that the two 'Nietzsches' conflict. And they do, given the above argument to the effect that only a sense of M restrictive to the point of meaninglessness avoids crossing over into metaphysics (which contests Leiter's strong membrane) of a deterministic kind (which conflicts with Nietzsche's text). For what I take Janaway to be pointing out, and Leiter to be missing, is that the therapeutic project of Nietzsche reflects his belief in a strong notion of (at least his own) agency, and therefore any 'M' leading into determinism can be properly shown to be conflicting the 'therapeutic' requirement.

It therefore seems to me that if naturalism is to have any interpretive value for Nietzsche studies, it should imply that Nietzsche holds at least implicitly the three following positions:

a) Determinism: all events are entirely determined by anterior causes. Consequently:

b) The innocence of discourse: our discourses of knowledge do not take part in or influence the object they describe (this is made necessary by Leiter's emphasis on the separation of M-naturalism and Nietzsche's therapeutic project).

c) Actualism: 'there are no objects that do not actually exist'.[8]

Leiter makes it clear that his Naturalist reading involves actualism when he insists that Nietzsche's alleged naturalism involves his belief in type-facts, and that defining naturalism with reference to the sciences commits one to regard naturalism as based on actualism. As Leiter writes: 'In my book, I document the many places where Nietzsche, in fact, embraces the idea of an "unchangeable" or "essential" nature' (p. 589).

2. Nietzsche's Other Naturalism in *Daybreak* V

In what follows, I try to show that all three of these claims are explicitly denied by Nietzsche in Book V of 1881's *D* (whether their rejection leaves Nietzsche with any viable option is a separate issue). Leiter's remark that 'Nietzsche, in fact, embraces the idea of an "unchangeable" or "essential" nature' (p. 589) and his implicit recognition that this claim is systematically linked to the other aspects of his naturalism may provide a starting point. My intention in the remainder of this paper will therefore be to sketch out Nietzsche's general view about the question of 'nature' as 'deterministic', 'unchangeable' and 'essential'.

Nietzsche's critique of 'nature'

The main concern of Book V is the proper conception of nature. There is one view of nature that Nietzsche endeavours to overcome, and which is strikingly similar to Leiter's: it is the idea of nature as a set of causally connected facts and in which becoming is seen as a mere development of the already given (weak becoming). Let us call this 'closed nature'. Nietzsche opposes closed nature with his idea of an open nature where causality is efficient but not determinant, and which accommodates for becoming in a non-deterministic sense (strong becoming), and therefore, for agency. In the weeks immediately following the publication of *D* in July 1881, Nietzsche wrote:

> For 'The outlines of a new way of life'
>
> First book in the style of the first phrase of the ninth symphony. *Chaos sive natura*. 'On the dehumanisation [*Entmenschlichung*] of nature'. Prometheus becomes chained again to the Caucasus. Written with the cruelty of Κράτος, the power. (*KSA* 9:11[197])

And:

> A fundamental error is the belief in the harmony and the absence of the battle. (*KSA* 9:11[137])

Although they are sketchy, these notes synthesise much of the project of the freshly completed Book V of *D*: it is a matter of finding 'a new way of life' through a new conception of nature. This new conception of nature as 'chaos' involves the 'de-humanisation' of nature. Nietzsche's idea of reason as ensuring the harmony between the human and nature suggests that we must understand 'humanisation' to mean 'fathomability': the dehumanisation of nature precisely means the recognition that nature is unfathomable to human reason. Note how Nietzsche would agree with Leiter that causation is a purely explicative principle. The difference is that Nietzsche emphasises the perils of causal explanation. Finally, we can see in the polemical reworking of the Spinozistic motto '*Deus sive natura*' that Nietzsche regards (seemingly paradoxically) the 'dehumanisation of nature' to involve a 'de-deification' of nature too.

Although this passage makes these connections explicit, we do not need to resort to the *Nachlass* to see such themes presented in Book V. In the very important aphorism 464, entitled *The shame of those who bestow* Nietzsche makes an explicit connection between humanised nature, deified

[8] Tomberlin (1998) defines actualism in these terms, and makes a strong case to the effect that 'naturalism implies actualism'.

nature, and causal determinism in the context of a barely veiled allusion to Spinoza. He writes:

> [Y]ou have put a god into nature and now everything is again tense and unfree! ... But there is no need for that, it has been only a dream! Let us wake up!

It is a matter of making us 'free' again by removing god from nature. In substituting nature as *Deus* with nature as *chaos*, Nietzsche ensures that we think of nature only as a free force. This may give us a preliminary insight into the relations between open nature and human freedom: if nature is open, it makes room for human action (both individual and cultural) to exist in a strong sense.

Aphorism 427 develops the bond between open nature and cultivation through the figure of horticulture. Horticulture (which is literally a form of cultivation) is the result of a dissatisfaction with nature and therefore reveals how nature is not human, but needs humanising, through cultivation. It is only by seeing that nature is not human that we can attempt to humanise it. It is therefore a very specific kind of freedom that needs retrieving: the freedom to humanise nature, something Nietzsche has been calling, since at least the time of the *Untimely Meditations*, *cultivation*.

The first conclusion one may draw from Nietzsche's critical examination of the notion of nature is that any deterministic concept of nature makes no room for cultivation, whereas the correct concept of nature in fact defines nature as inviting completion through cultivation. A second point that may be made readily, is that Nietzsche's 'de-humanisation' of nature involves a refusal of the given (*D* 445) that prefigures the contrast between factualism (a cult of supposedly given facts) and Nietzsche's own fatalism (an affirmation of fate as a creative force) and the ultimate contrast between being and becoming (See also *D* 441 and *D* 442 which expound Nietzsche's rejection of 'facts').

Nietzsche's critique of 'type-facts'

With this point established, Nietzsche opens a new sequence (*D* 430–434), where he becomes concerned with the figure of the Reformer necessary to achieve the requisite type of cultivation. The opening aphorism of Book V depicts a nature that is silent and indifferent to the human, like the sea is indifferent to her admirer. This silence of sky and sea, Nietzsche adds cryptically, might force the human to 'become exalted above himself' (*D* 423). The tragic indifference of open nature, Nietzsche suggests, needs to be restored in order for new humans to arise. Those new humans are defined as cultivators and Nietzsche calls them 'Reformers' (*Reformatoren*, 6[44]).

According to Nietzsche, the liberation involved in the open conception of nature is liberation from our loyalty to nature. This is a liberation that makes hubris possible again (a call to hubris that will reach its culmination in *GS*'s announcement that we killed god): we are now free to make of ourselves what we will, and of the world likewise. Nature is not finished or deterministic, it is *to be finished*, and culture is no longer inconsequential but the redemption of nature.[9]

The question of the type of the Reformer establishes a firm connection between Nietzsche's concept of open nature and his criticism of what Leiter calls 'type-facts' (pp. 586, 589, 590, 595, 596). The crucial argument, in my view, lies in Nietzsche's re-working of the notion of human nature. This is a critical discussion that parallels almost exactly the discussion of nature in general: Nietzsche endeavours to reintroduce a strong sense of becoming within human nature by refusing the idea that individuals are determined once and for all (Nietzsche says in *D* 538 that such a conception attaches us to 'what is the most personal and unfree' in ourselves). Leiter's idea of type-facts is akin to Schopenhauer's concept of character, and it is therefore not surprising that Leiter finds in Nietzsche many discussions of them: Nietzsche, after all, has an ambivalent and intense rela-

[9] As chaotic, nature demands human action and creation in order to be redeemed. Although Nietzsche uses the word *Erlösung* only once in *D*, giving it its Christian meaning, we know from the *Nachlass* of *D*, that he was already elaborating the concept of *Erlösung* that will be so central to *Z*. Even though he doesn't use the word in the published version of the aphorism, *D* 540 ends with connecting Raphaello's ability to study, which Nietzsche opposes to Michelangelo's connection with nature, by preferring the former for his ability for infinite creation and for being able to produce 'ultimate justificatory goals'. In other words, Raphaello's ability to learn allows him to redeem nature through creation. A draft of this aphorism, from the end of 1880 uses the term '*Erlösung*'. The same idea, without the word, appears in D. 436, 462, 540 and 568, and of course, in his 1887 preface, Nietzsche equates '*Morgenröthe*' with '*Erlösung*') (*D* P:1).

tionship to Schopenhauer. In *D* V, we see a very anti-Schopenhauerian Nietzsche, who laments stridently over the damage caused by the doctrine of the unchangeability of character. This doctrine, he believes, is nothing short of the greatest obstacle to the advent of the new men he calls 'geniuses', for geniuses are those that synthesise their unchangeable character *and* their fleeting spirit (none of which is deemed sufficient to determine one's actions or identity), and thus succeed in attaining cultural agency as 'reformers'. Note that it is one thing to recognise the existence of unchangeable characters (as Nietzsche does), and it's quite another to regard this character as 'central determinants of personality and morally significant behaviours', (p. 595) as Leiter does. Nietzsche does not go as far as to say that all is changeable and nothing is natural in us. Simply, he insists on the fact that we possess two dimensions to our individuality: one is character, and the other is educable. As a result, a well-thought-out lifestyle can make us attain 'a new nature in us' (*D* 534), something Schopenhauer (and Leiter) would regard as impossible.

In *D* 115, character is criticised for being invisible and subconscious: if it exists, it cannot help us *understand* our actions, for it is by nature hidden (which directly conflicts with Leiter's default defence position, that naturalism is minimally 'explanatory' (pp. 571, 580, 581, 586, 592)), and in *D* 565, Nietzsche warns us, in a pre-Sartrean fashion, against bad faith: we must not use our character as an excuse, especially, not as an excuse *for not learning*. Indeed, he writes, 'our ignorance and our lack of desire for knowledge are very adept at stalking about as dignity, as character' (*D* 565). Just like a certain idea of nature as objectively given removed cultural agency, Nietzsche worries that thinking of one's nature as determined by a character would remove personal agency, and this second removal is as lethal to any cultural project as the first (Nietzsche himself brings together his argument against naturalism and his argument in favour of learning in *D* 540). In an extremely rich and complete aphorism, Nietzsche brings together the questions of freedom, of learning, of character and of cultivation in a beautiful horticultural metaphor:

> *What we are at liberty to do*. One can dispose of one's drives like a gardener and, though few know it, cultivate the shoots of anger, pity, curiosity, vanity as productively and profitably as a beautiful fruit tree on a trellis; one can do it with the good or bad taste of a gardener and, as it were, in the French or English or Dutch or Chinese fashion; one can also let nature rule and only attend to a little embellishment and tidying-up here and there; one can, finally, without paying any attention to them at all, let the plants grow up and fight their fight out among themselves. Indeed, one can take delight in such a wilderness, and desire precisely this delight, though it gives one some trouble, too. All this we are at liberty to do: but how many know we are at liberty to do it? Do the majority not *believe* in *themselves* as in complete *fully-developed facts*? Have the great philosophers not put their seal on this prejudice with the doctrine of the unchangeability of character? (*D* 560)

Opposing the uneducable character with educable agency, Nietzsche declares, is crucial to any cultivating project, and those who 'know [they] are at liberty' to cultivate themselves, are the only ones one could properly call 'geniuses', while those who ascribe genius to character are said to misuse the term:

> 'Genius' is most readily to be ascribed to those men in whom, as with Plato, Spinoza and Goethe, the spirit seems to be only *loosely attached* to the character and temperament, as a winged being who can easily detach itself from these and then raise itself high above them. On the other hand, it is precisely those who could *never get free* from their temperament and knew how to endow it with the most spiritual, expansive, universal, indeed sometimes cosmic expression (Schopenhauer, for example) who have been given to speaking most freely of their 'genius'. These geniuses were unable to fly above and beyond themselves, but they believed that wherever they flew they would discover and rediscover *themselves* – that is *their* 'greatness', and it *can* be greatness! The others, who better deserve the name, possess the *pure, purifying eye* which seems not to have grown out of their temperament and character but, free from these and usually in mild opposition to them, looks down

> on the world as on a god and loves this god. But even they have not acquired this eye at a single stroke. (*D* 497; see also *D* 532)

We seem to have therefore, a rigorous and conspicuous parallel between Nietzsche's criticism of the concept of nature and his criticism of the concept of character. The parallel lies in their common goal: to reject determinism so as to make cultivation possible.

This critique of the essentiality and unchangeability of nature, although it directly contradicts Leiter's naturalistic claims in several ways, would not suffice to refute him if it was only taking advantage of the fact that Nietzsche is often ambiguous if not contradictory, and therefore, that his writings could be put to use both for and against most claims. In the present case however, it would be too hasty to retort that Nietzsche's views on the 'unchangeability' of nature and character are contradictory. Indeed, it is so only if one assume a complete externality of nature and change, which, of course, begs the question. Nietzsche's point, on the contrary, is that there is a ground, below the unchangeable and the changeable, which unifies both, and it is this ground that one must call nature. If Nietzsche is a naturalist, he is one of this other kind: a naturalist of open nature. Of course, such 'other' naturalism falls short of being deterministic by a long stretch. On the contrary, nature thus considered opposes determinism and makes room for a strong concept of change and becoming by way of the reformer's agency. It is to this idea of agency that we now turn.

2.1. Nietzsche and the opacity of discourse

Janaway and Leiter seem to correctly regard Nietzsche's overall project as both speculative and therapeutic and *D* is a case in point. It is worth noting further (perhaps against Leiter), that the speculative and the therapeutic project are necessarily connected for Nietzsche. *D* is organised around two projects: to enquire whether and how nature has any room for philosophical agency (that is to say, to what extent Nietzsche himself is able to dispense his cultural therapy in consequential ways), and *at the same time*, to initiate this therapeutic movement. In other words, *D* as a whole is concerned with the question of the continuity between discourse and reality. This is a theme declined in numerous ways, from mental causation

to the causal power of metaphors and dreams, to the history of cultural revolutions and of their heroes (including Plato, Goethe, Napoleon and Wagner) etc.

One of the ways in which Nietzsche formulates this problem is through the relations between *Vita Activa* (which Nietzsche associates with reality: it is the life of the practical man) and *Vita Contemplativa* (which is theoretical). In the terms of Leiter's polemic with Janaway, *Vita Activa* includes the therapeutic project, and *Vita Contemplativa* includes the methodological and speculative one (Nietzsche himself makes science a form of *Vita Contemplativa* in *D* 41). In keeping with Leiter's response to Janaway, we should expect that Nietzsche maintain a strong separation between the two vitae, corresponding to Leiter's strict opposition of methodology and therapy. However, we see that Nietzsche's first order of business is to dismiss their opposition and to criticise any metaphysics that appeals in any way to such an opposition. In fact, Nietzsche's establishment of the continuity between *Vita Activa* and *Vita Contemplativa* is congruent with his establishment of an open nature which provides room for agency: Nature needs finishing by way of cultivation, and the agency it requires for doing so is that of the 'reformers' whose contemplation of the world involves an action over the world.

In a very important aphorism entitled the *On the seventh day* (*D* 463), Nietzsche pursues the question of whether the world is finished or to be finished in terms of resignation and creation. He suggests that the world must be conceived as lying between the realm of creation and the realm of resignation, as both fact and potentiality, therefore, as an object for both *Vita Activa* and *Vita Contemplativa*. He imagines god admonishing mankind:

> 'You praise that as my *creation*? I have only put from me what was a burden to me! My soul is above the vanity of creators. You praise this as my *resignation*? Have I only put from me what was a burden to me? My soul is above the vanity of the resigned'.

The work of the demiurge is neither creation nor fatality, for these should not be opposed to each other. On the contrary, there is a *necessity* to create that shatters the opposition between creation and resignation, and between

fact and possibility. It is this necessity that becomes the focus of Nietzsche's more ontological musings in *D*: how must we think of reality in order to account for it being a necessary unification of the actual and the possible? That is to say: how can we think of a world that supports the *continuity* of *Vita Activa* and *Vita Contemplativa*? (*D* 452, 458, 463, 496, 500, 540, 548, 563 all establish the continuity of reality and contemplation).

In Book V, Nietzsche proposes repeatedly that we inaugurate a new relation to 'things'. In *D* 567, entitled *In the field*, for example, he declares:

> 'we must take things more cheerfully than they deserve: especially since we have for a long time taken them more seriously than they deserve'. So speak brave soldiers of knowledge.

The phrase 'soldiers of knowledge' of course is intended to shock, for it is a direct violation of the ideal of non-intrusiveness of knowledge, and thereby, of the opposition of contemplation and action. Taken in coherence with the title of the aphorism 'in the field', we are reminded of the 'ploughshare' which Nietzsche regarded his own book to be, and it becomes clear that what Nietzsche means by 'taking things cheerfully' is accepting to regard them as *cultivable*: this cheerfulness is the aforementioned *hubris*. 'Taking things seriously', on the contrary, is a form of factualism. This is an aphorism that initiates the final sequence of the whole of *D* (aphorisms 567–575, all of which are about the consequentiality of thoughts and of writings), and one that was written as an echo to the projected title of the book, and therefore, it seems to me that its importance cannot be overstated. This aphorism directly conflicts with Leiter's factualism. Indeed, the 'brave soldiers of knowledge' are those who understand knowledge to be not knowledge of things, but knowledge of possibilities attached to things. This is, in Nietzsche's view, a distinction that has only been very faint until his own discovery that being enclosed becoming. Descartes and Spinoza, he writes, were such 'soldiers of knowledge' whose passion for knowledge made them run the 'danger' of 'becoming panegyrists of things!' (*D* 550). For here lies the great danger: in taking things too seriously. For knowledge, in Descartes and Spinoza's minds, was ambiguous: part knowledge of becoming (of *natura naturans*, Spinoza would say), part knowledge of things (*natura naturata*). The object of true knowledge, however, Nietzsche insists, is open nature: a combination of actuality and potentiality; it rejects factualism and requires an original, possibilistic ontology.

If true knowers are also soldiers and cultivators, it is precisely because knowledge is no longer external to its object, no longer transparent and unintrusive. The spirit, Nietzsche suggests in *D* 476, creates new regions of being, new objects for itself, and this is due to the fact that one cannot know the world of experience without thereby contributing and adding up to it. This makes the task of knowledge infinite, and Nietzsche laments:

> If only it were enough just to stand and gaze at it! If only one were a miser of one's own knowledge!

But it cannot be enough to just 'gaze' at the world, for contemplation detached from action is now recognised to be a mere abstraction. Gazing always transforms its object and knowledge, which transforms its own object as it approaches it and winds up endlessly chasing its own tail.

Knowledge, Nietzsche declares in *D* 550 quoted above, begins as a superficial and external application of mind to matter, but at long last, it becomes transformative. Using the case of aesthetic judgements, Nietzsche writes: 'knowledge casts its beauty not only over things but in the long run into things – may future mankind bear witness to the truth of this proposition!' (*D* 550). In the following year's *GS* 301, Nietzsche would refer to this transformative contemplation as *Vis Contemplativa*.

Indeed, Nietzsche notes, it is when the 'active people' practise contemplation and the 'contemplative' practise action that they become 'mighty practitioners'. This is a crucial phrase which echoes 'the soldiers of knowledge' discussed above: although 'might' and 'practise' would seem to belong to the active individual, Nietzsche insists in this aphorism, that it is only in the combination of contemplation and action that 'mighty practice' arises. For the practice of *Vita Activa* alone is only inconsequential, if we remember that both contemplation and action fall prey to the same illusion: that of the non continuity between reality and action. On the contrary, Nietzsche finishes the aphorism by revealing what he means by 'mighty practitioners'. He writes: 'thus, a defect of character [being either contemplative or active] becomes a school of genius'. 'Mighty practitioners' and 'soldiers of knowledge' are geniuses; that is to say, on the basis of our foregoing

discussion, they are those that unify spirit and character, the possible and the actual, those who *create* or rather, those through whom creation takes place.

Nietzsche's critique of determinism therefore must be understood not simply as an expression of his insistence on historicity. It also indicates how fundamental this historicity must be: it is a historicity that is more than a development of a pre-existing determinate project, or potentiality. This kind of becoming, which determinism can accommodate, Nietzsche regards as superficial and anecdotal, this is the one he calls 'progress'. In *D* 554, entitled *Going on ahead*, he opposes progress with the much more indeterminate 'going on ahead'. For progressing already contains a criterion of progress, that is to say, a *telos*. Progress is a becoming that always already presupposes a pre-established knowledge of both the past, the present and the future of the trajectory. It is not surprising therefore that Nietzsche wilfully gives up knowledge of the future in order to restore free creation. For in replacing 'progress' with 'going on ahead', what is lost is knowledge of the endpoint, but what is gained is freedom of creation. What is gained, therefore, is a sense of possibility, and geniuses are '*seers* who tell us something of the *possible*!' (*D* 551).

We can now return to the relations of contemplation and action, for Nietzsche's project was to overcome their opposition, and this is achieved in the figure of the genius, a figure whose possibility has been established by Nietzsche's deepening of his anti-deterministic ontology. The genius is eminently contemplative and eminently active, precisely because once well-understood, the object of contemplation becomes understood as the possible, and therefore, true contemplation must count as creative action, the bringing about of the possible. Let us return to the question of naturalism. It seems to me that the naturalist line of reading Nietzsche is articulated most clearly and consistently by Brian Leiter. This is a naturalism which relies on a sharp distinction of method and therapy, on a deterministic concept of nature – and of character – as closed, and on factualism. All of these positions are denied explicitly by Nietzsche in Book V of *D*. Perhaps we should take Nietzsche's argument as an invitation to research in what way we can conceive of another naturalism, a naturalism of open nature, perhaps even of an original possibilist ontology.

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Beyond the Free Spirit Works

Werner Stegmaier in discussion with the editors

You have recently published a monograph on the fifth book of *Gay Science* called *Nietzsches Befreiung der Philosophie: Kontextuelle Interpretation des V. Buchs der 'Fröhlichen Wissenschaft'*.[1] What do you think this book adds to the first, pre-*Zarathustra* version of *GS* published 5 years earlier?

After considering alternatives, Nietzsche decided to publish the 40+1 aphorisms[2] which he had completed after *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and *Beyond Good and Evil* as a supplementary book to *Gay Science*. One of the reasons

[1] Boston/Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012. Title translates as: *Nietzsche's Liberation of Philosophy: A Contextual Interpretation of the Fifth Book of the Gay Science*

[2] On Nietzsche's love of numerology see Wolfram Groddeck, *Friedrich Nietzsche, 'Dionysos-Dithyramben': Bedeutung und Entstehung von Nietzsches letztem Werk* (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991) and Henning Ottmann, 'Kompositionsprobleme von Nietzsche's 'Also Sprach Zarathustra',' in *Friedrich Nietzsche: Also sprach Zarathustra*, ed. Volker Gerhardt, Klassiker Auslegen (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2012), 35–51.

Famously, the number forty has a great deal of meaning in the Bible: after their escape from Egypt, the Jews wandered through the desert for forty years; Moses waited for forty days on Mt. Horeb to receive God's commandments; Elijah spent forty days on the road to meet God on Mt. Horeb; Jesus went into the desert for forty days to find himself, and appeared on the earth for forty days after his resurrection. Every time, a new, great reorientation was initiated. Nietzsche often alludes to the bible using the number forty. For example: *KSA* 7:5[85] ('One must go forty weeks in the desert: and become skinny'); *HH* 253 ('It is sound evidence for the validity of a theory if its originator remains true to it for forty years'); and *Z*:1 'On the Teachers of Virtue' ('Ruminating, I ask myself, patient as a cow; what then were my ten overcomings? And what were the ten reconciliations and the ten truths and the ten laughters to which my heart treated itself? In this manner reflecting and rocked by forty thoughts, sleep suddenly falls upon me, the unsummoned, the master of virtues.').

for this was the theme of the death of God, originally found in the third book (§125), entitled *The madman* (*der tolle Mensch*). Nietzsche opens the fifth book with this theme. It is restated and revalued in the following way: the statement that 'we have killed God' now means – more soberly put – that 'that the belief in the Christian God has become unbelievable' (§343). Now the consequences of this are considered. The tone softens, the text becomes denser, the style finer, and the joyfulness (*Fröhlichkeit*) of the new science begins to sound more tragic. In the fifth book, Nietzsche continually examines the 'long, dense succession of demolition, destruction, downfall, upheaval that now stands ahead.' 'Nihilism' – a concept only mentioned once before, in *BGE*– is presented here as forcing us to glance into an abyss of instability and disorientation that we had previously shrouded with religion and metaphysics. But here Nietzsche is not speaking of the concept of an eternal return, which he had presented at the end of the first edition of *GS*, and now he also leaves aside the concept of the Übermensch, which he left to his figure Zarathustra to teach. Instead, Nietzsche tells a new story in his own name. It is the intervening story until the time when 'the tragedy *begins*' (§382) or 'the *parody* begins' (Preface §1). Both will be possible, and what will happen to individuals or the community as a whole depends on whether one can both understand and live with nihilism. This interval and, as the fifth book suggests, only this interval can yield a joyful science which has freed itself from the chains of a metaphysical morality and of moral metaphysics, allowing us to meet the challenge of creating stability in thought and life on our own. Nietzsche follows these themes, which relate to this 'fragile, broken time of transition' (§377), very closely and with a new philosophical depth. At this time he is now at the height of his aphoristic art, and uses this to write with greater concision and, through implication and gesture, makes the unspoken speak as loudly as the spoken. Nothing here is extraneous: seemingly incidental remarks, parentheses, interrupting dashes, and ellipses can be pivotal in understanding the whole. The mirth that matures into serenity, joyfulness primed by tragedy, and the stylistic brilliance of the fifth book of the *GS*, and, most of all, its stunning new philosophical discoveries led me to attempt a complete interpretation of an aphoristic work. It is the first since Peter Heller began a complete interpretation of *HH* in 1972, before he gave up in exasperation. The fifth book contains some of the most important aphorisms in Nietzsche's entire corpus: for example, on the devotion of scientists to the belief in truth (§344), on the rank of philosophers in regards to their power to face up to problems (§345), on nihilism (§346), on the freedom of a free spirit (§347), on the origin of consciousness in communication (here Nietzsche defines his own philosophy as 'real phenomenalism and perspectivism') (§354), on the origin of cognition in the endeavour to find reassuring certainty (§355), on the origin of the 'free society' in play-acting (§356), on 'Europe's longest and bravest self-overcoming' by the transformation of the Christian conscience in a scientific one (§357), on the traditional alternatives of European art and philosophy and Nietzsche's new alternative which he claims 'Dionysian Pessimism' (§370), on 'the question of being understandable' (§371, §381), on the 'music of life' (§372), on the ultimate consequence of perspectivism (§374), on the homeless 'wanderers' who know how to find stability in instability (§377), and finally, in §382, on the 'alternative ideal' of free spirits, with which they can be prepared to counteract tragedy.

The 41st aphorism (§383) is the 'epilogical farce' (*Nachspiel-Farce*) in which 'the spirit of my book' assumes its independence and, like a ghost over him, the author, swoops down to chase away the 'raven-black music' that *GS* at last gave voice to with the new 'the tragedy begins…'. We must remember that Nietzsche described the fifth book of *GS* as 'Dionysian' in the sense of the Athenian festival of Dionysus, in which three tragedies were followed by a satyr play. The 'mirth' of the fifth book is tragic in that it has limited time before the news of nihilism reaches a wide audience (§343) and the tragedy is unleashed.

Nietzsche refers to middle period as his 'yes-saying' period. Do you think this yes-saying disappears after the this time or is it still an important aspect of Nietzsche's project for the remainder of his philosophical career?

The sense in which 'yes-saying' is meant is itself a problem. For a start, yes-saying and no-saying go together. To say 'yes' only makes sense if we can also say 'no', and in his first aphoristic work Nietzsche said a firm 'no' to metaphysics, morality and the kind of science (*Wissenschaft*) that these give rise to. Furthermore, saying 'no' only makes sense against a background of saying 'yes'. By this time Nietzsche had even learnt to affirm nihilism, and eventually reaches *amor fati*, the all-encompassing affirmative thought. Even when his attacks become more fierce in his later work, yes-saying

does not disappear. Therefore Nietzsche's distinction between yes-saying and no-saying requires more subtle understanding. In *Ecce Homo*, where he uses it emphatically, he also says 'I contradict as nobody has ever contradicted before, and yet in spite of this I am the opposite of a nay-saying spirit' (*EH* 'Destiny' 1). A no-saying spirit habitually says 'no', and says it out of *ressentiment*. Nietzsche says 'no' to *this* no-saying, saying 'no' not *out of ressentiment*, but *to ressentiment*; and therein is he a yes-sayer, and, what is more, a liberating yes-sayer. Nietzsche calls this liberating yes-saying a no-doing. Equally, Nietzsche finishes *BGE*, with which, according to *EH*, the 'no-saying' part of his 'task' began, by sketching a vision of what he calls 'noble' people. And, in the middle of his most aggressive, no-saying work, *The Antichrist*, we see the most yes-saying moment in his writing: his redemptive understanding of the redeeming type, whom, nonetheless, he designates with the word 'idiot'. Nietzsche's entire philosophy, a campaign against the 'spirit of the gravity', and the restrictive and oppressive nature of European metaphysics and morality (or at least this is what he intends), is waged on behalf of yes-saying; he only says 'no' in order to liberate new yes-sayers from their chains. This he does by force after *BGE*.

Thus, in my opinion the boundary should not be taken too seriously, given that the conventional division of Nietzsche's philosophy into three phases is questionable. Nonetheless, and without attending to the distinction between yes-saying and no-saying, I think it very worthwhile to study the aphoristic works, which have for so long been overshadowed by *Z* and the later works, on their own terms. For here Nietzsche experiments in all directions, without committing to certain doctrines, and in so doing is he often at his most exhilarating. We can in turn understand *Z* as an experiment, after limitless explorations in new areas of philosophical thought, in concentrating his thoughts and presenting them as doctrines which can be taught – but still not in Nietzsche's own name; rather, in the parables of Zarathustra. But the teachability of a thought presupposes that it can be transferred from one consciousness to another without corruption, something which Nietzsche finds thoroughly contentious. Therefore, these teachings must be understood as anti-teachings.

What, for you, most prominently differentiates the middle from the later Nietzsche?

This issue of *Pli* clearly states the decisive points in its *call for papers*: the middle period's detachment from metaphysics, a philosophy orientated around the sciences, and the free spirit who is necessary for such a philosophy – if, that is, we are choosing to maintain the division of Nietzsche's philosophy into three periods – and the concentrating and deepening of the new way of thinking in the later period. This new, deeper thinking involves criticising science for its dependence on metaphysics and morality. But to me this appears to be as much an overcoming in motion as a decisive break. Indeed, only *one* break is clear and unequivocal, one that Nietzsche himself names and constantly emphasises: his disengagement with Wagner and Schopenhauer. But his constant emphasis of this should make us suspicious. For when he announces the future 'Dionysian Pessimism' (§370), he holds onto both the Dionysian, which he celebrated in *The Birth of Tragedy*, where he supposed that it would be reborn in Wagner, and pessimism, which here stands for Schopenhauer. When he arrived at his new understanding of both the Dionysian and pessimism, he perhaps wanted to suggest a continuity in his thinking by using the formulation 'Dionysian Pessimism'. This might be the right path, since many interpreters see the whole of Nietzsche already present in *BT* and everything after that as only offering variations on this content. And the significance of the polemical tone to which he inclines in the later work first becomes conspicuous in the 1888 writings. But even here something else appears, something which, for over 20 years, I have called 'Nietzsche's critique of his life's reason'. Just as he previously interrogated Socrates, Plato, Spinoza, Kant and others with his genealogical method, and in so doing asked after the conditions under which they came to express their ground-breaking ideas, he now turns such inquiry upon himself. In this spirit, he asks himself why just he, this Friedrich Nietzsche, gave birth to a thought that he saw as both redemptive and as important to European humanity. In this vein he asks: '*Why* I am so wise', '*Why* I am so clever', '*Why* I write such good books', '*Why* I am destiny' (I emphasise the 'whys'). These questions are neither autobiographical nor megalomaniacal , as a lot of people assume. In *EH*, they are aligned with *amor fati*. 'That you do not want anything to be different, not

forwards, not backwards, not for all eternity,' as Nietzsche writes in *EH* (*EH* 'Clever' 10), is depicted in *AC* as 'a floating existence awash in symbols and incomprehensibilities'; it is the evangelical practice of his Jesus type. Nietzsche thus concludes his philosophy. And this is also the end of his previous struggle. He now knows that he *is* a fate for philosophy, and now need only wait for this to be recognised, whereupon he will become 'born posthumously' as an author. If we are to divide the development of Nietzsche's thought into phases, we cannot stop at three, but in my opinion must instead talk of four phases where each allows us to view the one before in a new light.

Anglophone literature on Nietzsche contains many unsolved interpretive puzzles (What are drives? Is Nietzsche a naturalist? Is he a compatibilist? and so on). What are the German literature's most important puzzles that are still unsolved?

Generally, Continental and, within that, German Nietzsche scholarship, thinks less in terms of 'camps' delineated by 'isms', such as 'naturalism' or 'postmodernism'. It rarely argues for 'positions' with reference to researchers from one or other camp, or re-evaluate them with new arguments. As a result, there are few 'puzzles' regarding, for example, nihilism, naturalism, or perspectivism, with which many could engage and from which a dense discussion could arise – no doubt a very effective and productive form of scholarship. Roughly, Continental Nietzsche scholarship works differently: one approaches problems that one has discovered oneself, not in the name of an 'ism'. One does not choose a camp to which one must ally one's opinions like in a political party. Nietzsche created for his philosophy his own names ('Dionysian Pessimism') and he gave those other names that he adopted ('phenomenalism and perspectivism') his own twist ('the actual ..., as *I* understand it'). Keeping to this European tradition leads to a greater variety and complexity in the themes and styles of interpretation, and, in this way, also fosters creativity. Of course, that does not mean that Continental Nietzsche scholars do not refer to one another, but only that everyone can deal with a different set of puzzles.

Even so, we can delineate some general focal points in Continental scholarship. First, the study of source material has been given more weight

thanks to Montinari and his attempt to organise Nietzsche's thought not only systematically, but also historically. For years, for example, Nietzsche's sources for his knowledge about Spinoza or Dostoyevski, whose ideas he greatly appreciated, were a point of contention, since he never tells us himself. Some scholars let it go at that. However, just because Nietzsche used a source does not necessarily mean he endorsed it. Some, myself included, see in questions of source material study only preliminary questions for potential answers to philosophical problems. For example, for me, Nietzsche left Spinoza unfinished, as an unsolved riddle and, in the end, Nietzsche did not have enough time to read Dostoyevski's most important works. A further example is the magnum opus question: when and why did Nietzsche abandon his much anticipated 'magnum opus', the *Wille zur Macht* [Will to Power] or *Die Umwerthung aller Werthe* [Revaluation of all Values], for which he strived for so long? The answer to this puzzle says much about the character of Nietzsche's philosophising, especially whether or not he aspired to a 'system'. On this side of the English Channel, it is therefore intriguing that in the Anglophone Nietzsche scholarship, which argues so carefully, the compilation *The Will to Power* is used (not by all, of course), when it was in fact fabricated by his sister and Peter Gast out of *Nachlass* material. The fact is, *WP* does not exist as a Nietzsche text. The focal points of Continental Nietzsche scholarship certainly include – besides *Z* —the interpretation of the unpublished text *Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense*, the aphoristic works and especially the later writings from 1888. A further, significant puzzle on which many people work is the meaning of the 'sovereign individual' (*GM* II.2). For the young non-Anglophone European generation of Nietzsche researchers, the motifs of Nietzsche's philosophy become more and more interesting. These include self-referentiality and the paradoxes which can result from it, Nietzsche's style and his many modes of philosophical writing (for instance essays, maxims, aphorisms, speeches like Zarathustra's, dialogues, polemics, poems) and of composing books, and their significance to his philosophy, a theme on which Nietzsche himself often insisted. Here, German-language scholarship has a clear advantage: it can more easily illuminate the linguistic nuances of Nietzsche's philosophy, which always potentially have an intellectual dimension, than can scholarship by those whose mother tongue is not German. Indeed, Nietzsche says of himself: 'I am a nuance' (*EH* 'The

Case of Wagner' 4). This is probably his most dense and precise description of himself.

In my experience, one discovers the 'puzzles' or 'riddles', which Nietzsche himself posed – he called himself a 'guesser of riddles', but was in fact a poser of riddles too – , not so much through comprehensively systematic interpretation as through detailed contextual interpretation of his single texts. These puzzles can be found in the particular position of a certain word or a simple nuance – and what we initially assume to be the natural meaning of an aphorism, what it appears to be saying, can be flipped on its head. Also, Zarathustra's famous teachings of the *Übermensch*, of the will to power, and of the eternal return of the same soon present themselves as riddles. What do they really say? Can one even call them serious philosophy? Whatever the answer, no major philosopher has taken them further. Nietzsche's diagnosis of nihilism is taken far more seriously. Nietzsche also made a riddle of this in his published writings. Most solutions to the problem of nihilism which are discussed are taken from the *Nachlass*. Nietzsche did not publish them, perhaps because he believed that they were not sufficiently well thought out. Heidegger offered a very simple solution to the problem when he made Nietzsche into a metaphysician, one who surpassed all previous metaphysics. But this went completely against how Nietzsche understood himself. I have, therefore, interpreted those teachings in the context of nihilism as anti-teachings, anti-doctrines, and as such they have – much to my surprise – joined together very precisely. Many young Nietzsche scholars, Anglophone and Continental, go along with this, while older colleagues, who have presented alternative interpretations, are understandably hesitant.

I am very reticent to talk about *German* Nietzsche scholarship. My reasons for this: Walter Kaufmann, who was very influential in post-WWII American Nietzsche scholarship, also worked extensively in Germany; Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, who also broke with Heidegger's metaphysical reading of Nietzsche, cooperated closely with Mazzino Montinari; French Nietzsche interpretation lent the German so much suggestive meaning; and the diverse and rigorous Anglophone Nietzsche scholarship, which is so rich in ideas, has had a further and strong influx into German scholarship. Modern Continental Nietzsche scholarship was, from the beginning, very much constructed internationally. Almost all Continental Europeans

speak English, and many French, which they learn in school, but mostly those in the Anglophone world do not read or speak German, French or Italian; you do not find a lot of references to books and articles published in these languages in English-language books and articles. Non-Anglophone Nietzsche scholarship is unfortunately widely ignored in the Anglophone world, and that feeds an ongoing and unfortunate repetitive or double scholarship. But there are of course laudable exceptions, and this interview will hopefully help increase such exceptions. So, we will work on this and should continue working in order to, as we say in German, 'bridge the gap' (*den Gap überwinden*).

– Prof. Werner Stegmaier, 5th November 2013

Translated by David Rowthorn and Matthew Dennis

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Paul Franco: Nietzsche's Enlightenment[1]

Review by Jeffrey Pickernell

In *Nietzsche's Enlightenment*, Paul Franco aims to show us a middle period that is as deserving of attention as Nietzsche's early and late works, a middle period made up of internally coherent books that are not, as the post-structuralists might have it, simply fragmentary or even deliberately calculated to illustrate or argue a radical perspectivalism. Instead, we are told that 'Nietzsche does ultimately have a theory to prove and an axe to grind, albeit a very complicated one' (p. 15). Whilst some attention has been paid to the middle period in recent years since Ruth Abbey first opened it to the English speaking world, Franco's unique and welcome contribution is his thorough developmental account of Nietzsche's thought, his keen sensitivity for the changes in Nietzsche's thinking over the years that separate *Human, All Too Human* and *The Gay Science*. In this context, Franco sets himself in opposition to the deconstructionists Deleuze, Derrida and Kofman who, at least with respect to *HH*, paint Nietzsche's aphorisms as disparate, lacking in interconnections and a shared concern – to the point where what is to be enjoyed in them is exactly the chaos of contradictions in human life and meanings. Franco's project is to bring out the fundamental connectedness of the middle period, and he does an excellent job of showing the key aphorisms that tie Nietzsche's work into a coherent whole, staying close to the texts and providing illuminating citations for his claims, all the while avoiding the danger of straying into simple

[1] Paul Franco, *Nietzsche's Enlightenment: The Free-Spirit Trilogy of the Middle Period* (London: University of Chicago Press, 2011).

exegesis with an admirable dexterity; throughout, his prose is clear and a pleasure to read. *Nietzsche's Enlightenment* begins with an almost biographical historical account of Nietzsche's growing dissatisfaction with German culture after the first Bayreuth Festival, linking his disillusion with Wagner and Schopenhauer to his break from Romanticism and move towards a pro-enlightenment position in the middle period, towards an affinity for the scientific spirit that he formerly decried as lacking the Dionysian power necessary for the healing of culture and society. It ends with a discussion of the period as a whole and the impact that it has had on the themes of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and the later works, having clearly and lucidly shown the intervening progression in Nietzsche's thought.

Following on from Nietzsche's departure from Romanticism after Bayreuth, Franco shows us a Nietzsche who is aligned with the enlightenment project in *HH*. Disappointed with the failure of intoxicating art and music to truly alleviate suffering and advance culture, Franco's Nietzsche turns towards a questioning, open attitude to the world, attempting to see past the apparent origins of custom and morality and being nourished by a new awareness of his apparent instincts' origins in custom and utility, borrowing from the ideas of Spencer, Darwin and Rée to see that our apparently natural thoughts on culture and our care of ourselves and others emerge from utilitarian presuppositions. Our religion, which Schopenhauer would hold to present us with (sublime) truths, can be traced back to an early conception of the world in which nature is infested by spirits or animi, a natural landscape that is wholly numinous and must be entreated and exhorted to yield the conditions of human life. Although this conception is long since superseded, in it we see the origin of religion as attending to our (metaphysical) needs and as being fundamentally aimed at something quite independent of the truth – all religion instead fills some kind of need. Thus we see that the scales drop from Nietzsche's (the free spirit's?) eyes as he adopts the questioning attitude of science and the enlightenment. The cracks that are opened in the Romantic outlook allow us to criticise romantic morality and mores; we see that on the one hand that all action is fundamentally egoistic, connecting back to the 'secret' utilitarian origins of morality – on the other, we are shown a consistent pattern of lightening and blackening of human existence by Romantic-Christian outlooks – they necessarily take away with the right

hand in order precisely to be able to give with the left. These errors are produced because of a lack of critical thinking about the origins of apparent instincts and snap judgements that are actually informed by the defective Romantic-Christian mode of thinking.

Moving forward, *Daybreak*'s work-in-progress title of 'The ploughshare' illustrates the purpose Franco's Nietzsche has in mind as his ideas develop, a universal benefaction as a result of the breaking up of our old moral codes and the presuppositions behind them. Yet this can be a harrowingly painful experience – indeed, to call an experience harrowing is just to liken it to the upheaval of the ploughshare. We are shown the fundamental irrationality of our mores, the chance nature of what is lauded or decried by culture, and find only 'gruesome beasts' in our path as we try to trace our present day morality back to some earlier higher or divine source – our real reasons for having the morality we do have been forgotten, and the ones we do have are post hoc rationalisations which cushion us from the real wellspring of our moral thoughts, such as the confusion of cause and effect by what amounts to an ancient shamanism. Left behind is the notion that the origins of morality were utilitarian, but according to Franco we should not see the book as attacking utilitarians like Reé but instead as being focused on the value of morality. Here we see the first appearance of a fully-fledged concern with the self considered aesthetically; the value of our conducts and the mores we judge them by should be aesthetic, and aimed at the benefit of all. The knowledge-seeking attitude that brings this awareness about does not get any less painful for its contributions to human life, but that just goes to show us that knowledge is a passion as much as love because we are compelled to seek it out despite its painfulness just as the doomed lover is moved to pursue their impossible yearnings. The overall point is that it our passion for knowledge needs must show the lack of value for life in our standard mores; the origins of morality are problematic just as they show us there is no hidden or baseline aesthetic value to our customs, yet simply pointing this out gets us nowhere. It is in *GS* that the texts turn to the practical.

Franco takes the theme of incorporation of knowledge to be central to *GS*, where this incorporation is a process of assimilating it and rendering it useful to human life and endeavours – a process of engaging with it to produce practical results which effect a cultivation of the self along

aesthetic lines. The painful experience of breaking up our preconceptions has not lost its sting by the end of *D*, and so the question becomes how we can incorporate our new knowledge in spite of the pain required to gain it. This problem is doubled by the first appearance of the 'greatest weight', the doctrine of eternal recurrence, the incorporation of which is the most pressing and difficult out of all the revelations given to us by the open attitude and passion for knowledge of the free spirits. Additionally, the death of God represents a watershed, demanding that we incorporate it or face great problems – we are told that 'the same scientific mentality that has led to the de-deification of nature has also led to the complete undermining of Christian morality' (p. 135), and that the vast majority of humanity cannot even comprehend that there is a problem. Nietzsche's madman and herald of God's demise appears mad partly with respect to the incomprehension of the majority, and yet it seems that, through his guilt at the death of God, at being one of the 'murderers of murderers', the one individual closest to incorporating knowledge is still far from successful. Hence the stage is set for *Z*; whether we read *Zarathustra* as an Übermensch or a stop on the road to him, it is his place and not the free spirit's to further the incorporation of knowledge. In the 1886 prefaces, Nietzsche describes the free spirit trilogy as coinciding with a kind of sickness with which was necessary for him to be inoculated so that he could ultimately grow stronger overall; once we pass into *Z* this sickness has gone by, and we can move forward having seen how incorporation of knowledge is possible – setting ourselves positive projects that are not simply the breaking up of the existing order we saw in *HH* and *D*. After all, ploughing the land is not enough to provide us with the food we need – we must sow new seeds and cultivate them, just as the destruction of the old order is a prelude to the 'sowing' of new types of men who can cultivate themselves in the light of the passion for knowledge and its results. In this regard the middle period is, for Franco, one in which Nietzsche becomes the author of his late works, tearing down his earlier association with Romanticism and Dionysian frenzy to clear the path for a solution to the problems of culture.

Franco's keen sensitivity to the texts as a period of evolution in Nietzsche's thought is a boon to Nietzsche scholarship in English, and throughout he connects his reading back to the original texts in a systematic and comprehensive fashion, along with drawing extensively from the *Nachlass*

to make his case compelling. His book is nothing less than tantalising in parts, offering hints at the external influences acting on Nietzsche throughout the period but steadfastly remaining immanent to the texts of the free spirit trilogy. To look at one example, we can see on pp. 142–3 where Franco connects *amor fati* with Emerson's essay on fate and with Nietzsche's admiration for Emerson, but goes no further than highlighting this connection; the discussion of free spirited passion for knowledge and independence of thought dovetails with Emerson's views on self-reliance and the necessity of self-knowledge and the formation of one's own true opinions in a way that demands further study, but Franco merely teases us with such connections. However, this need not be a negative – instead, we can say that Franco's internal developmental account of the middle period invites us to look at how his relation to surrounding influences changed over time, and look forward to the deepening of our understanding this will bring. Not only, then, is this a useful addition to contemporary scholarship, but a call to arms that promises much for the future.

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Frank Chouraqui: Eternity by the Stars (translation of Blanqui's *L'Éternité pars les Astres*[1])

Review by William Knowles McIntire

Frank Chouraqui's translation of Louis-Auguste Blanqui's work *L'Éternité par les Astres* is remarkable in several ways.[2] Chouraqui himself has composed a brilliant introduction that rivals, even surpasses in some respects, the Preface written by Jacques Rancière found in the 2012 edition of *L'Éternité par les Astres* in which Rancière also references Friedrich Nietzsche among others. Walter Benjamin also makes considerable mention of Nietzsche and Blanqui's respective views of eternal recurrence in his *Arcades Project*. Chouraqui refers to all of them in his introduction, as well as of Jorge Luis Borges' own appropriations of the idea, artfully situating Blanqui's work in its historical, philosophical, and literary context.

This is not the first English translation of Blanqui's work, however, although it is the first translation available in book form. The first English translation appeared in *The New Centennial Review* in 2009, of which it

[1] Louis-Auguste Blanqui, *L'Éternité pars Les Astres* (1872; Paris: Les Impressions Nouvelles, 2012).

[2] Page references are to Chouraqui's translation unless otherwise stated. References to Blanqui's original French text will take the following form: (B [page number]). Louis-Auguste Blanqui, *Eternity by the Stars*, trans. Frank Chouraqui (New York: Contra Mundum Press, 2013).

appears Chouraqui had no prior knowledge since he makes no mention of it.[3]

There are several differences to be found between these two translations, usually minuscule or negligible, but at times with meaningful implications. In general, it can be found that Chouraqui's translation is the better of the two owing to these differences. The word-choice is one of the first differences encountered. Anderson's translation of the title 'Eternity *according to* the stars', although not incorrect, gives the impression of a story told by the stars and from which one is removed. This is mistaken. Chouraqui's translation portrays an embodiment of the sidereal universe, where 'Eternity *by* the stars' allows the impression of not only abstract inference, but also the embodiment of the symphony of sidereal elements, a part of the same composition.

It might be beneficial to look at some examples from each translation and the original below for comparison. The examples come from a section in which Blanqui discusses comets.

Blanqui writes: C'est pousser un peu loin le dédain des comètes que de confondre leur nullité avec celle de l'éther, voire même du vide'. (B 52)

Chouraqui's translation: 'Conflating in this way the nullity of the comets with that of the ether or perhaps even of a vacuum is pushing one's disregard for the comets a little far'. (p. 80)

Anderson's translation: 'This carries the disdain for comets a step further by confusing their nullity with the ether's nullity, or even emptiness itself' (A 13).

Anderson might have chosen the best translation of 'vide' into 'emptiness', where Chouraqui's 'vacuum' might be pregnant with unintended meaning. Otherwise, Chouraqui captures the sense of the passage more accurately

[3]References to Anderson's translation will take the form: (A [page number]). Louis-Auguste Blanqui and Matthew Anderson, 'Eternity According to the Stars,' *CR: The New Centennial Review* 9, no. 3 (2009): 3–60, doi:10.1353/ncr.0.0087.

by asserting that the disregard/disdain[4] for comets is *pushed too far*. Anderson thinks this merely *carries* the disregard/disdain *further*, and is thus not without possible justification.

Blanqui writes: 'Ne seraient-ce pas plutôt les captives suppliantes, enchainées depuis des siècles aux barrière de notre atmosphère, et demandant en vain ou la liberté ou l'hospitalité? … ces pale Bohemiennes qui expient si durement leur visite indiscrète à des gens établis'. (B 56)

Anderson remains literally true to Blanqui by retaining 'Bohemiennes' as 'Bohemians', while Chouraqui modifies this into 'gypsy'. Chouraqui's modification is beneficial; it maintains a consistency with the nomadic and metaphorically 'stateless' character of comets that Blanqui identifies, using the broader meaning of 'Bohemienne' that describes nomadic and disenfranchised populations on the outskirts of civil society rather than ethnic Bohemians specifically.

Anderson also mistranslates 'demandent en vain' as 'vainly demanding' (A 16) '*Demander*' does not mean 'to *demand*' in English, but 'to *ask*' for something. Chouraqui more accurately translates it thus: 'begging in vain for liberty or hospitality' (p. 85). '*Begging*' is justified because the comets are previously described by Blanqui as 'captives suppliantes'. And again, Anderson mistranslates 'les barrière de notre atmosphère' into 'our atmosphere's gate' (A 16). Chouraqui, more accurately, translates this as 'the barriers of our atmosphere' (p. 85).[5] In general, it can thus be observed in these few passages that Chouraqui, whilst taking some liberty to better convey Blanqui's meaning and sentiment in places, generally procures translations that remain truer to the original.

Of particular interest to Chouraqui in composing his introduction, this work introduces an idea also found in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche: eternal recurrence. Chouraqui observes that Nietzsche mentions Blanqui 'in the 1883 preparatory *Nachlass* to *Zarathustra*' (p. 25). But, the entry appears to be only a 'reference to the book, leaving it open to debate whether

[4]As for which of these words is more accurate, it can be noted that Blanqui previously writes of the comets being despised (mépris), but here 'disregard' appears logically more consistent in this context.

[5]It might be noted, however, that 'limits' might be a better translation than 'barriers'.

he had read it at all' (p. 25). And while Nietzsche did make mention of Blanqui and *L'Éternité par les Astres*, Chouraqui observes, there is 'no conclusive evidence' about whether or not Nietzsche was influenced by Blanqui's work (p. 25). Still, although the direct acquaintance with Blanqui's work is not certain, the fact that Nietzsche mentioned the work in his *Nachlass* of 1883 sufficiently demonstrates that Nietzsche did know of Blanqui and his work, likely in relation to the idea of eternal recurrence, thus compelling Nietzsche's note. It is more likely that Nietzsche's interest resulted from what Chouraqui asserts is 'One of the many striking intellectual coincidences of the 19th century' (p. 47). Regardless, any Nietzsche scholar would enjoy Blanqui's work not only because of the common theme of eternal recurrence, but most of all because of the differences.

Chouraqui observes some similarities of the ideas of eternal recurrence between Nietzsche and Blanqui implied by the thesis, such that infinity collapses transcendence into immanence (p. 26), for example. But there are more striking differences between their orientations with eternal recurrence.

Nietzsche's use of the idea of eternal recurrence is explicitly philosophical. Blanqui's speculation, on the other hand, is largely scientific. Nonetheless, 'In reading Blanqui', writes Chouraqui, 'it is not for the science', which can be seen as outdated throughout, 'but for reasons that are cultural in the deepest sense' (p. 22). The philosophical or cultural value of Blanqui's work, however, requires some extrapolation and inference on the part of the reader.

Furthermore, Chouraqui observes that eternal recurrence pertains to events for Nietzsche; for Blanqui, the recurrence is materialistic (p. 27), although Blanqui's materialism could imply the mechanistic emergence of events. In a footnote, Chouraqui elaborates on the point that Nietzsche's emphasis was on *temporal* repetition, and 'In a famous *Nachlass* entry written the year following Blanqui's [present work], Nietzsche explicitly declares … that time should not be divided to the infinite, but rather, that it is constituted of 'time-atoms' (p. 33). In other words, both are in a sense atomistic in their thinking, only Blanqui's atomism emphasises *spatial* materiality; Nietzsche's, on the other hand, entertains a *temporal* atomism that is nonetheless compatible with the physicalism of forces and energetics

prevalent in his thought (pp. 26–27).[6] Nietzsche also does not presuppose a spatial infinity of the universe, as does Blanqui, and so his idea of eternal recurrence is temporally weighted – a *repetition* of events – whereas Blanqui's idea of eternal recurrence is spatially weighted – a *replication* of material organisations so that a plethora of worlds might exist simultaneously, some identical, some widely divergent, some with slight modifications.

One of the most significant differences between the two thinkers concerning eternal recurrence concerns *amor fati*. Chouraqui does not explicitly refer to *amor fati*, but his understanding of it, and the importance for Nietzsche of willing one's fate in relation to eternal recurrence, is found throughout his introduction. Chouraqui correctly observes, 'Nietzsche regards the thought of eternal recurrence as a thought whose effect takes place within the body of its subjects, a certain kind of "*incorporation*"' (p. 29, my emphasis). The ability to incorporate all events of one's life depends on a positive relation to them that *amor fati* provides. Furthermore, Chouraqui recognises that the idea of Eternal Recurrence, for Nietzsche, could 'liberate mankind from any phantasy of the afterlife' (p. 31) – any delusion or hinter worldly desire.

In *Z*, Nietzsche writes of eternal recurrence with an aphorism titled 'The heaviest weight' (*GS* 341), examined in Chouraqui's introduction. Here, we are asked to think of the possibility that all that will happen has already happened, the same events occur time and again. This is presented as both inevitable and unavoidable, and Nietzsche sees that only a strong character can will this to be the case. In order to *will* eternal recurrence, *Amor fati* is necessary.

Nietzsche advocates *willing* one's fate rather than tolerating or avoiding it. This is expressed by *amor fati*. In *GS*, Nietzsche writes, 'I want to learn more and more how to see what is necessary in things as what is beautiful in them – thus I will be one of those who make things beautiful. *Amor fati*: let that be my love from now on!' (*GS* 276). And again in *EH* he writes, 'My formula for human greatness is *amor fati*: that you do not want anything to be different, not forwards, not backwards, not for all eternity.

[6] Chouraqui writes that it is debatable whether or not Nietzsche is a materialist, but does make use of thermodynamics. I would argue Nietzsche is a physicalist and not a materialist in any sense of the word.

Not just to tolerate necessity ... but to *love* it' (*EH* 'Clever' 10). *Amor fati* is, while sparsely referred to explicitly, imperative for Nietzsche.

Blanqui, by contrast, does not *will* his fate; he tolerates it. After a number of Blanqui's failed revolutions, *L'Éternité par les Astres* signals that Blanqui had transformed from a man of action into one of 'speculative reflection on missed opportunities' (p. 6). Blanqui's consolation comes from collapsing the distinction between contemplation and action (p. 22), so that Blanqui inhabits alternate worlds where his action is successful and unrelenting. Chouraqui observes, 'Blanqui's hypothesis sounds like a final farewell to revolution', while 'Nietzsche's version stands as the culmination of his own cultural revolution. The socio-cultural meanings attributed by the two men to the thought they share seem fully contrary to each other' (p. 30). Blanqui's hypothesis gives him closure to his revolutionary life, and Nietzsche's hypothesis is an opening up the possibility for transformation; Blanqui resigns himself to retirement, and Nietzsche is most emphatically opposed to it and finds in eternal recurrence a call to action.

In his version of eternal recurrence, 'Blanqui', writes Chouraqui, 'finds that his longing was always satisfied in reality', that what he longs for is 'always already there' (p. 18), somewhere in the great infinite expanse of the universe. In other words, Blanqui finds consolation in eternal recurrence. He tolerates his fate by neutralising, or disavowing, his imprisonment and defeat by imagining his freedom and success on a multiplicity of other worlds. Chouraqui observes that *L'Éternité par les Astres* is a 'desperate plea of the wretched of the earth for being allowed into a whole in which defeat is never final, mistakes can be redeemed, missed opportunities recur, and where the crossroads of history leave no road untraveled' (p. 8). And in a letter to his sister about the present work, Blanqui writes that he means to illustrate that he is no longer a threat to society, and is now 'very remote from political matters and moderate in every way'.[7] Nietzsche, on the other hand, enthusiastically presents himself as a threat to society and the status quo.

The most significant difference between the two thinkers that we learn from Chouraqui's introduction would be this: *amor fati*, if involved in Blanqui's hypothesis, is involved only as the love of a fate that is imagined and

[7]Blanqui, in a letter to his sister, quoted (p. 32).

hinter worldly, thus not how Nietzsche would characterise *amor fati* at all. This work represents Blanqui's attempt to make of fate something that is quite other than his own as a supplicating prisoner, held in contempt like the comets he describes in this speculative composition, imprisoned in the Fort du Taureau.

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Dirk Johnson: Nietzsche's Anti-Darwinism[1]

Review by Thomas Waterton

Dirk Johnson's newest monograph, *Nietzsche's Anti-Darwinism* (*NAD*), presents an adept and original account of the role of Darwinism in Nietzsche's development and thought. Providing detailed insights into the historical and philosophical context of Nietzsche's engagement with Darwin, Johnson shows clearly and persuasively that neither is Nietzsche's philosophy commensurable with Darwin's, nor is his apparent hostility towards Darwin reducible to fundamental misunderstandings. Contrary to such popular conceptions, Johnson's book shows – particularly through its innovative reading of Nietzsche's *The Genealogy of Morals* – that the antagonism between Nietzsche and Darwin is truly philosophical, and that understanding this is of major importance for anyone wishing to understand Nietzsche's philosophy as a whole.

NAD is a book of two halves. The first part is devoted to making clear Darwin's 'pre-eminence' (p. 1) in Nietzsche's philosophical development as a whole, and the second to providing a detailed interpretation of *GM* as first and foremost a theoretical attack on Darwin, and one whose 'arguments only truly make sense and reveal their hidden meanings in their function *as* polemic' (p. 7). In other words, *NAD* presents both a general developmental account of Nietzsche's thought and a more focused exegesis aimed at showing in detail the culmination of this development.

[1] Dirk R. Johnson, *Nietzsche's Anti-Darwinism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

Concerning his first objective, Johnson pulls no punches. Darwin, he writes, 'represented the absolute starting point and unspoken framework for *all* of Nietzsche's subsequent investigations from the middle period on' (p. 3). Furthermore, unlike John Richardson's view in *Nietzsche's New Darwinism* (to which *NAD* is, in part, a response), he does not believe that Nietzsche's disagreements with Darwin are based on fundamental errors.[2] Johnson readily accepts the unlikeliness of Nietzsche having read Darwin first hand, but makes a convincing case for the scholarly accuracy of the sources through which he would have encountered him. From the period of the *Untimely Meditations* onwards, Johnson's Nietzsche is concerned with Darwinism's attempts to describe the natural origins of man's beliefs and interpretative apparatus; he is not concerned with the 'ape-genealogists' who emphasise the evolution of man *qua* physical organism. The developmental story of *NAD* begins with the 'early Darwinism' (p. 15) of Nietzsche's essay on David Strauss and his engagement with the French *moralistes*. Nietzsche's relationship with Darwinism then undergoes a critical transformation in the middle period – a transformation which is particularly visible in his increasing scepticism regarding the altruism-egoism distinction. Darwinism is further and more directly rejected and radicalised in *Z*, concerning which Johnson provides intriguing (if brief) analyses of passages such as the prologue and 'The Convalescent' as revaluations of the notion of 'wills competing in nature' (p. 106). Finally, he provides an insightful exegesis of the explicitly anti-Darwinist passages in Nietzsche's later works (such as *TI* and *AC*), providing a portrait of a Nietzsche whose own thought is defined by a fundamental antagonism with Darwin.

It is in Johnson's discussion of the mature Nietzsche – both in *GM* and elsewhere – that his book really shines. Despite having some appreciation for the value of naturalism due to its role in discrediting philosophical idealism, Johnson's mature Nietzsche is not another 'clear-eyed' (p. 8) naturalist. However, neither is he the 'pure' systematic philosopher found in, to use Johnson's examples, Heidegger's or Deleuze's accounts. The Nietzsche of *NAD* occupies a subtle space between these 'two dominant traditions' (p. 9); he is both positively influenced by and deeply critical of nineteenth-century scientific discourse. This Nietzsche is a 'biological perspectivist'

[2]John Richardson, *Nietzsche's New Darwinism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

(p. 103), concerned with analysing and evaluating the ways that actually existing biological types interpret phenomena without appealing to totalising perspectives, scientific or otherwise. Such a reading is informed by Johnson's understanding of the will to power as natural, interpretative self-affirmation, and his critical adoption of Deleuze's terminology of active and (re)active will. Johnson's understanding the Übermensch and the '*anti*-faith' (p. 72) of the eternal return is derived from this.

While many of Johnson's interpretations of specific texts are original and persuasive, the part of his work likely to be of most scholarly interest is his reading of *GM*, which takes up the entire second half of the book. The subtitle of Nietzsche's text – 'A Polemic' – is taken seriously, with Johnson treating *GM* not as the appearance of a positive genealogical method *à la* Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault, but as a destructive enterprise. The targets of this polemic are the '*Genealogists of Morals*' (p. 88), i.e. Darwin and his followers, who attempt to account for the origins of morality and other cultural practices through evolutionary narratives. Drawing attention to the 'English psychologists' of Nietzsche's preface, Johnson's approach is a refreshing departure both from the simplistic anticlericalism of some naturalist readings, and from the theoretically brilliant but interpretively dubious approach of the aforementioned Deleuzian/Foucaultian school. Also commendable is Johnson's emphasis on *GM*'s structure and holism, with each of the essays standing as a separate prong of a single argument which reaches its culmination in the third essay's conclusion against the Christian asceticism of nineteenth-century science.

GM's first essay, Johnson argues, is concerned with undermining the alleged 'impartiality' of Darwinian conceptions of 'nature' and 'fitness'. This is done through showing that the Darwinist idea of nature – nature as totalised, competitive 'playing field' in which power struggles against power – was itself a (re)active interpretation imposed on the world by weak 'priestly' types unable to endure the active self-affirmation of strong-willed 'aristocratic' types. The second essay attacks what Nietzsche sees as the quasi-teleological narrative linearity of Darwinists' descriptions of morality's origin (for example, in the 'instinctual sympathy' of the *Descent*). Nietzsche, against Darwin, describes two separate but simultaneous histories of morality, the first moving 'almost miraculously' (p. 147) from the practises of punishment and custom to the breeding of a superior sovereign individual,

and the second resulting in 'bad conscience' as a contingent response of one race to their conquest and enslavement by another. Finally, the third essay describes the process by which the (re)active wills of the first two essays took the form of nineteenth-century science, epitomised in (Darwinist) science's status within the most perverse form of the inherently perverse ascetic ideal: the nihilistic will to truth of 'scientific atheism'. Johnson's analysis concludes with an elaboration of what Nietzsche expects from his 'philosophers of the future', who, once liberated from these toxic interpretations, will be able to project will to power affirmatively in the spirit of the Greek *agōn*.

Johnson's reading of *GM* is remarkable in its subtlety and originality. As well as providing a coherent, holistic account, it also gives clear exegesis of many aspects of the text that have been diminished or overlooked by commentators. Among these are his analysis of the notoriously enigmatic opening sections of the second essay, his consistent mindfulness of Nietzsche's psychologism, and his attention to Nietzsche's discussion of an 'honest, unconditional atheism' (p. 199) that goes beyond the will to truth itself – an aspect of the text he shows to have been lost in Kaufmann's translation, which associates it with the 'modern scientific atheism' (p. 198) of the ascetic ideal. Even if one were unsympathetic to its anti-Darwinist orientation, these insights alone would make Johnson's analysis essential reading for any student of *GM*.

Despite this, however, there are some significant flaws with Johnson's analysis – flaws which at times leave the status of its conclusions vague, and at times seemingly unwarranted. Chief among these is Johnson's emphasis on the historical Darwin, whose role is emphasised in Nietzsche's development both above other Darwinists that Nietzsche might have been more aware of (such as Paul Rée), and above the philosophy of an 'ideal' Darwin (i.e. Darwinism). Despite admitting that 'Nietzsche does not appear to have read *The Origin of Species* (1859) or even *The Descent of Man* (1871)' (p. 3), Johnson refers to these and other works by Darwin frequently. This can be excused to a certain extent by his – in themselves persuasive – accounts of the accuracy of Darwin's German reception. However, at times this explanation is not sufficient. For example, Johnson refers in a substantive sense even to the text of Darwin's *Autobiography*, which had only just been released in English at the time of *GM*'s publication. He also occasionally references sections which would have been completely unavailable at Nietzsche's time, such as those which were excised from the *Autobiography*'s original publication by Darwin's wife. For a book which is supposedly concerned with the development and articulation of Nietzsche's philosophy, Johnson's frequent discussion of such passages is confusing at best.

Also confusing is Johnson's lack of attention to the work of other Darwinists that Nietzsche was familiar with. Most glaring among these is *The Origin of Moral Sensations* by Paul Rée, which, despite being explicitly discussed in Nietzsche's preface to *GM*, only receives a single passing reference in the second part of Johnson's book as 'just one single Darwinian hypothesis' (p. 154).[3] This is particularly egregious since Rée's *Origin* discusses several of the main topics of *GM* – for example, punishment and 'innate non-egoism' – which, for Johnson, are included as responses to Darwin's work.

Such objections put Johnson's claim that it is not the case 'that Nietzsche misunderstands specific points of Darwin's arguments' (p. 10) in a different light. For while it is true that, for example, Darwin locates the source of morality in 'instinctual sympathy' in the *Descent*, it would be controversial to imply that similar errors are fundamental to Darwinism *qua* evolutionary theory. Johnson's apparent inclusion of non-developmental claims about Nietzsche's relation to Darwin – that is, claims about their antagonism beyond what Nietzsche could have known – appear to have a straw man as their target. For while it is true that the second essay of *GM* throws doubt on Darwinian 'instinctual sympathy', one would now be hard-pressed to find an evolutionary biologist who accepted such an explanation for morality in the first place. When it strays from the developmental picture, Johnson's account is persuasive but often trivial – sure, Nietzsche provides resources for undermining Darwin, but evolutionary science has been doing the same thing for 150 years. As for his more generally applicable critiques of biological science, they rely on an understanding of biological perspectivism which is shown to be a persuasive reading of Nietzsche, but not one which Johnson argues for in its own right.

Finally, Johnson's 'first objective' – 'to argue for the pre-eminence of Darwin for the development and articulation of Nietzsche's philosophy' (p.

[3] Paul Rée, *The Origin of Moral Sensations*, in *Basic Writings*, ed. and trans. Robin Small, bk. 2 (Chemnitz: Ernst Schmeitzmer, 1877; Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 2003).

1) – risks coming off as too ambitious. While his account of Nietzsche's development and philosophy is internally consistent and generally true to the spirit of Nietzsche's work, it does not rest on a huge amount of textual evidence. Some readers may be left unconvinced that Darwin 'quite simply represented the absolute starting point and unspoken framework for *all* of Nietzsche's subsequent investigations from the middle period on' (p. 3). By insisting that Nietzsche's antagonism with Darwin was primary for his development (rather than simply important), and by turning his relationships with Wagner and Schopenhauer to into mere responses to this 'unspoken framework' without significant engagement with the literature on this topic, Johnson risks distracting his readers from his otherwise excellent scholarly work.

It should be emphasised, however, that when Johnson's book is considered as a whole, his scholarly work is indeed excellent. Despite the aforementioned flaws, the picture of Nietzsche's engagement with Darwin given in *NAD* is a persuasive and illuminating one; the self-described 'main thrust' of his work – 'to point out the *antagonistic* character of their relationship' (p. 1) – is extremely persuasive. Johnson's adept grasp of Nietzsche's style and thought puts a lot of pressure on those who wish to depict Nietzsche's philosophy as commensurable with Darwin's, even if his claims about Darwin's fundamentality for Nietzsche are less convincing. With his subtle and discerning analysis, Johnson has not only set the bar high for future discussions of the role of Darwin in Nietzsche's philosophy, but also provided valuable insights concerning the broader questions of Nietzsche's naturalism and the reading of *GM*. Even in the face of its flaws, *Nietzsche's Anti-Darwinism* is likely to shape these aspects of Nietzsche scholarship for years to come. And, indeed, it deserves to.

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

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